DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 214 680 PS 012 783

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TITLE What "Is" Pro-Family Policy? Proceedings of the Bush Interest Group/Symposium (New Haven, Connecticut, May 18-20, 1981).
INSTITUTION Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. Bush Center in Child Development and Social Policy.
PUB DATE 82
NOTE 222p.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC09 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Conferences; Day Care; Employed Women; *Family Programs; *Federal Aid; *Financial Support; Government Role; *Moral Issues; *Political Issues; *Public Policy
IDENTIFIERS Conservatism; Liberalism; Media Role; *New Right

ABSTRACT

In these proceedings of a May 1981 symposium, the origins of the New Right and its efforts to capture the "pro-family" label for itself are explored. Also addressed is the question of why there are two opposing children's lobbies, one conservative and one more liberal. Special emphasis was placed on the Family Protection Act and on federal budget cutbacks in child and family programs. "Excesses" of liberal style and more substantive factors -- most notably the persistent devaluation of the homemaker and what Alan Crawford called "the systematic sanctification of liberal sexuality" -- were cited as possible explanations for the rise of the New Right pro-family movement. Alternatives to present policies which affect families as well as the question of an appropriate federal role were also explored at the symposium. Policy issues were discussed, such as policies designed to ease the conflict between work and child care, and indirect federal subsidies to families. While participants conveyed the impression that a national family policy might be as undesirable as it appears unachievable, there was a sense that participants should work to bring family issues to the attention of the Reagan administration. A synopsis of the 1981 Family Protection Act, a comparison of the Act with the original Laxalt bill, and a postscript on the current status of some provisions of the Family Protection Act are appended. (Author/RH)

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WHAT IS PRO-FAMILY POLICY?

PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSH INTEREST GROUP/SYMPOSIUM

May 18-20, 1981

Published by:
The Bush Center in Child
Development and Social Policy
Yale University
New Haven, CT 06520

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors would like to thank all the speakers at the conference and participating fellows from the four Bush Centers. We would also like to thank the Bush Foundation for its sponsorship of this interest group as a Bush Network activity.

In addition, the following individuals deserve special thanks: Matia Finn, Lynn Kagan, and Edward Zigler, for their guidance in conceptualizing the interest group; Judith Meyers, Ellen Pinderhughes, Lisa Stone, Esther Rothblum, Sally Pindar, and Edward Blatt (among other Yale Bush fellows), for their help in planning; Susan Shays, for extensive research and planning; and Theresa Glennon, for help with conference logistics.

Also, we would like to thank Louis Margolis and Brad Schwartz for their special presentations on the fate of a proposed Child Health Plan in North Carolina and on supply-side economics, respectively. While these presentations were not taped (and thus were not included in this volume), they contributed much to the discussion at the interest group.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge the provision of supporting documents from the Children's Defense Fund; from Gina Bessey, legislative aide to Sen. Rober W. Jepsen; and from the other Bush Centers.

FOREWORD

When the Bush interest group/symposium, "What is Pro-Family Policy?" met in May 1981 to examine a variety of perspectives on family policy, there was an underlying sense of irony that the term "pro-family policy" had proved slippery at best. President Jimmy Carter first used the phrase "pro-family" in his 1976 campaign to mean such measures as securing welfare law provisions to encourage families to stay together and supporting federally funded day care for employed mothers. By the end of the Carter administration, however, a coalition of New Right groups with a quite different social agenda had claimed the "pro-family" label for itself. Policies once touted as "pro-family" were suddenly declared "anti-family." In the proposed Family Protection Act, which has been called the platform of the New Right pro-family movement, federally funded social services are attacked as intolerable intrusions upon family independence, while public promotion of traditional moral values is advocated as a legitimate federal function to protect families.

Against this backdrop of confusing labels, the first purpose of the symposium was simply to present several positions vying for the "pro-family" label and to meet some of the players in the debate. A secondary, although more ambitious purpose was to find out if there were any areas of common ground among the various positions along the family policy spectrum.

It is also important to state what the symposium was not designed to do. There was no effort to include speakers from all major points of view

on issues affecting the family. None of the speakers spoke primarily from a feminist perspective. Neither was there a Marxist on the roster, or a representative from a religious organization. None of the speakers officially represented the Reagan administration. And although the Children's Defense Fund, represented by Ellen Hoffman, devotes much of its efforts to the protection of minority children, there was no speaker explicitly voicing the concerns of minority families. Finally, the audience, which consisted primarily of Bush fellows and faculty, was heavy on academics, light on professional advocates. As a result, the symposium could be faulted for being too polite; it did not reflect the shrillness of the family policy debate.

Within these confines, symposium participants set about the task of examining perspectives on family policy, with a special emphasis on the New Right pro-family movement. The origins of this pro-family movement were discussed both by those sympathetic to its tenets and by those opposed. There was some agreement that insensitive rhetoric, on the part of child advocates as well as of feminists, has contributed to the rise of the New Right. Using catch-words like "early intervention" and "cadre of child care providers," advocates of federally-supported child care programs have sometimes been their own worst enemies. There was also some recognition that more liberal child advocates have overdone the doomsaying strategy, constantly warning that the family is an endangered species to the point that they have unwittingly prepared the way for the restrictive "family protective" measures they abhor.

In addition to what might be called these excesses of liberal style, substantive factors--most notably the persistent devaluation of the homemaker and what Alan Crawford called "the systematic sanctification

of liberal sexuality"--were cited as possible explanations for the rise of the New Right pro-family movement. Jonathan Rieder presented the New Right pro-family movement as an understandable response to "vast and rapid changes in the morals and mores of the nation that have touched families, schools and communities." Why labor to discover the secret motives behind New Right discontent, he suggested, when the manifest sources of discontent are so compelling?

Alternatives to present policies which affect families were also explored at the symposium. While there was some agreement that, in the words of Lewis Koch, systems designed to help families too often "promote rather than obviate dependency," there was no consensus concerning what the appropriate federal role toward families should be. Connie Marshner, a leader of the Pro-Family Coalition, argued that the federal government should stop usurping the functions of families, because federal efforts to help families only further weaken them. Yet, Marshner did see a more creative or activist role for the federal government in some areas of policy affecting families. For example, she favors using tax laws to encourage more private solutions to social problems and attaching strings to federal funds for education and legal services in order to protect traditional family values. Marshner also said she would consider a differential family wage scale for heads of households so that insufficient finances would not force both parents into the workforce.

Ellen Hoffman, while acknowledging that federal programs have sometimes been inefficient, nonetheless argued that it is important to look at the federal programs that have worked. It is nice rhetoric to speak of turning decisions back to families and localities, she said, but in fact, block grants are destroying many of the mechanisms which have

protected local participation. Similarly, said Hoffman, one must look at the reasons why the federal government got into categorical programs in the first place: as a result of discrimination based on race, geography, sex, or handicap, there has been no choice for many families and children but to rely on federal assistance for such basic needs as food, shelter, education, and health care.

Nathan Glazer appeared to agree with Marshner that the government should stay out of family policy. Too often, social programs have unintended consequences, he said, including the perpetuation of the problem they were supposed to correct. But Glazer, unlike Marshner, felt that the federal government has the least business trying to regulate matters of family morality, such as the rising divorce rate, the increasing rate of illegitimacy, or the legalized practice of abortion. "When we look into what national policy could do about any of these things," said Glazer, "we see the inevitability of irreducible conflicts...We are so frightfully divided over key issues affecting the family [that any active government role is only apt to increase the level of conflict]."

Edward Zigler suggested that there were areas of family policy where liberals and conservatives should be able to agree, primarily in the area of policies designed to ease the conflict between work and child care. For example, he said, conservatives and liberals should agree on the need to help facilitate access to certain services such as school-age day care, flexible work hours, and a six-month paid maternity leave as an alternative to a mother's early return to the workforce. Zigler acknowledged that the role of the federal government might not be to design and run these programs. But, he said, in the discussion following his talk, the federal government is going to be forced to provide some direction to the states,

even if it amounts to no more than facilitating discussion concerning which state approaches seem to work best.

Addressing the question of the appropriate federal role, Robert Moroney suggested that indirect federal subsidies to families may be wiser, and promote less dependency, than targeted programs. Summing up the conference, Moroney said that although he believed that there could be agreement on some particular policies, "a comprehensive family policy is a foolhardy, dangerous, and impossible goal." Family policy should not be seen as a total package, but rather as a series of key issues which affect families.

Despite this underlying sense that a national family policy may be as undesireable as it is unachievable, lobbyists Connie Marshner and Ellen Hoffman were concerned that family issues are not even being considered in much of the current national policy debate. If we could agree on nothing else, said Marshner, perhaps we could agree to work together to bring family issues to the attention of the Reagan administration. Hoffman said that budgets for on-going direct-needs services were being slashed in Washington with little mention of either the New Right's or the liberals' concerns about the family.

The primary function of this interest group/symposium was simply to provide a forum for debate of national policies affecting children and families. In the aftermath of the highly polarized 1980 White House Conference on Families and the cancellation of the national White House Conference on Children in 1981, this was no easy task. Yet, in retrospect, we also have some disappointments about the symposium. Each of the speakers articulately defend his or her position, but there was a tendency to downplay the others' concerns. For example, some speakers tended to

belittle the difficulties in finding suitable day care for children of working parents, thereby making it easy to dismiss any serious discussion of the need for private-public initiatives to help address this problem. Other speakers seemed to treat too lightly the problems of teenage pregnancy, pornographic literature that exploits children, and the trivializing of sexual relationships on television, again making it easier to dismiss any approaches for dealing with these problems except what the individual parent can do. In truth, we suspect that parental difficulties in finding suitable child care arrangements and parental frustrations with an increasing sense of loss of influence over children's lives cut across all political labels. It is unfortunate that inflated rhetoric, or the war of the "buzz" words, has at least temporarily drowned out responsible debate on these issues, which concern a majority of families in this nation.

S.M.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PRESENTERS AND DISCUSSANTS

JONATHAN RIEDER is an assistant professor of sociology at Yale University. His field of interest is American politics and culture, and he is the author of The Trials of Liberalism: The Making of Middle America in Canarsie, 1960-1980, to be published by Harvard University Press in 1982. He is currently doing research on the New Right.

ALAN CRAWFORD is the author of Thunder on the Right. He has worked as a reporter for the Washington Post and was editor-in-chief of a small daily newspaper in West Virginia. Former editor of the New Guard, a magazine for the Young Americans for Freedom, he was also the first assistant editor of Conservative Digest. Mr. Crawford's articles have appeared in the National Review, the Nation, Social Policy, and Inquiry. He wrote speeches for former Senator James L. Buckley and has been press secretary to three Republican congressmen. He is now at work on his second book.

LEWIS Z. KOCH is a broadcast and print journalist. From 1967 to 1972, he was a writer/producer for NBC News in Chicago and produced an awardwinning documentary on the Chicago Democratic Convention of 1968. From 1972 to 1975, he wrote a syndicated column on the problems facing the American family, and one column on child abuse won a first place media award from the Family Service Association of America. Mr. Koch was an editor of the Chicago Journalism Review and a contributing editor for Chicago Magazine. From July 1979 to January 1980, he was public affairs director for the White House Conference on Families. He is the author of numerous articles

on family and marriage and co-author, with his wife Joanne, of The Marriage Savers.

CONNAUGHT (CONNIE) MARSHNER is director of the Family Policy Division of the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation and editor of the Family Protection Report, the key communication link of the pro-family movement. She is chairman of the Pro-Family Coalition, which was organized in relation to the White House Conference on Families, and in this capacity she worked with Phyllis Schlafly to develop a strategy for sending pro-family delegates to the conference. Mrs. Marshner was also instrumental in the formulation of the Family Protection Act, which was introduced in the 96th Congress and which was in the process of revision at the time of this speech. Prior to joining the Free Congress Research Foundation, she worked for the Office of Economic Opportunity, for Congressman Philip Crane, and for the Heritage Foundation. Trained as a teacher, Mrs. Marshner is also an education critic and author of Blackboard Tyranny.

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urban affairs.

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EDWARD ZIGLER is Sterling Professor of Psychology at Yale University, where he also serves as director of the Bush Center in Child Development and Social Policy and as head of the Psychology Section of the Yale Child Study Center. In the 1960s, he was a member of the national planning and steering committee of Head Start and served on Head Start's first national research council. Professor Zigler was responsible for administering the program from 1970-1972 in his capacity as the first director of the Office of Child Development of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. He was also formerly head of the U.S. Children's Bureau. Author of several books and numerous articles in scientific journals and popular periodicals, Professor Zigler's research interests include motivational determinants of children's performance, cognitive development and mental retardation, developmental theory of psychopathology, effects of socio-economic deprivation, and the impact of social action programs on child and family life.

NATHAN GLAZER is a professor of education and sociology at Harvard University and former professor of sociology at the University of California at Berkeley. He has been on the staff of Commentary magazine, an editor

for Doubleday Anchor Books, and an urban sociologist for the Housing and Home Finance Agency in Washington, D.C. Professor Glazer, now well known for his numerous books and monographs, co-authored his first book, The Lonely Crowd (with David Riesman and Reuel Denny), twelve years before he received his PhD. Among his books are: American Judaeism; Beyond the Melting Pot (with Daniel P. Moynihan); Remembering the Answers: Essays on the American Student Revolt; Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (co-edited with Daniel P. Moynihan); Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy; and The Urban Predicament (co-edited with William Gorham).

SUSAN KENT MUENCHOW directs the Media and Social Policy Unit at Yale's Bush Center. Formerly on the staff of the Carnegie Council on Children, she has also been a reporter and survey editor for the Christian Science Monitor in Boston and a researcher in education and religion for Time magazine. A graduate of Stanford University and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, she writes frequently for Parent's magazine and other publications on child development and social policy affecting children and families.

ROBERT MORONEY is director of the doctoral program at the Arizona State University School of Social Work. At the time of the conference, he was professor of social planning in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina, where he was also a faculty member of the Bush Institute for Child and Family Policy. He directed a study evaluating the effects of Medicare and the UAW Health Insurance Program on nursing home utilization. Professor Moroney has also worked for the Office of Planning and Coordination, Office of Administration and Finance in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and for the U.S. Public

Health Service. Since 1977, he has been editor of the Urban and Social Change Review. He is the author of numerous journal articles and chapters on family policy and human services.

SANDRA SCARR has been professor of psychology at Yale University since 1977. Formerly professor at the University of Pennsylvania and at the University of Minnesota, she was also a fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences. Author of numerous journal articles, Professor Scarr's research interests include genetic and environmental influences on intelligence, aptitude, and achievement. She is well known for her studies conducted among families with twins and among families including both biological and adopted children. She is editor of Developmental Psychology and has been an associate editor of the American Psychologist and a consulting editor for Child Development.

At the time of the conference, W. GARY WINGET was a mid-career fellow at the Bush Center at Yale, while on leave from his position as executive director of the Child Care Council in St. Paul, Minnesota. He is also a member of the interim steering committee of the National Campaign for Child Daycare for Working Families. His current child care policy interests include state and federal sliding tax credits for working parents, involving parents in the evaluation of child care services, and long-range child care trends.

WHAT IS THE NEW RIGHT?

Jonathan Rieder

What is the New Right? Simply put, the New Right equals Barry Goldwater plus George Wallace plus computers. Barry Goldwater enters the equation as a symbol of the Sunbelt conservatism which attracted affluent, economically conservative voters of the Southwest to his 1964 campaign. George Wallace is critical, because he has shown a demonstrable appeal to the legions of Southern Baptist and ethnic Catholic workers, many of whom have traditionally been Democrats. And computers are important because the New Right thrives on the electronic wizardry of Richard Viguerie and a host of other political technicians across the land.

Yet, perhaps the equation is overly aphoristic. From a slightly different vantage point, one may describe the New Right as a continuation of the Old Right in its mission to roll back the economic and foreign policy heresies enacted by Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. The New Right has elsewhere been described as a recurring alliance of "avid Cold Warriors, rhetoricians of laissez-faire and proponents of cultural retrenchment." The point is well taken, so long as one adds that the current right brings with it a number of differences.

The first difference, readily apparent in the pro-family movement of the New Right, involves a shift in obsessions. I use the term obsessions in the sense of a concern that passionately grips its holder,

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not in the pejorative clinical meaning. The upheavals of the 1960s gave right-wing protest a cultural emphasis, captured in the phrase "the social issues," and generated a much wider audience for the classic rightist lamentations about the breakdown in the nation's moral fiber. Central to the New Right is its identity as a moral crusade of traditionalists locked in battle with the chic, feminist, and secularist forces of cosmopolitianism which have reshaped American culture in the past generation. The titles of articles in one of their journals, Conservative Digest, suggest some of their concerns: "High Court Ruling Against Ten Commandments in School Forces Secularism on Kids"; "National Council of Churches Plans to Censor Bible Sexism; Trendy Liberalism Runs Amok." The showcase legislation of the Pro-Family Coalition, the Family Protection Act, would forbid curricula in public schools which inculcate values or behavior counter to local community norms, would proscribe the purchase of instructional materials which portray the sexual division of labor in any but the traditional way, and would refuse federal funds to groups or individuals who present homosexuality as an acceptable alternative lifestyle. While the Family Protection Act will undoubtedly undergo modification as it progresses through the labyrinth of Congress, it seems significant that, according to the Congressional Research Service, many of its provisions are constitutionally dubious.

The second difference is one of sensibility. The new generation of rightists does not lack for zealotry. But whatever it owes to the ideological passions of the Goldwater crusade of 1964, the New Right views itself as a pragmatic bunch of zealots. Devotees to a cause, the New Right understands the intricacies of deploying talent. Their organizational skills have been evident in candidate recruitment, in

fundraising activities, in the coordination of a variety of autonomous religious and secular bodies that form their shocktroops -- including the National Conservative Political Action Committee, the rifle lobby, the fundamentalist groups, the Moral Majority, the anti-abortion and Stop ERA cadres. It has aimed these organizational weapons, with great media fanfare, against liberal senators like Bayh, Culver, and McGovern.

The third difference involves a change in the context of American political debate occasioned by the breakdown of the New Deal coalition that sustained so much liberal legislation. Students of the party system have debated whether a political realignment, or simply a de-alignment, has taken place. But whichever position is true, the New Right has gained momentum precisely as the old Democratic coalition has faltered, and it has done so by deliberately appealing to Democrats who feel the party has been captured by a minority, whether racial minorities or their white patrons in the upper-middle classes. To the extent that the Democratic Party has lost its mass base among average working people -- and some would say the party has surrendered its mass base -- the New Right has tried to tempt Southern Baptist workers and ethnic Catholics who once formed a significant part of the Democratic Party in the bygone days when party loyalty remained intact.

As a sociologist of American politics, I want to place this remarkable development of the New Right in the broader framework of theory, in order to give context to the more specific discussions of the Family Protection Act and family policy that will follow over the next two days. It seems to me that two popular visions of the New Right anticipate a more theoretical quarrel. First, is the New Right the latest outburst of authoritarianism, a vengeful protest à la McCarthyism, an uprising which

threatens democracy? Former Senator George McGovern, a target of the New Right, remarked in the Congressional Record, "They call themselves conservative, but their zealotry, self-righteousness and vindictiveness towards those with whom they disagree connotes something radically different from the authentic conservatism of, say, Robert Taft or Senator Goldwater." In contrast, one New Right publicist has described their efforts quite simply as a plan to purge America of a generation of mindless self-indulgence and to revive a failing Judeo-Christian heritage.

Now, before launching that theoretical discussion, let me say a few words about the scope of the New Right and its relationship to the alleged "conservative mandate" of the 1980 election which gave it visibility and political legitimacy. The success of the Right in the political arena is undeniable. It is not quite overstatement to say that Phyllis Schlafly single-handedly stopped the ERA dead in its tracks. The evangelical side of the New Right registered thousands of voters for the presidential election and shepherded them to the polls. It flexed its muscles in House races, perhaps to a lesser extent in Senate races. However, a measure of caution is advisable when assessing the significance of the New Right, especially in light of the considerable fanfare made over their more flamboyant acts by the national media, and considering not only the extravagant claims of their proponents, but also the frequently apocalyptic fears of their detractors. Two caveats seem especially apropos.

First, it is doubtful that the New Right poses the radical threat to customary American politics discerned by some pundits. For the fervor of the New Right conforms to a long-standing tradition of moralistic binges in American life. Every generation or so, seekers after light have arisen to do battle with the forces of darkness. As Seymour Lipset has remarked,

the routine bargaining of the two-party system is complemented by an American tradition of exuberant social movements like prohibition and abolitionism. Such outbursts have occurred with some regularity, flaring brightly and burning out after a few years. Moreover, past moral revivals have usually culminated with a victory of the forces of modernism over the forces of traditionalism.

The second caveat involves the ambiguity of the conservative mandate of 1980. That ambiguity stems from the variousness of the currents in American public opinion and the complexity of the people who swim in them. For one thing, the decline in the vote for most of the incumbent Democratic senators targeted by the New Right was roughly the same as the decline in the vote for incumbent Democrats not targeted by the New Right. To a significant extent, the "sea change" in the American electorate was a familiar phenomenon of a highly unpopular president, who was hardly an unequivocal liberal, taking an entire ticket down with him. An additional aspect of the ambiguity in the 1980 election inheres in the diversity of meanings attached to the words "liberal" and "conservative." For the traditionalists who align themselves around the New Right, and even more so the voters who supported Ronald Reagan, are not unambiguously conservative. Compared to European voters, Americans are notorious for their lack of ideological consistency. A majority of evangelical Protestants hold relatively liberal opinions on economic matters, even while they affirm conservative cultural ideals. Surveys indicate a liberalizing trend among significant segments of the core supporters of conservatism, as measured by acceptance of Social Security and their support for federal health initiatives. What constituted the Reagan mandate was less a principled conservative protest against the idea of

the welfare state than a conservative mood. For the bulk of the public, that mood means a demand that somebody do something about inflation and the lack of direction in American foreign policy. Within this larger swirl of opinion the clientele of the New Right comprises a much smaller though highly vocal market for extreme conservative views.

To describe the New Right is one thing. But to understand it is a bit trickier. In the time remaining, I will present a classic approach to the explication of the right, classic in the sense that it reappears over and over. Then I will present an alternative to the conventional wisdom. Of course, in focusing on the "classic theory," I am intentionally ignoring a variety of important, competing ideas about the New Right's origins.

The classic approach is really an extended family of related theories, which achieve a certain unity in their common use of the metaphor of strain. Right-wing protest, from this perspective, is best seen as a symptom of psychological or social strain, however that is expressed. Like its predecessors of Populism, Goldwater conservatism, or McCarthyism, the current New Right belongs to the genre of status politics, irrationalist protests whose passions separate them from more prosaic concerns, like the pocketbook, which are more amenable to the cutting of deals. The argument goes something like this. Groups which feel insecure in social status or shocked by social change become disoriented. Susceptible to joining frenetic social movements, the dispossessed show the following afflictions: a conspiracy vision of the world, a longing to take revenge against scapegoats, and fantasies of apocalyptic renewal. In Richard Hotstadter's famous -- and some would say infamous -- phrase, status politics is steeped in "paranoid style." According to this theory,

the working classes and the lower middle classes are said to be especially vulnerable to these afflictions because of authoritarian child rearing patterns or because their personalities in some sense require rigidity, authority, and obedience. George McGovern has retrieved Hotstadter's arguments almost word for word: "At the core of the paranoid style of the New Right is the feeling of persecution and victimization: far from feeling all-powerful, the paranoiac in politics tends to regard himself as a righteous innocent, set upon by powerful, wicked and unscrupulous conspirators." Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union, in its reproval of the Moral Majority, argues in a recent newsletter that the so-called family issues really have nothing to do with the family; rather, they are only a symptom of the need for consolation among people who feel threatened by America's unstable global position and domestic economic uncertainty. This sense of insecurity draws people together in a mythic celebration of a mythic past, a mythic traditional family.

In this view -- and this is the important point -- politics is everything but what it appears to be. It is therapy, it is exorcism, it is catharsis, but the issues themselves are incidental. What evidence can be martialed for such a view? Let me mention two or three examples that some commentators have chosen to advance what is basically a psycho-political analysis of the New Right. First, New Right writers often reveal feelings of injured pride and cultural slight. Rightist organs of opinion applaud the values of Main Street against those of Wall Street, the virtues of small-time capitalists of the Sunbelt against the fancy East coast, Ivy League-educated Yankee banking elite. Echoing Phyllis Schlafly's contention that a cabal of Eastern

internationalist liberals until recently controlled the Republican Party, New Rightists today complain that it has been a rich man's club catering to the country club set.

Secondly, one might discern a conspiratorial world view in the rampant, almost exuberant, tendency of the New Right to personalize blame for complex events. Richard Viguerie, whose heroes include Joseph McCarthy, demands in The New Right: We're Ready to Lead, "Who Lost Iran? ...Who crippled the FBI and the CIA? Who's keeping our kids from praying in school?...Who encourages American women to feel they are failures if they want to be wives and mothers?...Who tears apart the family and the community by the forced busing of children...?" The answer in each and every case is liberals, who might be surprised to discover their omnipotence. In Listen America, Jerry Falwell, the head of Moral Majority, describes the International Year of the Child as a socialist plot to destroy the family: "'Child neglect' and 'child abuse' are terms used only to cover the true intention of the proponents of IYC. Only a revival across America will help to get rid of child abuse and child neglect. Not only is the IYC antifamily, but it is anti-God and anti-American as well."

As a third indication of the alleged afflictions of strain, an undercurrent of sadistic punishment is often said to lie close to the surface of New Right diatribes. Paul Weyrich righteously divides the world into a Manichaean struggle between the forces of God and of Satan. The head of a Moral Majority chapter has called for stoning homosexuals to death in accordance with Biblical scripture. Emphasizing the importance of the emotion of revenge among the New Right, Alan Crawford begins one of his chapters in Thunder on the Right with the same quote Peter Viereck used in his 1954 essay on Joseph McCarthy, "The Revolt Against the Elite."

The verse comes from Vachel Lindsay's parody of a young supporter of William Jennings Bryan. Viereck used the poem to make the point that McCarthy followers, like their Populist predecessors, felt slighted by patrician Easterners. In their support of Joseph McCarthy's attacks on State Department dons like Dean Acheson, Irish and Italian Catholics were primarily voicing their working class longings for revenge against Eastern hauteur: "And all the way to frightened Maine the old East heard them call...Prairie avenger, mountain lion, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan...Smashing Plymouth Rock with his boulders from the West."

In this portrayal, then, the New Right remains an irrationalist movement fueled by humiliation and vengeance. The family is simply a symbol for a number of other non-family, non-moral issues by which the average people, who feel abused by the fancy people, may compensate for their humiliation by taking refuge in their superiority over the cosmopolites, the secularists who look down on them.

The image of strain has generated some fine insights into the dark side of American politics. But in its less sophisticated versions, the theory of status politics produces severe distortions. I wish to dwell for a moment on the flaws of the approach rather than its considerable strengths. For one thing, applications of strain theory often have problems of method and data. Many of the fascinating articles compiled in the important volume edited by Daniel Bell in the 1950s, later reissued in the 1960s as The Radical Right, took the form of finely crafted, brilliant speculative essays which lacked the hard empirical edge of numbers. Both statistical and historical analyses of more recent vintage do not support the view that status anxiety or authoritarian personality explain the phenomena in question with sufficient discrimination.

Secondly, the image of strain often proves serviceable as a weapon of attack as well as a neutral attempt to delve into the truth. William Rusher, the publisher of the National Review, anticipated the continuing political uses of the strain model when he called for a New Right party in the mid-1970s. Writing in The Making of the New Majority Party, he beckoned moralistic, militaristic, patriotic Americans to join together. With his customary ascerbic tongue, he predicted that "mass psychoanalysts of the Hofstadter variety will no doubt soon discover and report that it has a powerful appeal for 'rigid' personality types." Rusher's main gripe contained more than a partisan jab at his enemies. In recent history, the language of therapeutic science has often been a way to neutralize political opponents. Strain theory was targeted against the New Left in the 1960s. Some partisans of a psychoanalytic bent argued that the politics of young radicals was a form of acting out, the expression of oedipal jealousy through political psychodrama, a revolt of sons against the fathers. The stigma of crankery served to sustain a narrow consensus of acceptable belief and to invalidate controversial opinions, from either the left or the right, that might disrupt a moderate conventional wisdom.

The political misuse of social science points to a third weakness in the strain model. Failing to understand that politics involves more than matters of pocketbook, some variants of strain theory are reductionistic to the extreme. Citizens who mobilize to protect the family, or to preserve an individual's right to abortion, are not ranters because they refuse to split the difference. Leo Rubuffo has made a similar point in The Nation, warning leftists they need "to recognize that deeply held, often esoteric beliefs about 'divine revelation' or 'original sin' are not invariably masks for resentment." The New Right's belief that

fundamentalist values are accorded a diminished quotient of respect reflects a keen perception of the decline in the status of cultural tradition. Unless one holds to an unyielding materialist view of human beings in which tangible rewards form the only inducement to political participation, to fight back in defense of those traditions seems a reasonable response.

A simple example clarifies the above points. One New Rightist has complained that a textbook entitled Human Sexuality advises children that because parents are old-fashioned and narrow-minded about moral values, the home is the worst place to learn about sex. Here the Right is accurately identifying a political fight to control the certification of appropriate morality and cosmology. Connie Marshner writes in Blackboard Tyranny that "parents object to interference with the inner thoughts of their children; they object to intrusive questions about home and family; they distrust soul-searching between or among students; they do not want their children's values 'clarified' by the schools." The struggle over the contents of pedagogy involves the state, the schools, and the family in a complicated adversary relationship which progressive education cannot easily dismiss. Teachers, sex educators, and social scientists have vested interests in keeping a professional monopoly over the definition of reality. Sociolinguists have argued for a long time that teachers are often the carriers of alien speech and moral codes, especially in minority neighborhoods. Values clarification courses which encourage the criticism of received dogma, often justified by structuralist notions of enlightened moral reasoning, do represent an intrusion of experts into the locale and do undermine the cultural monopoly enforced by parents. One may applaud the extension of

"enlightenment," or one may decry it, but the sociological analysis that informs the Right's vision has considerable merit. In their understanding of the power plays that accompany progressive education, the New Right has finally attained an understanding that feminists and leftist critics of the therapeutic state and professional expertise have been offering for a generation. There is a politics of private life. There is a politics of family life. The sphere of intimate life is not immune from political matters. The fact that the awareness now dawns on the Right does not undermine the larger truth; the difference between leftists and rightists in the specifics of their family politics does not threaten that truth either.

In sum, vast and rapid changes in the morals and mores of the nation have touched families, the schools, and communities. Such an awareness returns us to a focus on the substance of rightist complaint as well as on the style of complaining. One has to be a good deal less nimble exegetically than a Hofstadter seeking to discover the secret motives behind discontent, because the manifest sources of the discontent are so compelling.

These reflections on the "authenticity" of cultural conflict bring us to a contrary view of the New Right. Because I am running out of time, I shall quickly sketch this alternative view, which might be called "the New Right as political culture." Quite simply, Yankee abolitionism, Jewish liberalism, and Italian-American "shrewdness" -- rather than being psychological phenomena -- represent the moral and political heritage of distinct subcultures. As analyses of ethnic voting patterns and beliefs indicate, such teachings are drummed into children by their parents over the generations. Jews are not more liberal than non-Jews simply because their personalities contain less of that elusive substance called

authoritarianism. Jews are more liberal in significant respects because the teachers of their culture intervene, both consciously and unconsciously, to implant warnings about the dangers of racist crusades and to stress the sanctity of tolerance. The stability of Yankee social liberalism in the Republican, economically conservative New England strongholds that remained impervious to the Goldwater appeal in 1964 underlines the same point. The dynamic also explains the cultural fundamentalism of the New Right. Because of the limitations of time, I shall postpone discussion of the Catholic fraction of the traditionalist alliance.

The attitudes of the Protestant audience of the New Right reflect an indigenous folk culture originally rooted in small towns and the countryside of the Midwest and the South. Michael Miles, in his The Odyssey of the American Right, has characterized one of the cultural streams associated with right-wing Protestant Republicanism: "There was a culture of Americanism just as there was a politics of Americanism. Both culture and politics emerged from the milieu of provincial Republicanism -- from Main Street...'Individualism' was valued as the expression of business initiative; it did not imply a mandate to explore the hidden places of the soul. Conformity and Individualism were not contradictory but the symmetrical expression of Puritan enterprise."

Since my time has expired, let me conclude with one final thought. The pro-family movement of today and the Protestant revivals of the past share a number of features in common. Both the historic and geographic roots of the current New Right coincide with those of previous crusades against evolution, gambling, immigration, Catholics, Sunday baseball, and the saloon. Each of these loomed large as the anti-God, and anti-

family, villains of their day. One student of American cultural history describes the plight of the evangelical Protestant of the 1920s, for whom "the 1920s meant 'modernism,' and 'modernism' among other things meant the waning of church influence, particularly over younger people, the breakdown of parental control, the discarding of the old-fashioned moral code in favor of a freer or 'looser' personal one, which manifested itself in such activities as purchasing and drinking contraband liquor, participating in ultra-frank conversations between the sexes, wearing skirts close to the knees, engaging in various extreme forms of dancing in smoke-filled roadhouses, and petting in parked cars." Prohibition involved a fight between the defensive cadres of an abstemious Protestant culture against its hedonistic and cosmopolitan rivals. The organizational format of the revivalistic crusade against alcohol also resembles that of the current New Right. Temperance forces animated the fundamentalist congregations whose ministers gave space to anti-drinking sermons after the church service. In just one year, in the state of Ohio alone, prohibitionists raised two million dollars to defeat wet candidates through "political action committees" operating outside the party system. In closing, then, the pro-family movement expresses the renewal of the timeless struggle of tradition against the incursions of modernism. The concerns of the rank and file of the New Right originate less in irrationalist psyches than in vexing issues of cultural equity, domination, and influence created by pluralistic societies.

THE RANCOROUS NEW RIGHT:

FLIP SIDE OF RADICAL FEMINISM

Alan Crawford

On the notion of family policy I think I must share that determination that Benjamin D'Israeli expressed when he said, "How enemies would triumph were we to retire from the stage." I don't know how many of you have read my book, Thunder on the Right, but a good deal of my enemies now include some of the "high-muckamucks" and "high-muckamuck-esses" of the New Right, which by the way is their term, not mine. I think it has a certain usefulness beyond being a convenient hook, as one right-wing reviewer put it, "on which for Crawford to hang his petulance."

The New Right, properly defined, certainly does exist. Some of its representatives have been in rare form lately. Just in the last few weeks we've seen Phyllis Schlafly, for example, tell the members of the Senate's Labor and Human Resources Committee that virtuous women are seldom accosted by unwelcome sexual propositions, familiarities, obscene talk, or profane language--which only tells me that for all of Phyllis' galavanting about, she seems never to walk by construction sites. Sexual harassment in the workplace only occurs, she has also said, when a non-virtuous woman gives off language which invites sexual advances but chooses to give her favors to man A and not to man B, and he tries to get his share, too.

Then, of course, we witness Senator Jeremiah Denton, who once, I

understand, pondered the execution of adulterers, and introduced some legislation to appropriate $40 million to promote teenage chastity. Denton wasn't very specific about how this was to be done, but he did say that the administrators of funded community centers would be encouraged to find ways to spend money, a phrase that Dave Stockman's going to love, to promote self-discipline and chastity and other positive family-centered approaches to reduce adolescent pregnancy. I guess we're going to have to find out someday whether promiscuity and adultery are the same thing, and whether Senator Denton wants to string everybody up or just to gas them. Whatever the case, this looks like it's going to be a long legislative session, but not without a glimmer of hope. The New Right, after all, prides itself on coalitionism. So it is not beyond imagining that someday Schlafly and Denton are going to team up and put together legislation which might tell us who is and who is not virtuous, which lists might then be turned over to prospective employers.

It doesn't surprise me one bit, really, that outside of campaigns and the world of direct mail, the New Right has proven itself to be hopeless amateurs, and that in a way spells relief. Their social issue legislative package, which Jonathan Rieder mentioned, is Senator Laxalt's Family Protection Plan. And it may be a measure of the New Right's political savvy that it was recently denounced, by no less a conservative than James J. Kilpatrick, as "preposterous, misbegotten, hopeless and legislatively speaking, so much junk." This isn't, however, to suggest that the New Right doesn't bear watching. Just because these people haven't been able to get their act together on Capitol Hill does not mean they don't represent considerable pestilence in the body politic, and that their anger hasn't touched a very sensitive nerve throughout the

country. Whatever else you may say, these guys don't mince words. Of all the letters they manage to send out, my own favorite is one from Christian Voice, which speaks directly to the concerns that bring us here today. I quote: "This letter will make you angry, but I'm going to tell the truth about militant gays, liberal educators, cruel atheists, and godless politicians. Dear Friends, I am rushing you this urgent letter because the children in your neighborhood are in danger. How would you feel if tomorrow your child was taught by a practicing homosexual, was bused 20 to 30 miles away to school every morning, was forced to attend classes in a school where all religion was banned? If you think this could never happen, you are in for a shock."

The rest of the letter, signed by the Rev. Robert G. Grant, said that the drive for homosexual rights, busing, the ban on school prayer, and other actions are just a fraction of a master plan to destroy everything that is good and moral here in America. This master plan, the letter goes on, is being orchestrated by godless militant gays, liberal educators, and vicious atheists.

Christian Voice, of course, is only one of a number of the New Right political lobbies whose idea of religious service, it seems to me, is praying to God for the forgiveness of the sins of everyone else. The rest of their time appears to be spent raising money and defeating candidates for public office that they don't like. In this effort, of course, they are working closely with more straightforward lobbies like NCPAC. It is their shared strategy, in the words of columnist Pat Buchanan, to conduct siege warfare with the rest of the country, "to declare war on the Congress, to seek out, not avoid, political conflict with liberals of both parties," to engage in what Buchanan calls

"confrontation politics." Their intention, as Kevin Phillips has written, is to build a cultural siege cannon out of the populace steel of Idaho, Mississippi, and working-class Milwaukee and then blast the Eastern liberal establishment to ideo-institutional smithereens. This well-heeled group of direct mail fundraisers, media consultants, and TV evangelists who succeeded last November in knocking out five identified anti-family U.S. Senators is striking evidence, I think, of the growing sophistication of the New Right which is light years more advanced than what John P. Roche once called the "Flaky Right," of the John Birch Society type. And it owes that advancement to the rise of technicians skilled at turning the post-Watergate campaign finance reforms to their own benefit. As Roche wrote in the New Leader back then, the menace from the Right was in the early 60s "a mythical bogey, a vapor of the perfervid liberal imagination, with no real understanding of or serious interest in American politics beyond the level of theater." In any list of realistic dangers, the former ADA president said, fear of the radical right would rank 23rd between fear of being eaten by piranha and fear of college presidents.

Richard J. Whalen made much the same point when he wrote in 1974 that it might also be said that conservatism gave ground in the 1950s and 1960s "in spite of efforts to organize." The movement of organized conservative groups, he wrote, "was long on self-appointed leaders who were egotists, dogmatists, hucksters, and eccentrics all engaged in a childish sandbox politics and being very noisy about it." Others are decidedly more effective now but still noisy. They are so noisy, in fact, so as to suggest sometimes that they were the only force in the growing conservative community today, an impression that they like very much to leave. Certainly, they are powerful in a crude and, I think, temporary

sort of way because of their ability to raise huge sums of money not primarily from the fat cat industrialists, but from millions of small donors in the hinterlands through direct mail. The evangelists are powerful, too, because of their ability to reach and reinforce those same donors who have turned out to be very effective grassroots workers. My personal favorite is the Schlafly Eagle from Missouri who raised $2,000 for the cause, the proceeds from the sale of 450 coconut layer cakes that she whipped up in two months of non-stop baking.

Pure unadulterated zeal accounts for a lot of this clout. One political tactics newsletter purports that the zealous participant multiplies his minority status through activism. The National Right to Life Committee in 1979 studied its own membership and found that more than 70% of those interviewed had voted in the primary of the general election the year before, and another 50% kicked in $25 to $50 to at least one pro-life candidate. Fifty-five percent had said they would vote against the candidate solely on the issue of right to life, even if they agreed with him on virtually every other important issue in the race. More than 35% were prepared, they said, to cross party lines to vote for a candidate who opposes abortion. In times of low voter turnout, this was very significant. Maurice Rosenblatt of the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate says that the nation may be losing the votes of the broadly concerned citizen, leaving the field to those motivated by narrow, parochial and emotional interests.

The New Right represents the minority of voters and, I believe, a minority of Republican party members, and even a minority of voters who supported Reagan in 1980 -- though I keep reading in esteemed journals like the Village Voice that the election of the President signifies that

the jackboots will be storming up the steps any minute. What people like Jim Ridgeway, a friend of mine by the way, don't realize is that Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, and others didn't even support Reagan in 1980, having announced four years before that the Republican party could no longer function as a vessel of conservative values. I tend to agree with George Will that Reagan's election meant a number of things, but mainly it reflected the search by the American people for a better set of economic numbers. The New Right has failed to secure a single cabinet post for its leaders. And to whatever extent the GOP platform on which Reagan ran coincided with the policy recommendations of the New Right on abortion and ERA, for example, those policy recommendations prevailed only because of broad-based support within the party generally and, judging from the size of the Reagan landslide, that was a significant portion of the population.

It is important to understand, then, that the Reagan victory was less a victory of harsh rhetoric of the rancorous New Right than a victory of the President's amiable personality, the dismal record of his predecessor, and the emerging within Republican circles of the new, responsible, and in some ways very mature policy-oriented conservatism -- that of such diverse figures as Milton Friedman, Irving Kristol, Jack Kemp, George Gilder, David Stockman, Dick Lugar, magazines like the Public Interest and The American Spectator, and a number of gadfly columnists like Art Laffer and Thomas Sowell. This is a group of conservative office holders, theorists, and spokesmen who have been effecting what The Washington Post has called an intellectual revolution within American politics by accepting the legitimacy of the popular expectations raised by FDR but at the same time rejecting policy approaches that have done

little to fulfill those expectations but a great deal to create a large and inhuman bureaucratic state, effective only in inflating the money supply and waging war. That the New Right enjoys at best an uneasy and suspicious relationship with this group is significant, but probably understandable.

The last thing that the New Right seems to want is boring respectability, which leaders like Terry Dolan believe is purchased at great price. And so they view with extreme caution anyone so respectable as a neoconservative college professor. They do not, therefore, look with too much enthusiasm at a group more interested in disseminating ideas and pondering policies than rounding up votes -- these "chiefs without Indians," as Kevin Phillips has called them, people he identified with the following characteristics:

(1) disproportionately eastern, even New York city origins;

(2) close identification with the intelligentsia and with publications such as Commentary and Public Interest;

(3) strong anti-populism and lack of grass-roots political organization or interest;

(4) disproportionately Jewish antecedents and a strong support of Israel;

(5) previous identification with the Democratic party;

(6) support for elitist, internationalist institutionalists outside of conservatism rather than the Populist or nationalist variety;

(7) longterm "insider" involvement in Washington affairs.

All of which means that the New Right is not only alienated from the mainstream of American life, -- as alienated, I suspect, as some of those tough-nosed big spending liberals that it targeted for political

extermination -- but also that it has become alienated even from many people in America who share its worries about the drift of the society's economic and foreign policy, and, yes, its fears about the future of the family.

Thus, could Meg Greenfield write in Newsweek recently of the growing right-wing reaction on social issues and note as well the existence of vast numbers of people sympathetic with the dream who are merely reacting in what she called "predictable, normal, and valid ways to various terrible features of modern life." What Greenfield was interested in, however, as she put it, was that "in a way we asked for it -- we being the mild, moderate, and liberal majority that has been roosting near the center of the nation's politics for years," in short, the eastern liberal establishment against which the New Right is concentrating its fire. But what else could liberals expect but that a revolt against the nature of public school textbooks would be triggered when a survey of the books taken out of the West Virginia schools, and I quote here an article in the Nation magazine, "revealed that white working class parents from coal fields and southern mountains do have legitimate grounds for complaint. The editing reflects a value system that runs counter to most of what they cherish. The supplementary books, in particular, play out the alienation felt by urban intellectuals and university militants of 1960 who seemed, to the protestors, to have taken over the publishing houses of New York. Some of the selections were unpatriotic, sacrilegious, and pro-minorities, and they would, as the parents predicted, legitimize different values and raise heretofore taboo questions. Equally important was the almost total exclusion of people like themselves from the multi-cultural texts. The editors had not thought that coal miners, or country folk, or Appalachians,

or working people were either distinguishable groups or important enough to include. Paradoxically, the boards against a broadened English curriculum had shifted the spectrum away from the majority of citizens in the country."

However hysterical Phyllis Schlafly may be, some of the blame for her rise to prominence has to go to her radical opponents. When Kate Millet, for example, says that "the family as that term is presently understood, has got to go," or when Gloria Steinem announces that she favors a revolution and not just reform, you can expect a backlash will result. Betty Friedan likes to remind her audiences that only 17% of households in America have a father as a wage earner, the mother as a homemaker, and one or more resident children. It happens to suggest two things. First, that the movement of housewives for whom Schlafly speaks is hardly representative of the society as a whole. But it also suggests that the American family is changing and rapidly enough to worry a lot of people who kind of like things as they are.

What has amazed me about public outrage over the New Right is the apparent ignorance on the part of some of its liberal critics that reactionaries rise in reaction to something, usually through affronts which are very real and grievances that are usually somewhat legitimate. This is not, of course, to condone reaction, but merely to point out that the New Right has created no resentments out of thin air and is only exploiting ones that have been simmering for some time. I was particularly struck by this the other evening in Washington while I was tuned in to one of those call-in radio shows in which the host, who was a feminist, and her guest, who was a feminist, were bemoaning the plight of other feminists in the Reagan administration. When the caller, who

identified herself as a feminist, angrily demanded to know, "Why are we talking about women's issues at 1:00 A.M. on a Sunday morning, when Phyllis Schlafly gets prime time whenever she wants it?", only a sense of professionalism stopped me from picking up the telephone and getting into the fray. What I wanted to say is that Phyllis Schlafly only became prime time by leading something of a counter revolution against the movement of feminists, who had enjoyed being prime time for almost a decade before the New Right ever existed. And where has this woman been in the last ten years? I can personally recall no time in recent history in which Gloria Steinem, Eleanor Smeal, Kate Millet, and Bella Abzug were not themselves prime time. And it was only by exploiting the outrage of those whose values these feminists offended that Phyllis Schlafly got where she is today.

In essence, I think Christopher Lasch is correct when he writes in The New Radicalism in America that one begins to understand feminism only when he sees the feminist impulse as an aspect of a more general development, the revolt of intellectuals against the middle class. And it is this revolt the New Right is reacting against, the revolt that has spread throughout this society and embodies what William Irwin Thompson has called the civil war between the upper and lower and immigrant American middle class. In his history of the American Right since World War II [The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, since 1945] George H. Nash suggests the extent to which traditional working-class Americans have felt shut out of the system with their values ignored. The political significance of this becomes clear when he notes that a series of Supreme Court decisions aroused not just conservative intellectuals, but broad segments of the populace which right wingers could now, at long last,

cultivate. These include the policemen and law enforcement officials enraged by court decisions which protected the rights of criminals; millions of Americans who did not understand why the rights of atheists should prevent the voluntary reading of the Lord's Prayer and the Bible in public schools; Americans angry about the permissiveness in the court rulings on pornography; and anti-communists alarmed at the court's continual blows at congressional investigations and cold war legislation. Today, these same Americans are alarmed with the rulings that teenage girls need not have their parents' permission to receive birth control devices or to get an abortion.

And it did not escape the attention of the New Right that President Carter's White House Conference on Families was dominated by what they believe were forces that, far from protecting the family, were working to destroy it. The Coalition for the Conference, which included the National Gay Task Force, for example, urged that the government avoid stereotypical notions of the family and recognize, affirm, and provide for input from the wide diversity of family styles represented by our pluralistic society, a recommendation immediately interpreted, by middle Americans who got wind of it, as sanctioning same-sex marriage. According to The New Republic, every state that participated was required to develop an affirmative action plan to insure that representatives of diverse family forms participate, and the conference makeup, except for the noisy New Right contingent, was about as diverse as that of the Democratic National Convention of last year, which meant that the pigment was properly mixed but the attitudes were not. The New York State delegation was probably typical: 23% were childless, 50% had graduate degrees, and the overwhelming majority of the delegates were

employed by social service organizations, representatives of the helping professions, that is, whose own desire for political power Lasch has noted.

Now it is my own suspicion that these two warring groups of Americans within American society, or those most concerned with the status of women and the future of the family, are flip sides of the same record, two different responses to the increasing fragmentation of our private lives that now takes place within the American home. We would be seriously mistaken if we viewed this conflict as one of paranoid, insecure, neurotic reactionaries, arrayed against healthy, forward looking, well-adjusted professors. If Lasch sees feminism as an aspect of the decade's oldest revolt of intellectuals against middle-class values, Herbert Hendin in the Age of Sensation has upped the ante. He argues that the rise of determination on the part of young women today to pursue careers outside the home represents, at least in part, the desire of an increasing number of women to seek personal fulfillment in the professional world of work precisely because they feel totally incapable of carrying on successful and satisfactory personal relationships based on intimacy and trust. He argues that they see marriage and motherhood as a fatal trap to be avoided at all costs. Work to them provides a barrier against need and a definitive weapon against their own inability to deal with the increasingly difficult nature of human relationships.

My own suspicion, too, is that the New Right's equally hysterical defense of the world views depicted by the old "Ozzie and Harriet" show represents a frantic rear-guard defense of what they must know in their heart of hearts no longer exists for them and probably never did. This may be what makes the New Right sort of pathetic, but it makes it probably more dangerous than it otherwise might be. The New Right is following

that well-established pattern, referred to by Jonathan Rieder, of a declining group in society that seeks to re-establish, through formal political means, vestigial values already lost in the society as a whole. And I do not mean in any way to make light of this, but I think it tells us a good deal about what we need to know that according to last Tuesday's Wall Street Journal, there is a big brouhaha going on down in Monroe, Lousiana, where residents of that piney woods, Bible Belt town are falling all over each other to subscribe to a cable TV channel that shows dirty movies. This has caused considerable consternation to the preachers down there, and it probably ought to cause considerable dismay to the New Right organizers, too, for the latter have always operated on the premise that there exists out there, in the sticks, a new majority of Americans who deplore the current direction of the society and will rise up in rebellion to restore what Jerry Falwell calls the Judeo-Christian values. Drive to any small town in America and you'll find a dirty movie house, rolling papers behind the counter at the drug store, and, at the local college, an infirmary that issues birth control pills to the coeds. That, I think, is about all we need to know.

The evidence is that the New Right, in its present state of development, remains largely a social protest movement and a direct mail fund-raising operation for the benefit of its Washington-based leaders. They're only now beginning to learn that the business of public policy is something more complicated than the making of mailing lists and the ability to inflame the passions of lower-middle-class types. One would be seriously mistaken, however, to assume that it does not consequently threaten, or that it has ceased to threaten, the orderly processes of

American political life, or that it may not some day find the charismatic insurgence that Kevin Phillips says that it seeks. If, by that time, American liberals continue to foist onto the most traditional elements in American society public policies which violate their most deeply held moral values, the very real social anxieties the New Right has successfully exploited may boil over. It shall depend less, perhaps, on what its leaders do than on the opportunities presented to them by the new class of liberals. The liberals are not helping themselves, I would add, by disdaining with their own peculiar provincialism what E. L. Doctorow recently referred to in the self-same Nation as the "soul-murdering complacency of our provinces," which, after all, represents the hearth and the home of the New Right. Such attitudes only fuel the resentments, and the liberals are learning now that the hayseeds and hardhats are not nearly so complacent as they would like to believe. But if liberals persist, finally, in viewing all conservatives, or self-described conservatives, as alike, they won't be able to recognize the real danger if and when it arrives.

I would stress, too, that in viewing the growing militance of the New Right and its network of religious and political lobbies, we should never fail to bear in mind that this development is a symptom as well as a cause, a symptom of the alarming fragmentation of American political life. That fragmentation represents a far greater threat to the public than any manifestation of it. Finally, there are others who probably could have responded to the resulting anxieties and argued the case more elegantly than Phillis Schlafly or Jerry Falwell. But when responsible leaders don't respond, then less responsible ones will, and the society finds itself confronted with the Schlaflys, the Anita Bryants, and the

Jerry Falwells -- a fact which may tell us more about the condition of leadership in America than it does about the demagogues. In times like these I'm increasingly inclined to believe that the demagogues may be the least at fault.

THE NEW RIGHT: RESPONSE TO

AN UNEMPATHIC BUREAUCRACY

Lewis Z. Koch, Discussant

I would be one of the first to herald a standard for journalists, and for many academics as well, based on the adversary model. The first and primary obligation for these two groups would be the presumption of disbelief. Second would be a maintenance of continued suspicion, even of one's own findings. Examples of this type of journalism would be Woodward and Bernstein on Watergate and Seymour Hersh on My Lai. But there is a different, more suspect type of journalism -- advocacy journalism. Advocacy journalism, like advocacy scholarship, comes dangerously close to propaganda.

"Who, what, where, and when?" are the questions journalists and academics presume to answer by using investigative and adversarial techniques. To answer the question "why?" however, demands another quality -- the quality of empathy. First things first: to be sure, I am interested in the who, what, where and when of instances like Watergate and My Lai. Later I want to know why. Yet the techniques of hard, close investigation and those of empathy are not antithetical. In journalism, I offer the names of Norman Mailer, David Halberstam, Tom Wolfe, the early Gay Talese, and Garry Wills. In the social sciences, there are David Riesman, Robert Coles, and Tom Cottle, just to name a few.

For a moment, perhaps two, Alan Crawford departs from the strictly

adversarial model of journalism when he explores the New Right pro-family movement in Thunder on the Right. Citing the 1971 work of a political scientist discussing the phenomenon of the Goldwater and Wallace supporters, there is the suggestion that both these movements came about, at least in part, as a response to feelings that society had withdrawn its approval from the values the group upheld. But that point, especially as it referred to the 1964 Goldwater convention, had been empathically and brilliantly made only a few months after the convention, by a man of the left, Norman Mailer. Mailer understood that many of those who were Goldwater's most devoted followers had chosen that direction because the main thrust of the Republican party, as well as the rest of the nation, appeared to denigrate the very values they held most dear.

At another point in his book, Crawford labels the political coalescing of the New Right as "the vengeful rear-guard actions of Americans who feel dispossessed or overlooked." And then Crawford tentatively allows as how some of these Americans "may have legitimate grievances." Yet Crawford, a man of the right, like the vast majority of his counterparts on the left, fails to be empathic. Crawford is comfortable dismissing, rather than discussing; he is wrathful rather than empathically responsive. Empathy does not mean agreement, but rather the ability to understand.

The failure to understand, to be empathic, is driven home in Crawford's subtitle to his book: The Politics of Resentment. The 331 pages of the book are replete with facts -- so and so believed this, so and so wrote that. Yet we are never allowed to examine motives. We are surfeited with facts and yet, I believe, the sensitive reader is left unsatisfied. Resentment is a state of feeling, but we are never

permitted into the worlds that triggered that state.

In short, Crawford has presented us with a world without empathy.

Why is empathy so important? With only the slightest change for clarity's sake, let me use the words of psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut: "Empathy is accepting. It is a confirming and understanding echo evoked by the self. Empathy is a psychological nutriment without which human life, as we know it and cherish it, could not be sustained."

Note, please, that nowhere is the word or idea of "agreement" used in connection with the concept of empathy.

The New Right pro-family movement is one quite understandable response to an American society that has become increasingly polarized and unempathic. Earlier in the century, empathic informal groups that truly aided children and families existed. But that concept has been transmogrified into unempathic governmental and bureaucratic systems that can, far too often, hurt children and families. Rigid rules and regulations are substituted for human responsiveness. Departments are created to meet our temporary needs dependency. Those who have failed to "cut it" in our society are judged by those who <u>appear</u> to have succeeded, in the third person -- "them" -- just as Kafka's Gregor Sampsa, after he found himself turned into a bug, was referred to in third person by his wife and daughter.

Our society has substituted the concept of dependency for empathy. And we have developed systems for dependency that psychiatrist Williard Gaylin has described as "infantalizing adults": welfare and the courts, to name two such systems. And try, if you will, to imagine those moments when you were a young child and you believed your mother and father were the absolutest, most powerful, wonderful god-like person who could or would exist. And then, try to imagine that at that

very moment, for reasons you could never understand, your father and mother were grossly humiliated, made weak, helpless, almost child-like right in front of your eyes. Who can calculate the psychic damage of turning adults into children -- the damage to parent as well as to child. Thanks to a static, unempathic public policy, we hook parents on the narcotic of dependency so that they wait, childlike, for the next fix, and the next, and the next. And then we have the termerity to disapprovingly wonder at their dependency. That any political group, right or left, could view that kind of world without resentment, would be a wonder.

Let me hasten to note here that there are, indeed, very real instances when all of us are in need of that narcotic of dependency. It would be the height of madness to undergo a needed operation without a narcotic. But we also know that the narcotic should be withdrawn as soon as it is physiologically and psychologically possible. But we have built, continue to build, and plan to build edifices of and for dependency, edifices that promote rather than obviate dependency.

Within the child-and-family systems developed over the past one hundred years, one can find numerous individual instances of real and specific help. But it seems to me that the New Right pro-family people, as well as a small but not insignificant group on the left, have seized upon the essential interventionist truth in their evaluation of those systems. One can find a very specific example of that truth contained in a recent report written by the School of Social Service at the University of Chicago.

First, according to the report which studied children in the state of Illinois (The State of the Child, by Mark Testa and Fred Wulczyn, 1980), "there appears to have been no discernable improvement over the last

decade in the poverty status of children in the state" -- this, despite hundreds of programs and millions of dollars expended.

A second factor in the declining viability of the poverty family is what the report calls a dramatic increase in the number of children living with one parent. Though the reasons for this increase are complicated, we are faced with the inescapable fact that there has been a substantial movement away from the optimal situation of a loving mother and father caring for a loved child.

Third, indicators of youth's condition, such as teenage suicide, drug use, truancy and vandalism, juvenile crime, school dropouts and suspensions, together with employment and unemployment, suggest rather conclusively that a significant and sizeable number of youth are alienated from themselves, from the law, and from those institutions designed to affect them most significantly: family, school, and work.

And finally, the report states that there is a strong -- "inescapable" is the word the report uses -- connection between the indicators and race.

The first and perhaps most difficult challenge for this symposium will be to develop models for helping families that are not interventionist in nature, models based on what families themselves want, not what others believe families ought to want. The challenge for those on the left will be to finally admit what they know in their hearts is true, that the centralized, non-kinship systems they have developed and operated under for the past one hundred years are essentially bankrupt. This does not mean the idea of helping children and families is bankrupt. Only that the systems designed to accomplish that end have failed.

The second challenge, as I see it, will be for those on the left

to hold in check their reflex rejection of suggestions by the right. Long ago, the left progressives staked out children and family saving as their "turf." The most natural response is to dismiss any alternative suggestions by those on the right. One can only view with a jaundiced eye the left's ability to champion the cause of an infinitesimal number of our society while turning their back on those equally in need whose numbers are substantial. It does not have to be a zero sum game, where helping one kind of family automatically means one will never be able to help another kind of family.

The third and final challenge this group will have to deal with is the very nature of the systems developed to help families. What those on the political left side of the issue of pro-family policy ignore is the impersonal juggernaut of the bureaucracy. And I include in my umbrella use of the word "bureaucracy" not only governmental workers on the federal, state, county and city level, but also the bureaucracy of the so-called "helping professional" as well: the social worker, the teacher, the psychologist, and the home economist.

As Max Weber pointed out in his essay "bureaucracy," (Essays in Sociology, 1946), the fully developed bureaucracy works under the principle of sine ira ac studio -- without scorn or bias. "Its specific nature," Weber wrote, "which is welcomed by capitalism (and I might personally add, by socialism and communism to an even greater extent) develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue."

Thus, the very nature of the family policy bureaucracy operates in

exact contradiction to the natural needs of families. Every family constructs its own rules -- passionate, subtle, artful, canny, acute, sensible -- and, yes, irrational to the outsider, but still in service of the family. But viewed objectively by an unloving, unempathic outsider those rules appear to contain the basic elements of anarchy. The basic, basic element of family is love -- a completely irrational commitment, based on faith and trust, a system that is anathema to the secular rationalism of the bureaucracy under which bureaucracy must operate.

As Richard Rubinstein has so brilliantly pointed out in his work, The Cunning of History, no laws were broken during the Holocaust. The managers and technicians of violence operated under precise bureaucratic rules. The Stalinoid bureaucrats and those who followed also operated under the same precise, bureaucratically administered rules. The gulags, the mental hospitals function exactly under Weber's injunction of sine ira ac studio -- without scorn or bias.

I would argue that the violence families and family members are subjected to in the United States, subjected to by our own bureaucracies, are, in fact, not aberrations but rather rational manifestations of contemporary bureaucracy.

Whenever there is a scandal -- be it a wretched Willowbrook, or the ignominy of the adoption process, or the meanness of nursing homes (and nursing homes are the most bureaucratically regulated industry in the United States) -- the premise argued by the left is that the system is benign. There are always excuses -- not enough money, incompetent administrations, the stupidity or cupidity of superintendents or uncaring supervisors.

The time has come, however, when we can no longer excuse the inherent

defects of the bureaucracy.

I find myself in agreement with the words of Gilbert Steiner in his just published book, the Futility of Family Policy: "I am impatient with the entrepreneurs of family policy, finding it a concept without a clear content; suspicious of politicians, bureaucrats, or scholars who participate in the movement without pinpointing its objectives; and doubtful whether family policy, no matter if described as comprehensive or partial, implicit or explicit, is a useful or practical theme. Its sloganeers might more profitably concentrate on health, education, and welfare programs to serve children in need or older Americans."

To that end, I think it is important to examine two of the most important volumes in setting out family policy, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, and Before the Best Interests of the Child, by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit. (I think it says a good deal about what went wrong with the White House Conference on Families that, while I was on the staff, I heard one of the inexperienced "powers-that-was" -- who had "read" in the area of children and families -- summarily dismiss Al Solnit as too "traditional.") I hope we will keep both of these volumes in mind over the next two days, for they caution us not to get embroiled -- and perhaps this is my greatest worry for this conference -- in a hopeless debate about the means by which we can achieve the best of all possible worlds for children and families. As Solnit and his colleagues so eloquently explain, the "best of all possible worlds" is beyond our grasp. With a mature understanding of the nature of limits and of imperfectability, the authors of these two volumes advise us that we have to learn to tolerate and deal with ambiguity.

The law, as Solnit and his co-authors understand, "is incapable of

effectively managing, except in a very gross sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between parents and child." The same would hold true, I would argue, for family policy bureaucrats and family life professionals. They cannot, I repeat, "effectively manage, except in a very gross sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between parent and child." The authors also understand that "parents should generally be entitled to raise their children as they think best, free of state interference," but that when state interference is called for, it is to be used "minimally" with the goal being to "create or re-create a family life for the child as quickly as possible."

But my reading of the law, as well as my familiarity with the ideals and goals of most family policy planners and professionals leads me to the conclusion that the recommendations of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have largely been ignored. The courts, as well as the children and family professionals, appear to hunger to interfere with family matters. Maximum, rather than minimum, state intrusion and interference with family life seems to be the thrust of those on the left. There are also elements on the right which appear to advocate maximum state interference as well.

It is my contention that the insights, as well as the specific recommendations, offered in both Beyond and Before the Best Interests of the Child should have had an extraordinary effect on the entire family policy establishment -- from Cabinet Office Secretaries through social service secretaries. While a minority of those in judiciary offices appear to have adopted some of the recommendations, the overwhelming majority of those in the children and family area have either ignored or bitterly opposed the thrust of those two books.

We are faced with asking the question -- why has this happened? I would like to offer one possible answer. If one defines maturity as the ability to tolerate ambiguity, then Beyond and Before the Best Interests of the Child epitomize maturity. The best of all possible worlds is not obtainable, therefore we must try to do the best we can, realizing our inability to achieve it all. Perfection is beyond our grasp.

But it has been my experience over the past decade, in meeting hundreds upon hundreds of men and women all over the country involved with the children and families -- in the fields of law, psychology, sociology, social work and education -- that the vast majority of these people cannot tolerate or deal with ambiguity.

Let me use the term "experts" as an umbrella for these family professionals. These experts have developed unrealistic ideals, grandiose visions, if you will, of how children and families should behave. These unrealistic ideals match the experts' equally unrealistic vision of their own abilities to manipulate and control reality. These experts express a belief system not unlike that of the young child: "If I do this, the most important and powerful persons in my reality, my parents, will do that. If I do that, then my parents will do this. See how much fun it is to control reality."

In an optimum situation, the young child will receive minimum doses of frustrations. The child will see that he or she cannot always control or manipulate. And if the frustrations are neither too great nor too small, the child will grow to adulthood, able to separate ideals from reality.

But the vast majority of experts that I have met, in person or

through their writings, refuse to accept the fact they cannot control and manipulate. In fact, when these experts are confronted with that realistic possibility, they fly into a rage. Why, they demand to know, can't I do it all? It is not unlike a child's tantrum, a kind of narcissistic rage. Their grandiose sense of self-esteem has been threatened.

I would suggest that the two books, Before and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, are like arrows that wound the self-esteem of the experts. These books confront the experts with the possibility that their grandiose visions of perfection for children and families may not and should not be realized, that in fact, these grandiose visions have often worked to the harm of children and families. And because the experts' self-esteem has been wounded, they react with rage. And in this case, because the rage is somewhat civilized, it takes the form of ignoring or bitterly opposing the recommendations in these two books, even if they should be in service, truly in service of children and families.

I have leaned heavily on the psychological reasons why I believe the works of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have been largely ignored. I am aware that there are political as well as economic reasons as well. But to leave the psychological element out of the analysis is to miss a significant part of the answer.

This morning I finished reading the manuscript of an extraordinary book that should -- I repeat, should -- have a profound effect on all of us as we try to conceptualize what is happening to the American family and what (traces of hubris?) we should do about it.

The book, not yet published, is entitled Middletown Families--Fifty Years of Change and Continuity, by University of Virginia sociologist Theodore Caplow, with a 60-page chapter on "American Families During the

20th Century," written by perhaps the most respected name in the field, Reuben Hill.

The book is a continuation of the work of the late Robert and Helen Lynd, authors of the famous Middletown (1929) and Middletown in Transition (1935). Caplow and his researchers went back to Muncie, Indiana in 1977 and 1979, armed with more than fifty years of data from the Lynds. What Caplow found in Muncie -- and what Reuben Hill argues is replicated throughout the rest of the nation -- will astonish those who believe the American nuclear family is dead or dying. Briefly, here are just a few of the findings.

The American marriage is alive and well. Ninety-five percent of husbands and wives in Muncie, Indiana report they are "satisfied" with their marriages.[1]

Contrary to U.S. Census figures, the status of marriage in Muncie over the past fifty years indicates little change in the rate of divorce. In 1930, 47 marriages per 100 ended in divorce; in 1975, the number was 51. There is strong, if not conclusive, evidence that the U.S. Census figures for divorce nationwide in the 1920s and 30s were underestimated by 50% or more.[2]

1 - Editors' note: Based on questions asked a sample of married respondents in Caplow's research group. Fifty-seven percent said they were "very satisfied," and 38 percent were "satisfied." The other choices were "neutral" or "dissatisfied." When asked to rate the marriages of their friends, nearly all respondents thought their own marriages were better than those of their friends. Other circumstances of the interviews, such as place and whether couples were interviewed separately or apart are not noted.

2 - Editors' note: Caplow reports that the discrepancy between figures taken from Muncie's local and circuit court records and U.S. Census figures on divorces in Muncie is as follows: Federal Census Bureau figures fall 17% below Muncie's in 1925, 8% in 1928, and 19% in 1929. Figures for the entire nation are likely to have been influenced by "incomplete and slipshod" methods of obtaining statistics.

Middletown has become a place where the experience of the present generation resembles the experience of the past generation and will likely mirror the experience of the next generation. Aside from the fact that 50% of married wormen are now working outside the home, one cannot find the dramatic effects stemming from the women's liberation movement that the popular media contends. In fact, the liberation of women from solely homemaking and child-rearing duties began around 1935, in Muncie, and has been progressing steadily since then.

The most dramatic change occurred to the family from 1890 to 1920 -- from child labor to prolonged education, from hand-powered work to machine powered home, from an enclosed community to an open community.

Despite the major stressful events of the 20th Century -- namely, World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, the Korean conflict, and the civil disorder associated with Vietnam and civil rights -- the family remains nuclear, intergenerational and extraordinarily stable.

There has been little change in family behavior -- only in acceptable norms. Men and women today wish to marry and to have two or three children, despite the fact that they know divorce is a possibility.

According to the authors, there are three strong anti-family policies now in existence: 1) the tax on marriage, 2) bounties for the production of babies out of wedlock, and 3) the systematic promotion of adolescent sexuality.

The book Middletown Families, to be published next year, I feel, offers one conclusive, optimistic insight: in spite of everything family policy planners have done to the contrary -- the American family is alive, well, and -- yes -- thriving.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION I: ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN "RIGHT" AND "LEFT"

Much of this discussion underscored the difficulties in defining the terms "right" and "left," much less finding areas of agreement between the two elusive groups or labels.

One participant objected to what she called LEWIS Z. KOCH'S equation of "social service professionals" with "the left," adding that she doubted "either group would be very flattered by your associating the two." Koch replied that he would rename the political bias of social service professionals "progressive" rather than "leftist."

EDWARD ZIGLER then asked ALAN CRAWFORD, "What, in your own estimation, is the possibility of rapprochement between [conservatives and liberals on child policy issues]?"

Crawford replied that in the higher echelons of the two lobbies, there is little chance of rapprochement, because "they have a vested interest in not cooperating with each other....The last place [new ideas] will come from," he said, "is from people who have a vested interest in things as they are." In terms of finding a common ideology, he said, "I just see nothing but continued public dissension, but that's probably more a reflection of my own aberrant mind than of reality.... As a conservative, I guess I just don't see social problems resolving themselves. Things just get worse and worse."

When asked to explain the differences between his branch of conservatism and the pro-family movement, and what different solutions conservatism has to offer for the problems facing the American family, Crawford quipped, "Well, my branch includes maybe two other people." He said he was against intervention in these areas by federal government. Seeking further elaboration of what Crawford considered a "conservative" approach to a specific family problem, someone asked, "Where do you stand on teenage pregnancy?"

"I'm against it," Crawford replied. However, he further stated that he was concerned, along with members of the New Right, about "the systematic sanctification of liberal sexuality." But, he added, he believes that problems concerning teenage sexuality "probably are so deeply cultural that they transcend political solutions." He is comfortable neither with a Congressional committee meeting to determine "when the sperm meets the egg," nor with any legislative recommendations arising from such a study. "That's a bit presumptuous," Crawford said. The only recommendation he has is for "benign neglect."

Views of democratic procedure

JONATHAN RIEDER proposed that one of the ways traditional conservatives draw distinctions between themselves and the New Right is in their substantially different views of democratic procedure. The New Right believes they can discover and formulate the will of the majority, he said, and that once this will is formulated, "they can then impose that moral doctrine upon the rest of the people without protecting certain minority guarantees,...which violates the true conservative understanding of individual liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution."

As an example, he cited one provision of the Family Protection Act

which would make it illegal to spend federal funds on, or grant use of public property to, any individual who "advocates homosexuality as an acceptable alternative lifestyle." Rieder said that this provision clearly illustrates the notion that the state has a role to enforce some majority's morality on others. But even if the New Right and conservatives agree on the "focus of authority," Rieder said, they disagree on the procedural limits of the authority, and he suggested that one important issue to pursue during the conference "is [some] understanding of procedures."

One participant suggested the following analysis: that "the instrumentality of government should not...be used either to effectuate liberal ideals and impose them on the conservatives,...or [to effectuate] conservative ideals and [to impose the] conservative view of morality on the non-acquiescing liberals in the country." Could a possible point of agreement be that government should be neutral in any matter that involves individual morality and "matters within the home"?

Rieder replied that it might be a point of rapprochement between some conservative and liberal political leaders; however, based on the legislation they propose, he said, "it's not clear that the New Right... is willing to preserve the sanctity of individual determination within feminist, homosexual, and certain other kinds of families."

The welfare system as a federal intruder

Koch, turning the discussion away from procedures back to substantive issues, suggested that the left and the pro-family movement should be able to agree that the welfare system is too intrusive. To provide income supports to families in need, Koch said he "would do away with all new [needs] tests in the welfare bureaucracy and instead allow

anybody...who wants a check to write in and get it." Koch conceded that there would be abuses, but he said he could accept that, adding that he thought the "Pro-family people would accept it, too," especially "if we eliminate the kind of policies that urge or push a father out of the house."

One speaker agreed that the concept of a non-intrusive income support system -- such as a children's allowance -- does indeed find favor among neo-conservatives, such as David Riesman. The speaker added that some provisions of the Family Protection Act [which call for an additional $1,000 tax exemption for the year in which a child is either born or adopted] also appear in keeping with the philosophy of a children's allowance unencumbered by a "needs" test. So perhaps, indeed, the speaker said, "this is one possible area of agreement" between liberals, conservatives, and the New Right.

Decentralization and the participatory ethos

Another area of possible agreement between the left and the right, Rieder said, is in their respective criticisms of the tyranny or monopoly of the professionals. The phrase "professional dominance," which he says appears in Marshner's book Blackboard Tyranny, repeats many of the left's criticisms "of the monopoly of skills claimed by the professional educational establishment....Part of the positive influence that I see in the New Right, which is also very much part of the participatory ethos of the left, is that parents should take control of their own lives, over their own schools." People may disagree about the measures to express that participatory impulse, Rieder said, but "there is certainly some agreement that parents should reject the escalating dependence on the expertise of the helping professions."

Crawford agreed that left and right could come together from their

common "decentralist bias," but "that breaks down a little bit when the boom in small, neighborhood-run private schools across this country is immediately and automatically denounced as racist by the left." He said he would like to see "a little more open-mindedness" on the part of the left.

There seems to be some confusion, Rieder said, between the terms "liberal" and "left," and there is a distinction between the two. By "left," Rieder said he was specifically talking about the "non-liberal left." Rieder agreed with Crawford that much of the criticism directed against the New Right, Christian schools, and "many other features of local participatory democracies" can be described as "cultural condescension."

THE PRO-FAMILY MOVEMENT AND TRADITIONAL VALUES

Connaught Marshner

I'm not a scholar and I don't have any pretensions of being a scholar. You should know that straight off. What I am, basically, is an activist who is dedicated to making things happen in Washington. Recently the things that I have been working on have been the reconceptualizations of relationships between government and family. In the event that I should happen to take a position supporting or opposing legislation or candidates, I should make it clear that I am not representing the Free Congress Foundation. I'm representing Connie Marshner.

During all the discussion yesterday on the New Right, back and forth, I was having a series of identity crises sitting there listening. First, Alan Crawford was telling me that I was a neurotic offscouring of the politics of stress. Then I felt much better when Jonathan Rieder concluded that I was just part of political culture. I felt reassured.

I think it's true that when you get into discussions of families--as when you get into discussions of education, which is a sub-area--the liberal/conservative labels just don't work, because they have no reference points. The kind of terminology I prefer, that I think has some reference points, is traditionalists vs. modernists--or progressives, or something along that line. I'll specify later what I mean by tradition, but I think that kind of sketchy word may be more useful for our purposes.

I do want to say, just because of the talk about it already, a couple of words of what I believe the New Right is, and how it's different from the Old Right. I think the New Right is different from the Old Right above all in that it wants to be effective, it wants to do things. The Old Right, from the Taft types to the William Buckley, Jr. types, were content to debate the fine points of any given issue, and they would sit back and wring their hands and say, "Oh, my, isn't it terrible how the nation's going to hell in a handbasket?" And they had sketched out all the fine points, but they weren't doing anything about it. I think the New Right is dedicated to making things happen. We are using every avenue of citizen action the Constitution has provided for. And yes, that makes us unpopular. And yes, we get criticized for that. And yes, we get accused of all sorts of outrageous things. But what we are doing is using the political system designed by the Constitution to channel citizens' concerns. We're doing it, and we are having results from doing it, and if people don't like that, that's too bad.

The New Right is different from the Old Right, also, in the sense of social justice that it has, the sense of social responsibility. We are not dedicated to the advancement of big corporations. You will probably find as many criticisms coming from the New Right of the major corporations and all of the big Wall Street types as you will from anywhere else. I suppose part of the reason for that is the blue collar origins of many of the New Right leaders. We do believe in free enterprise as the best system for advancement of human potential, but not in corporate socialism and not in corporate monopolies either. We do believe in national defense, but we don't salivate every time the Pentagon rings a bell. There are plenty of conservative New Right

leaders who have great skepticism about the Pentagon and about what it asks for, and we recognize that it is as big a bureaucracy as anything else, subject to the same flaws. But national defense is not what we're talking about here.

I think the New Right is also different from the Old Right or from conservatism, in the usual sense of the word, in our emphasis on traditional moral values. The pro-family movement, of course, is especially noted for this. But up until the emergence of the New Right, say in the last five years, we didn't hear those issues being discussed. They were not exactly high on the priority list of the Republican party. I think that what emphasis exists now in the GOP comes from the New Right.

Now, let me go into a little bit about what the pro-family movement is. I think that there's a perception that the pro-family movement is sort of a small band of demagogues who are out there manufacturing public dissent and then exploiting it. Well, that is not true. We are not manufacturing any dissent. Let me just cite you a few Gallup polls from a few years back. In 1977, there was a Gallup poll that found that 25% of the public wanted tougher local standards on the sale of pornography at that time. In 1979, a Gallup poll for the Princeton Religious Research Center asked people's views on abortion. It found that 22% of the population was in favor of legal abortion under all circumstances, and that 19% of the population was opposed to legal abortion under all circumstances. Now in between those two extremes, there was quite a vast middle, and 54% supported legal abortion under certain circumstances. When asked further, "What circumstances?" seventy-eight percent said, "When the life of the woman is in danger." So, there you have 19% opposing abortion under all circumstances, and then you have a considerable proportion

opposing it, except to save the life of the mother, which is not exactly a far-out position. A 1980 Gallup poll done for the White House Conference on Families found that 79% of the public wants sex education and birth control taught only if parents specifically consent to the courses. In 1980 also, another poll found that 76% of the public answered yes on the question of whether they favored a constitutional amendment to permit prayers to be said in public schools.

Now, all of those issues are controversial. The New Right did not take prayers out of the public schools. The New Right did not put sex education in the public schools. The New Right did not create pornography. These are not issues that we have created. This is not dissent that we have somehow gone out there and manufactured. These problems are out there in the real world, and I bring this out to make it clear that those problems exist independently of the New Right and to refute the charge that we manufacture situations here.

A very interesting article by George Gallup in the April/May Public Opinion says that, "according to our definition, about one-fourth (23%) of the total adult population could be considered part of the Christian Right." The "our," of course, refers to Gallup's definition. Gallup thinks the figure is higher than actuality, because he included in his figure people who counted themselves as moderately right as well as far right in getting his sample group. Well, I've got news for him. Many people who work with, support, and follow the leadership of the pro-family movement/religious right--whatever you want to call it--don't even consider themselves "right" at all. There are many people who believe and support everything we're working for who don't consider themselves "right." There are also plenty who don't even consider themselves Christian.

The fact that the religious publishing industry is growing at the rate of 15% a year should tell us something about what the public is reading and what they want. Maybe a few other industries in the last ten years have been growing at the rate of 15% a year--maybe the microcomputers--but I can't think of any others that are growing at that rate. That says something about the thinking of the people of this land, what they're looking for, and what kinds of things they are interested in.

Even more stunning, there was, about a month ago, a study put out by Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance. They only conducted a survey to find out the values of the 80s to help them sell life insurance. And their results startled them, and I found them very, very interesting. They did a fairly large sample, and asked questions of the general public as well as of leadership groups. They randomly selected leaders from eight different areas of public opinion--education, law and justice, political leaders--and they asked them all a series of questions. They did all the usual demographic run-downs and figured out your age, your sex, your race, whether you were rich or poor, urban or rural--all the usual demographic indicators. They also had a scale designed to measure intensity of religious feelings. They had eight indicators, and they asked the people, "Do you do the following things, often, sometimes, never, (whatever)?" The eight indicators were such things as going to church, feeling that God loves you, praying, encouraging other people to go to church, listening to religious broadcasts, and a couple of other things. And they asked people all these eight indicators. Now, usually when you see surveys that are trying to cross-tabulate religious intensity with other characteristics, they ask if you go to church and how often you go to church. But this measured a lot more than that, a much broader range

of religious feelings. And then the people who had said, "yes, often," on all eight of them were labeled as highly religious. And this survey concluded that, based upon the proportion of their survey sample of the people who identified themselves as intensely religious, they figured that there were probably 45 million Americans between the ages of 48 and 65 who are intensely religious.

The fascinating thing about what they did with this study was that they asked these people all the usual political questions--the war in Vietnam, various economic questions, freedom of speech, freedom of press, all the usual political questions--and they found out that on the traditional political questions they could not predict where you would come down on those issues. The women and the men weren't so different, the rich and the poor weren't so different, the whites and the blacks weren't so different, the urban and rural weren't so different. All the things they had been expecting to find, all the traditional political truths, simply weren't there. People were not reacting as they were expected to react. The traditional political issues, in other words, were obsolete. What they did find, and they were surprised to find it (and I think they were displeased, judging by the tone of their report) --they found "that moral issues had become the leading political issues." That's their terminology. Now what did they consider as moral issues? They asked pretty straight questions throughout, by the way. A straight list: abortion, homosexuality, lesbianism, smoking marijuana, sex before the age of 16, living with someone of the opposite sex, adultery, pornographic movies, hard drugs, and sex between two single people. Pretty straightforward, uncluttered moral issues. On these issues, they found that there was an enormous gap between the views of the public

and the views of the leaders. Take the issue of homosexuality: 71% of the public felt the practice was morally wrong; 42% of the leaders felt it was wrong. Take hard drugs: 84% of the public felt that was wrong, but only 73% of the leaders agreed that it was wrong. And that figure breaks down in a very interesting way. They broke down the leadership into the religious leaders, business leaders, voluntary associations, education, science, government, military, news media, and law and justice. When you get down to law and justice, only 58% of them felt that hard drugs were morally wrong. Now doesn't that suggest part of the reason why we have a conflict, why we have citizens who are begging for something to be done about the drug problem and courts that don't seem to be able to carry through anything or get something done about it? Pornographic movies: of the general public, 68% thought those were wrong, but of the law and justice group, only 41%. So when you have a set of standards determining whether or not you have pornographic movies in your neighborhood as determined by your local courts, if only 41% of your local judges think that there's anything wrong with them, then there is naturally going to be a tension there between the citizens, who don't want it, and their judges, who do want it.

Now, when you find the same divergence on other issues, you get a tiny glimpse as to where the tension is coming from in the current political situation. It's an elite group, it's the judges and the bureaucracy--particularly lawyers and judges, as this survey demonstrates--who feel that these practices are O.K., and the people strongly disagree. Marijuana: 57% of the public feel that's wrong, 19% of the judges. So when you've got parents who want to keep their kids from getting hooked on marijuana, they get very little sympathy. Only 19% of the law-enforcement leaders have any sympathy for their point of view. Naturally, you're

going to have tension, you're going to have problems. On abortion, interestingly enough (they asked the question very straight, they said: "Do you feel abortion is morally wrong, or is it not a moral issue?"), the survey found that of the general public, 65% said it's morally wrong. When you get down to law and justice leaders, it was 25%. You've got a 40% gap in their understanding of the basic morality of basic public policy. I would venture to say that at the time of the Boston Tea Party, there wasn't that big a gap between the moral beliefs of the two sides in that conflict. I think this should tell us something about what's going on in the country, what people are thinking about, where the discontent is coming from, where these issues are coming from.

One last thing that I found very interesting from the Connecticut Mutual study: they asked questions designed to measure belief in the political system as well as participation in the political system, and then they cross-tabulated all of those questions, and it turned out (not to my surprise, but maybe to others who might have believed some of the rhetoric about how the pro-family movement is destroying the constitutional system)--it turned out that the people who were the highly religious ones had the most faith in the American system. They asked the question, "Do you agree or disagree: the way people vote is the main thing that decides the way things are run in this country?" Leaders: 29% agreed; public: 44%; but among the highly religious, 64% agreed.

The question was asked, "Do you agree or disagree: the most important decisions on public issues are best left in the hands of our leaders?" Of the leaders, only 34% agreed. I give them credit for having a little self-insight. Of the public, 44% agreed. That's not very high agreement. That's only 44% of the public who believe that the leaders of this

country can solve our problems. Among the intensely religious, 56%, a majority, believe that the leaders of this country can solve the problems. Now, where is the faith coming from for our American system? It's not the ACLU types who tend to be the believers. They have 34%-29% who believe in the American system. Of the intensely religious types, 64%-56% believe that our American system can work and solve our problems. I think that should tell us something. They asked the question, "Do you agree or disagree: the most important national problems can be solved with traditional American politics?" Thirty-five percent of the leaders said yes, 41% of the highly religious said yes, still more than the leaders, and 37% of the public. I mention these things in case you have been plagued with the doubts that have been implanted in your minds by hostile, full-page ads in the New York Times, contending that the "Moral Majority" and the whole movement which I represent is out to destroy the American way of life. On the contrary, I think it is our people who believe in the American way of government and are practicing it and putting it to use more than some of our detractors, perhaps, who prefer to solve their problems by dictating agendas to bureaucrats.

I think the questions that were asked here, and the results, indicate something else that you may not have realized, namely, that the Moral Majority phenomenon, the New Right phenomenon and the pro-family phenomenon (and there are differences between them, but right now I'll lump them together) is not motivated by a highly offensive spirit. These are not people who are out to enforce their morality upon the rest of the world, who are out there to change the nation to conform to their image. These are people who are motivated by a desire to defend their families,

their own children's upbringing, their own communities from pornographic movies, drugs, or abortion. This is a defensive spirit. It's people who want to protect their own little piece of the universe and who want their own families to be able to be raised the way they want them to be. It's much more a defensive than an offensive spirit.

Now, having gotten past the introductions as to who we are and what we are all about, let me enunciate a few principles that I believe should guide the formulation of social policy, particularly, family policy. Our goal is a just and humane society. I believe that a just and humane society will be consistent with, and will occur by way of, traditional values. Now, what do I mean by traditional values? Well, there's form and there's content. I think the form of traditional values is a system of moral norms, which, once well defined, are taken to be exceptionless. Moral norms, once well defined, are without exception. In other words, it's a non-consequentialist ethics. What do I mean by that? Consequentialist ethics is what probably many of us have been taught; it could be epitomized by adding a word to a bumper sticker that I see once in a while on the back of a car: "If it will feel good, do it." It is the thesis that you judge whether something is good or bad by the consequences. If taking kids away from their parents has good results, then that's a good thing to do. If sleeping around the neighborhood brings good results, well then, that's a good thing to do. Now, the non-consequentialist ethics, which I would adhere to, state that moral norms are not dependent upon the consequences; rather, actions are right or wrong intrinsically. Hence the norms concerning these actions, once they are well defined, are without exception.

The content of the traditional values is what most people usually

think of when they think of traditional values. Such things as the usual virtues--fidelity, chastity, loyalty, telling the truth, etc., the values of the Ten Commandments, the work ethic, self-discipline, delayed gratification, all of that sort of thing are the content of the traditional values. Now, I'm not going to argue the content of traditional values. If you don't agree with traditional values, you can go to a moral theologian and ask him questions. I'm not here to argue the content of it. I'm telling you what it is that we're interested in. So, I hope I've made it clear that what we consider traditional values is not some nostalgia for 1950. It's not the morality of "Father Knows Best" or "Ozzie and Harriet," not at all. Alongside traditional values, there are also some traditional assumptions about roles (e.g. appropriate roles for men and women), but these assumptions are not moral values and are not exception-free. I was appalled by someone who wrote (in Wilson Quarterly, I think it was) an article basically attacking the pro-family movement, and doing so in terms of how we were unhappy because the world didn't meet the standards of "Father Knows Best." Can this be serious scholarship? The charge has been made that we feel working mothers are not family, or that single parents are not families. That's so much baloney. That has nothing to do with the moral norms.

The second operational principle would be that the federal government is the least competent and the least desirable means toward, or agent of, the solution to any family problem. Simply, that's the basic beginning principle. Without doubt, government is the worst possible source of solution, by definition. Why? Because when the federal government does something, it relies on bureaucrats. The bureaucrats sit in their ivory towers in Washington and write regulations, and they promulgate them out

to the ivory towers in the eight different regions and write new regulations, and then administrators come into existence, whose primary purpose in life is to perpetuate their project or their grant and administer their regulations. And by the time all that happens, there is very little actually going to help the people who were supposed to be helped. When I worked for the federal government in the Office of Economic Opportunity, we did a study and found that something in the vicinity of 80% of the grant money was going to overhead. Only 20% of all the millions of dollars was getting to the people that OEO was supposed to help. That's one reason why the federal government is the worst possible, least competent means of solving problems.

Another principle: we reject the inevitability of social decay. You can read Mary Jo Bane's study and others which project these trends out to 1990 and beyond, showing continuing rates of more abortions, more divorces, more teenage pregnancy, etc., etc., etc. You can do that. But I criticize these studies just as I criticized the White House Conference on Families, because they were doing the same thing; they were assuming all these trends were going to continue. They never stopped and took a deep breath and said, "Wait a minute, why do these trends have to continue?" I reject the inevitability of the continuing social decay. Consequently, of course, I reject the inevitability of more and bigger government programs to put bandaids on those various manifestations of social decay. I happen to believe the national economy also rejects more and bigger government programs right now, but that's incidental. Even if the economy were booming, and not in the strangling state that it's in, I would still reject the inevitability of the continuing social decay and the solution that the federal government can solve more and more problems

--or create more and more problems than they would solve, I should say.

All this is not to say that we reject or we refuse to recognize the existence of problems. On the contrary, we do recognize the existence of problems, but what we would envision as a solution would depend, to some extent, on how we understand the cause, and I can't think of a better example to demonstrate that than the teenage pregnancy controversy. There are those who see the cause of the teenage pregnancy problem as lack of sex education and unavailability of contraceptives, and those who see the cause of teenage pregnancy as that will proceed along certain lines. Those of us who see the teenage pregnancy problem being caused by lack of values, an overdose of sex education, contraceptive availability, and misinformation will proceed along a different course to solve the problem. So, what the solution is depends on how you see the cause.

Now, what is the cause of social problems? Well, when you cut through the bureaucratic problems, and the governmental problems, and the management problems, and the administrative problems, and the philosophical problems, when you cut through all of that and get down to the basic things, at the bottom level of many of these problems, the basic cause is a turning away from traditional values by business, by community, by church, by families. (I won't say by government, because government is us, and if government turns away from these traditional values, it's our fault, because we, the citizens, have allowed it to do so.) To give you an example, take the Mormons, the Orthodox Jews, the traditionalist Catholics, the fundamentalist Protestants. Those subsets of society do not have the same rates of disintegration as the general public. Apparently, Muncie, Indiana doesn't, either. That's new information. But this suggests that when you have the traditional values

maintained in the community, in the church, etc., then you have fewer of these social decay problems. When families and the mediating structures between families and government cease meeting their responsibilities, then you have a vacuum created. And then, of course, you have an industry that springs up overnight to move in and pronounce the solutions to all these problems, and you have your self-proclaimed experts who are going to tell people how to do things, along with their federal grants. There is perhaps a chicken and egg problem there, in that the human service industries were sitting around waiting for the vacuum to occur, and the vacuum occurred, and they filled it. I think there was a simultaneity there.

Now, towards solutions. Based on what I've said before, you can see that the solutions that we would support would be ones that are guided by a return to policies that support traditional values and shrink the government role. Both are needed. You can't just shrink the government role overnight and not have fostered, in the meanwhile, the resurgence of traditional values, because you will have a vacuum created if you do that very quickly. And in the absence of community values, if there is no support for traditional values, we can cause a lot of harm, and, as you know, greed will really swell up to fill the new vacuum. That's theoretical, because it's not likely to happen that the government role is going to shrink any too drastically in any short period of time. The block grant proposal, for instance, which is the Reagan administration's centerpiece for this whole idea, is basically going nowhere fast. It would ameliorate the situation, I believe, if block grant proposals and the new federalism were to come about. But if you're depending upon a federal grant for your livelihood and are worried that it's going to vanish overnight, don't be too nervous about it.

A very important part of any solution would be significant measures taken to encourage private giving to human services operations. You know, $43 billion a year comes from private citizens to various charities, about half to the churches. Now, I don't see why there couldn't be a change in the tax laws that would allow businesses and individuals a tax credit on their total liabilities, say 10%, if they would give it to a human services activity. Before we had the federal government solving everybody's problems, there were many community services that were being done by churches, community groups, and local voluntary associations. Then the argument was made, "We need more federal money because these local people aren't getting the money they used to get." Well, that was true because Washington was taking more away from the people. If you give it back in small doses to those local community activities, why not save a round trip to Washington and encourage more direct giving to the human services activities in the community that are doing some good, that people like, that they are comfortable with? Also, the local community would have some say-so over it, which will give a sense of greater loyalty toward the whole operation. Within the Family Protection Act, there are a number of provisions that are designed to achieve this goal of encouraging more private solutions to the problems.

As to family policy per se, I would say there should be none. I am opposed outright to the establishment of any explicit government goals for families. It strikes me as being totally outrageous that the federal government would say, "Well, here are the goals that we're setting for families, and here's how we want families to achieve them." The federal government has no business doing that, any more than it has any business setting population policies, and saying, "Here is what the population

of this country ought to be, and here's how we think people ought to achieve their 1.5 children." That is the most presumptuous thing I can imagine--that the government would tell people how to run their lives--and that is what an explicit family policy gets down to.

My position is that families are strong when they have a function to perform, and when the government takes over the functions of a family, then as sure as the night follows the day, families are going to disintegrate and fall apart, because they have no reason to exist anymore. Families are strong when they have a function to perform, and if you take away from the family everything that it naturally does, then you don't have a family anymore. Take a look at the cases in history where there were genocide attempts, when there were people who were trying to destroy families in order to destroy another race. They uprooted them and moved them far from their homes, they took away all their property, they impoverished them, they made them slaves in some cases. Look at the history of America, or look at the history of the Irish. In Ireland, when they were uprooted in the 16th century, the intention there was to destroy that race, but the English overlooked one basic factor: they didn't destroy the functions of the family. You still had your family, and your family fed you, and your family educated you, and your family gave you whatever you had, and your family took care of you when you were sick; and as long as the family had those functions to perform the family continued to exist and it was strong. And the society that was created by those families was a strong and healthy society.

Contrast that with our situation today, where we have well-intentioned--I'll grant that they're well-intentioned--causes saying

that we'll provide your food and we'll take care of your health, and we'll provide your housing, and we'll provide you with everything you really need, and then you can be a strong family. It doesn't work that way. I think the proof is in the pudding. We have seen the results of that kind of misguided policy now. Families are strong when they have a job to do.

I was asked to assess the effectiveness of pro-family activity in Congress. Well, in the words of a famous song, "we've only just begun," folks. And seriously, we have, at least in 1981. I take heart from the fact that we're in the fight. I view the election of 1980 not as any great victory, but as winning the right to continue the battle. Somebody yesterday was commenting that Reagan's election had brought with it numerous Congressmen and Senators on his coattails. I think that is not universally true. I think if you look at the statistics and the election results, you will find cases like those of Grassley in Iowa, Denton in Alabama, Kasten in Wisconsin, and D'Amato in New York, where the Senator out-polled the President. That was no coattails effect for the President. You don't have a coattail if the lower part of the ticket outpolls the top of the ticket.

In the last Congress, the pro-family movement did play a role in preventing the passage of certain pieces of legislation, such as S.4 or S.1843 Criminal Code Revision, and things like that. But the conventional wisdom is that it's relatively easy to stop a piece of legislation. The challenge is getting one passed.

I want to mention also that the administration does not entirely share our concerns about social issues. There was enthusiasm about them on the campaign trail, yes; but now that Reagan is in office, I have

observed a certain discomfort with these issues. It may be that one area where the pro-family movement and you have a common purpose is in bringing to the attention of the administration the need for concern about these issues. My reading of the current situation at the White House is that they wish these issues would disappear, because they don't particularly want to deal with them. They seem to think that the only people who want to deal with them are grassroots zealots. Perhaps if the administration heard from some responsible, respectable people like yourselves that there really is a need for these problems to be addressed, it might raise their consciousness a little bit.

I was asked to address the Family Protection Act. The third generation of this act is about to be born. That's the bill that will be introduced June 17. The first generation of the bill was S.1808, as first introduced. There was a rush to introduce that bill. It went from legislative council to the Senate floor without a step in between for checking. Numerous errors had slipped in which nobody caught until it was already printed.

So the second generation corrected the mistakes of that first. S.1808--as amended--and H.R.6208--as amended--are the second generation. Unfortunately, most of the research and writing about the bill were based on the first generation. The "as amended" phrase is critical here because the true Laxalt bill was the one "as amended."

Senator Jepsen is now preparing to introduce the third generation of the Family Protection Act. Senator Paul Laxalt will be chief co-sponsor. He is not retreating from the bill at all, but only recognizing the limitations on his time in asking Roger Jepsen to take the lead. It is unfortunate I can't go into any detail on the third generation bill

now, because the Senator has not signed off on the provisions, and until he does, I can't tell you what will be in it. I can give you a general overview. The basic spirit in which the bill was drafted was to pinpoint particular offenses of the federal government against families, and traditional values, and religious freedom. Particular instances were pinpointed, and particular solutions were devised to those problems. That is still the basic idea of the Act. The initial bill had 38 separate concepts. The bill that Jepsen will introduce will have somewhere between 30 and 35 separate concepts. The content will be substantially the same. The form, the approach, the techniques of correcting these various problems will be quite different in some cases and not so different in others.

I hope I have given you an overview of what we are about, what some of our motivating principles are, and have laid the groundwork to begin discussing where there might be areas of agreement. The idea of having this conference was to find if there were anything that we could agree on, and if so, what, and take it from there. I hope that by having a chance to speak with you and meeting you live and in person--you see my horns up there and my tail I have tucked in my skirt today--we can realize that there might indeed be areas for discussion, where we can rationally begin to look for problem solving.

WHAT IS AND IS NOT PRO-FAMILY POLICY:

MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN A TIME OF SCARCE RESOURCES

Ellen Hoffman

I'd like to start by saying that you have provided an important opportunity by scheduling this seminar and inviting Mrs. Marshner, Mr. Crawford, myself and others to talk with each other directly about our mutual concerns for American children and families.

The complexity of the issues we are addressing was brought home to me yesterday by Alan Crawford's response when he was asked: "How do you feel about teenage pregnancy?" He gave what initially sounded like a flip answer: "I'm sure I'm against it." And then he paused and said: "unless the person wants to be (pregnant)."

Mr. Crawford's afterthought emphasizes that we do have choices and make choices--both as citizens and as families. We make choices in the public policy arena--choices which affect millions of children and their parents. And individual families make choices. Participation in a government-funded program or receipt of benefits from the government does not necessarily indicate that coercion or intrusion has taken place.

Because I am sympathetic to the statements made yesterday about the lack of empathy in these discussions, I'd like to start today by reading a passage from a Children's Defense Fund booklet that describes why welfare policies are primarily a children's issue. This quote is from a welfare mother who lives in Connecticut. She lives with her

three children on $338 a month provided by the State Department of Social Services and gets her blankets from other people's trash. Here is what she said:

> Sometimes in the winter, I lay in bed awake at night listening to the furnace go off. You're waiting and waiting, and wondering: Is it going to come on again? How long is the oil going to last? Can I afford to buy more?.... It gets to the point where if you hear the word 'snow' on the radio, you're crying....
>
> The public seems to forget that when we welfare mothers got married and planned our lives, we, just like you, expected our marriages to last. To all you people who were lucky enough to have your marriages last and who have 'lived happily ever after,' I am very glad you made it. But for me and the others who didn't make it, we don't ask anything from you, except stop putting us down and let us try to survive as best we can.

I think this statement shows that when we're talking about pro-family policy and what the role of the government is there are certain crucial facts: there are many different families and they are affected differently by public policies. In this country many families with children have no place to turn but the public sector to meet their basic survival needs. A welfare family of four in Texas receives $1,680 in AFDC and $2,568 in food stamps--a total of about $4,200 a year. In Mississippi they receive a total of about $4,100 a year. That's for four people! These families have an income considered to be at about half of the poverty line in this country, and they're not unique. One in six children in this country is poor in any year. In 1977, while 11.6% of the population was in poverty, 16% of all children were.

Poverty doesn't just mean loss of income. It also means lack of health care. There are 10 million children who do not have any known source of health care in this country. There are a half a million children who are living in foster care, who don't have a permanent home. These are not new figures. A lot of you have heard these before, but I

think that it's important for us to realize that these kids we are talking about, often have no alternative but the public sector if they are to have a future.

What is and is not pro-family policy? I'd like to talk a little bit about what I think is not pro-family policy. A lot of good examples of what is not pro-family policy have been presented to us in the last few months, particularly through the administration's budget proposals and through proposed changes in service, in delivery systems, and in how these programs operate.

First, I think pro-family policy is not one which hurts the needy. I don't think there's anybody in this room who hasn't heard and seen what the impact of the welfare and food program cuts would be upon the kinds of families I was just talking about. (Again, you have to be very careful about which programs you're talking about. Some are decreases in and increases; others are cuts.)

Secondly, pro-family policy is not one which depends on speed and political tactics designed to exclude the people most affected from an understanding of proposed changes, until it's too late for them to have an input at all. It is not pro-family to use an abstruse budget process, called reconciliations, to force an incredible range of both budget and substantive changes proposed at the same time--especially when the changes would affect practically every aspect of our social and economic policies. This type of tactic is not a responsible approach to a policy for families, about families, for children, and about children.

Third, pro-family policy is not one which removes the marginal but crucial services and resources necessary to keep families out of dependency or to remove them from dependency. Pro-family policy is not

one which says to get rid of the existing child care resources we have by cutting back on Title XX, by cutting back on the work and child care expenses allowed for AFDC recipients. Its not one which says food stamps and child nutrition programs do not have a constructive place in our society and that, therefore, these things should also go by the board.

Fourth, pro-family policy is not one which destroys or discourages the programs which can be documented and shown to have had positive effects in terms of strengthening families, in terms of allowing children to grow up healthy, in terms of preventing future law breakers in our country. We should be strengthening, not destroying programs like Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which shows good, positive results in terms of children's achievement; programs like Medicaid, which provide the most basic kind of health care to the kids who are lucky enough to get it because, as I said before, there are many who are eligible, but simply do not get the services. These programs are preventive, they save money, and they save lives. I don't think that a pro-family policy is one which simply says that because these programs cost money, therefore, they should go.

I don't think a pro-family policy is one which destroys procedural protections--long fought and hard earned in many instances--which are necessary to insure the basic American rights which many groups cannot get through any other process except to have them written into law. For example, in the case of handicapped children, if we destroy the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, we destroy a legal right to an education which a million youngsters could not secure before that law was passed. Even now, many of them still don't get the proper education. There's been a lot of progress, but there's still a long way to go, as those of you who have worked on it know.

The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Reform Act, enacted just about a year ago, also provided critical procedural protections to a particularly vulnerable group of more than half a million children--those in the nation's foster care system. The protections include the opportunity to have their placement reviewed on a regular basis, so that they don't end up in the limbo of foster care; to have an opportunity to be adopted if it is not possible for them to return to their natural family; to be placed in a setting close to their family and most like a family. These are not protections which were based on an abstract idea. They were enacted by Congress after years of study of specific children, after years of discussions with parents, the social workers, the judges, the administrators, everyone involved in this system, about what was needed to help homeless children.

The needs were documented and the protections put into place because there were real problems, not because someone said: "Let's make a bunch of rules to make it more difficult for families to have a say over what happens to their children." If the administration's proposed social services block grant goes into effect as recommended, all of these protections would be repealed.

A pro-family policy is also not one which snips the supports of the so-called social safety net; first creates them, then snips them a few weeks later for millions of families, which really don't have an alternative in terms of basic support for their children. It is not one which defines its social safety net as one which protects people and then removes those protections--for example, in the Head Start Program, by allowing for the funds to go to program support, but then through the back door saying: "We're not going to provide the support

that's brought in through the food programs, and we're not going to have the support that CETA provides in terms of staff."

I don't think a pro-family policy is one which abounds in rhetoric about turning decisions over to families and localities and state governments, at the same time that it destroys existing mechanisms for their participation in decisions, and secondly, fails to create new ones to be put in their place. There's been a tremendous amount of rhetoric about letting families control their children and their lives and about having state and local governments make policy decisions because they are "closer to the people." We have a law for handicapped kids that requires that their parents be allowed to become involved, if they want to be, in their education. We have parents playing advisory roles in the schools, in Title I and in the Head Start program, and now the administration is saying: "Knock those out with everything else, we're going to save money, we're going to turn programs back to the localities." Where, how, and when are parent activities supposed to take place? The administration has proposed block grants, stating that a certain amount of money will go to the locality. Yet, if you look at the Title XX program, the chief example of an existing block grant in the social services area, there is simply no reason to believe that those kinds of participation are going to be afforded to people. I suspect Mrs. Marshner and I probably hear the same stories on this issue--that Title XX social services policies are made in the back room by a few bureaucrats and a few politicians who talk to each other. The administration's proposals would encourage that type of system to be perpetrated by setting into place block grants to replace the few programs where we have had some attempts at public participation, even though they have not been uniformly successful.

Now, I'd like to emphasize the positive by sketching the elements of a pro-family agenda. First, I think it's an agenda which recognizes that all families have certain kinds of needs if they are to be healthy. Ideally, we would like to see these basic needs met through a strong economy, through self-sufficiency, and through independence. We should remember that we are talking about, in most cases, voluntary participation in government programs. We're not talking about people being coerced into programs, but about families and children who need assistance, who will suffer it it is removed. Food, housing, shelter, education, and health care are supports that children must have that some families, unfortunately, are simply not able to provide.

A pro-family policy needs to recognize that, historically, some families and children have not been able to meet these needs for a variety of reasons. One reason is discrimination--discrimination on the basis of race, geography, sex, handicap, where you live, whether you can get a doctor out in the country or not--all of these facets. A pro-family policy needs to recognize that, in fact, for many children, although many of us would prefer to see these needs met by a local or state government or by the private sector, there has been no choice but the federal government. CDF published a book called Portrait of Inequality not long ago. That book pointed out that black babies in this country are twice as likely as whites to die in the first year, that there is one chance in two of a black baby being born into poverty, that the black baby is 2½ times as likely to live in dilapidated housing and twice as likely to be on welfare as a white child. Discrimination still exists in this country, and many human problems are not addressed because of discrimination.

It would be nice to have streamlined programs. It would be nice to get rid of bureaucracies, to get rid of administrative layers, to eliminate administrative expenses. All of us probably agree that federal programs have, in many cases, not been as efficient as they might be. But it is important to look at what has worked, to look at which services or policies had a beneficial impact, to look at the truth and the real figures behind allegations of waste and ineffectiveness, and then make the choices. It is irresponsible to say that everything goes because nothing has worked and because we need a complete change. There is a line, and I've heard it a number of times recently, that says, "This is the 80s, and those programs were from the 60s, and, therefore, we have to get rid of them." That kind of an across-the-board condemnation does an injustice to any of us who would like to think that we have the ability to make some judgments and analyses of public policies.

Inequality and discrimination are barriers to many families in meeting the needs of their children. There are also often economic and social forces beyond our control. What do we expect of the families unemployed in Detroit right now? What are those families and their kids supposed to do about the problems of the auto industry? We must recognize that some forces simply cannot be dealt with by a particular family.

Another type of barrier to family self-sufficiency can be government policies such as the AFDC requirements' prohibition against "a man in the house." Again, these barriers have all been placed in people's way, at times when they may have wanted to be independent or to be able to do things in a self-sufficient manner.

Another plank in a pro-family policy agenda must assure that when we have scarce resources, we need to look at the total picture and to

determine the appropriate roles for the public and private sectors and what are realistic expectations of each. For example, we must realize that when we spend money through the tax system, we spend money. And it's very, very easy to say, "Let's not have grants that go to bureaucrats and put people, in effect, on the government dole to survive. Let's just use the tax system to create 'incentives'." When we use the tax system, we are spending money in just as a real way as when it is spent through a categorical or block grant program or anything else. Our budget decisionmaking system has discouraged a recognition and an understanding of the trade-offs between bulk spending and what are called tax expenditures. Some people in Congress will try to tell you that in the morning the Ways and Means Committee will make spending cuts and work on the substantive programs, and then in the afternoon they will work on the tax issues, and that those are two completely different things. Yet, when the issue is the deficit in the budget, or how much spending there is, those are not two different things. A certain amount of money comes in and a certain amount goes out. And that's why I raised the question about the cost of the Family Protection Act yesterday. This legislation contains a series of proposals for tax incentives--credits for dependent care, contributions to charities, etc. I'm not saying that any of these is desirable or undesirable per se. What is important is to make a conscious decision about whether these proposals are the best way to spend one or two or five billion dollars; or whether the money will go further if we spend it in a way that allows us to see clearly where it goes and whether it is effective. Using the tax system to achieve social goals tends to help those who need help the least and to make it extremely difficult to determine whether the

money has been used well.

In a time of scarce resources, I think a pro-family policy needs to recognize, again, that there are some ways of spending the money that are, in fact, efficient and that have long-term effects and for which our government can be held accountable. In the ten years after measles vaccine was introduced, the savings were estimated to be $1.3 billion. In 1978, there were over 650,000 fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds who were two or more years below grade level in school. If they had had better educational opportunities that had prevented them from even being just one of those grade levels behind, there would have been an estimated savings of, I think it was $1.3 billion in taxes, and that was an incredible amount of money. In AFDC we now pay for children in institutional care, or we did in 1978, close to $1,200 each per year. For a child in foster family care, we're paying about $260 a year, and for a child who is with his own family, we're paying $134. If as few as 10% of the children in out-of-home care in this country could be shifted into family settings, the savings could well be over $25 million a year.

In order to have pro-family policy which is serious about being effective and cost-effective, we must look at these different kinds of policy options. For example, our child welfare policy, in the past, encouraged placement of children in foster care, which is by far the most expensive, least productive, and least beneficial option for the child; and yet, the administration has a proposal to kill a brand-new remedy--the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Reform Act--by repealing it and replacing it with a block grant.

A pro-family policy must also recognize that many national needs

and interests cross boundaries of our local and state jurisdictions and suggest and require a national role for the government in some areas: for example, the mobility of our job force and the mobility of our families. I think we have no excuse for allowing children not to be educated in this country, when we know that they are going to grow up and move anywhere in the country with a need for a job. There are places where a black child cannot get a decent education, places where a handicapped child does not have an opportunity for an education. There is a national interest and should be a federal role in trying to accomplish those things if they are, in fact, not going to be done in any other way. In the area of health, we hear a tremendous amount about cost containments, and many major federal health programs are national programs. The health of a country, to some degree, is a national issue and a national question. Although I hear there's a very controversial new book which talks about the eight or ten different "countries" within the boundaries of the United States, we cannot deny that we are still one country, that people move, that our economy has many interlocking pieces which affect each other, and that just because a child is growing up in one place doesn't mean the needs of that child as an adult will not be transferred to another part of the country.

A pro-family policy also must recognize that there are areas of private individual conscience where families should properly exercise their own values and not necessarily bring the federal government into decisionmaking.

We should be asking ourselves whether proposals such as some contained in the Family Protection Act really do enhance the role of families in making decisions about questions such as the type of books

and curriculum used in a local school or the access of minors to information and services relating to pregnancy and birth control. My personal reading is that some of these provisions encourage more government intrusion into these sensitive areas--not less.

A pro-family policy must also provide information and mechanisms for accountability, so that individuals and groups of all political persuasions can examine just how public resources have been used and whether it is appropriate and/or worthwhile to use them in that particular way, and whether the policies are, in fact, constructive or desirable.

There are a few questions that I will just throw out, based on some of the discussions we have had here, and try to pose more specifically. One is: what do we do if we accept a policy which says the federal government and, to some degree any government, is the least effective and least desirable way of approaching public needs? What do we do about people who have very basic survival needs which are not being met?

I was at a meeting not too long ago where I spoke with 40 corporate executives, mostly defense contractors, who had come to learn about how Washington works. And I was asked to speak about what the Children's Defense Fund does, and why we need people working on these issues, and how we operate. And, at the end of my talk, I was asked by one of these executives: "Why don't we just take all this money from block grants and give it to the United Way in every community and let them give it out?" This sounded initially like a fascinating idea. And then I thought about some of the experiences that people have had with the United Way, and I said, "That may be a very desirable thing to do in many communities, and, in fact, it may be a very effective way of identifying what the

needs are and dealing with them. But let's look at one example--Washington, D. C.--where we had a large, effective United Way which refused to provide support to programs for blacks."

With a black city and white suburbs, virtually all of the money was going to programs serving whites. This was an extremely serious issue, because the Washington area United Way had a special arrangement allowing it to receive contributions from federal employees through a check-off system. When the facts about this situation came out, an entirely separate giving unit--the Black United Fund-- was formed to ensure that the black community would receive at least its share of the private contributions.

So I think we have to acknowledge that although it might be desirable to simply "turn over" support of social programs to the private sector, we have a long way to go before we can depend on that sector to really meet the needs in a fair and meaningful way.

A third basic issue we must confront as we are faced with these proposals for block grants and massive budget reductions is whether states and localities can do a better job than the federal government. In the early days of the Title I program for education of disadvantaged children, CDF did a study of how the funds were spent. In those days, Title I had very few strings attached and operated similarly to the block grants recently proposed. The study found that the money was spent on almost everything but the education of the targeted children. It was spent on swimming pools, on central office staff, on buildings. And the youngsters in need were simply not getting the services for which they were eligible.

All of the federal programs I've been discussing here today--the

civil rights laws, the family supports--were created for a reason. That reason was that children and families had legitimate needs which were not met by the private sector or by state and local governments. Until we can answer questions about what will happen to these children and families without food, without adequate shelter, health care, or education, we should not be talking about suddenly folding up the "social safety net" and leaving them to fend for themselves.

In conclusion, I'd just like to say that our discussions here have shown me that there are areas of agreement which might form the basis for continuing dialogue and action. The ones which stand out to me are:

- Concerns about bureaucratic inefficiency, waste, and failure to implement programs in the most effective way.
- The critical importance of preserving and strengthening the ability of parents to provide the supports their children require to be strong, healthy, and independent.
- The importance of maintaining the voluntary nature of social programs and policies so that in our roles as both citizens and voters we can make choices.

Will Rogers once said: "Discontent comes in proportion to knowledge." The purpose we all share here today is to improve our knowledge and understanding. I hope that the shared discontent which follows will make it possible for us to work together toward a society which we can all beleive offers just and fair alternatives for our children and families.

THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT:

A QUESTION OF PROCEDURES

Catherine J. Ross, Discussant

Some critics have stated that the New Right sees the beautiful and happy family as existing outside of history--and even outside of social reality in some way--as a natural, God-given, and changeless institution. This vision is truly a misconception of reality. Until about 150 years ago no one even proclaimed the rights of individual parents or families to be independent of the public sphere. The family politics of the New Right depends on a 20th-century ideology of the family as being what Christopher Lasch has labeled "a haven in a heartless world." But, on the contrary, the conflicts between the family and outsiders stem from the emergence of separated domestic and public spheres, from the separation of the moral and child-rearing functions from the productive functions of the family, or from the successful stripping away of various household responsibilities, all of which created an ideal image of the family as separate from society.

Conservatives see the involvement of the state in guiding the development of youth as a radical departure from the past. Perhaps it is, in the sense that the state itself has become the agent of enforcement. But we have to remember that until quite recently there has been no question about the right of the community as a whole to set standards for social norms. The law dividing families from outsiders

was thin at best. No one every argued that individual parents had better judgment than the community at large about what was good for children. To the extent that the procedures were informal and merged with religious institutions, there were fewer procedural guarantees against the intrusion of outsiders into parental decisions. To the extent that the New Right advocates the standard of community norms, it may indeed be a reactionary movement. As in past times, the primacy of individual parents to decide what is best for their children would be limited by prevailing cultural and Christian standards in the community if the New Right agenda were to become a reality.

I'd now like to talk briefly about one aspect of the Laxalt--or Family Protection--bill, even though we can't get a copy of the most recent version. First of all, I did try to obtain more recent versions from several congressional offices. Rep. George Hansen's (Idaho) staff said that the bill I have studied was their best shot at it. I'm also going to rely on the summary that was printed following Connie Marshner's name in the Conservative Digest last year at this time.

I think that the first version of the Family Protection Act--which originated from widespread discussions among the New Right pro-family lobbyists and the different congressional offices--can be used, if not as a piece of pending legislation for policy purposes, then as a representation of what these pro-family lobbyists would really like to do. And I think that there are a number of assumptions in the bill that many people with all sorts of political backgrounds can agree are disturbing. Notwithstanding Ellen Hoffman's very incisive comments today about the budget choices that are made when Congress uses tax credits, I think that most people would agree that the educational system has serious

problems; that the tax on marriage is not equitable; that people need help in paying for college educations for their children; that homemakers need some sort of financial protection; and that company-sponsored day care is certainly an option to be encouraged. On a more controversial issue, I would suggest that even the idea of providing release time for parent education could be seen as one way of resolving the issues that legitimately arise in a pluralistic society and would give churches and parents a chance to control that very personal aspect of the curriculum by controlling where their children fulfill school requirements for sex or parenting education.

But I think the real issues that arise from the Laxalt bill concern different views of the world. These are clarified only when we look at the most controversial and extreme aspects of the proposal. It's quite striking that the Congressional Research Service identified serious constitutional problems with one-third of the bill's substantive provisions. Such wholesale disregard of constitutionality cannot be attributed simply to sloppiness of writing. Nearly all of those constitutional issues arose in the areas of religious freedom, due process and, ironically, (if we are to believe the conservative movement's own claims) the implicit constitutional right to privacy.

For this reason I think it is very important to look at one issue that makes many liberals uncomfortable, which most clearly highlights the issues of privacy and other guarantees, namely, the heavy penalties the bill would impose for the mere advocacy of homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle. This is not a children's issue. But it seems to strike at the heart of some of the essential political differences between the liberal and the New Right philosophies. How far does our

proclaimed support for pluralism go? How far are we willing to go in support of very controversial minority positions? I think that we have to test the true limits of both of the philosophies under consideration today by focusing on these very disturbing provisions, even if they have never been made into statute.

The Family Protection Act would deny all federal funds to individuals or organizations that advocate homosexuality as an accepted lifestyle. A Congressional Research Service analysis has said that, as written, the bill would bar people not just from funds for activities in the public arena (as our representative from Sen. Roger William Jepsen's staff has stated), but also from veterans' benefits, Social Security, and all other personal forms of federal funding.

Let me just speak briefly about two other minor points. I admit that I seem to be focusing more on Connie's presentation. It's partly because I had time to make notes after Connie spoke and not after Ellen spoke. But I will mention two details that are related to Ellen's presentation. The first concerns the return of the New Right to a faith that we can encourage private groups to fulfill welfare functions. I think that it's very important to remember that the historical reason we have so many federal programs is precisely because the private sector failed to provide these services, and their failure forced the government to get involved. I will just share a brief example from the case of support for widows with dependent children. Private agencies argued that this was no place for the government to be involved and that they would fulfill all the needs of widows; the Rockefeller Foundation provided a ten-year grant to show that private agencies could meet legitimate demands for aid. After the first year of the grant, the agency

administering this program in New York City said, "We had no idea there were so many poor people in this city. We can't possibly do this no matter how much grant money we raise." This was in 1912. I don't think that we've come very far in the private sector since then.

On a related point, the New Right suggests that families are strong when they have functions to perform. I think that there's a lot of truth in that belief, and I think that we should encourage families to fill as many functions as they can. But here again, involvement of the government in social programs stems from a realization that many families cannot meet all of their needs. Again, if you look at the period from 1905 to 1912, in which there was an industrial recession and a lot of inflation, studies of the cost of living forced social reformers to realize that even two-income families could not possibly feed or clothe their children, let alone save for emergencies. And at that time no one advocated that women should work. So economic problems and social problems have always coincided.

How do the two political sides that are lobbying on children and family issues view each other? I think that, as Ellen has said, we have made a really good start today in trying to enhance communication. Let me just talk about some of the problems in communication that have occurred in the past. I think because of the tone of this conference everyone has tried to find areas of consensus and, as I said in discussing the Laxalt bill, there are indeed some areas of consensus.

One of the problems has to do with who belongs to each side. Who are these people? There's a lot of misrepresentation, because both sides really are umbrella groups that contain people with quite different personalities and philosophies. It's very easy for both sides to

block communication by stereotyping their opponents. For example, the New Right can point to postures like "abortion on demand" in a society in which no services are given on demand. That's really a red flag. On the other side, liberals can refer to preachers like the Rev. Dan Fore, who heads the Moral Majority in New York State and who regards the Bible as holding the key to all political decisions but doesn't know what languages it was originally written in. It's very easy to stop debate by trying to find the most extreme or comical positions on each side.

More important are a series of charges and counter-charges about basic philosophy. On the one hand, the New Right charges that liberals have set in play a system in which the state intrudes into families in order to transform values. As historians and social critics have commented over the last decade, the defense of families against state intrusion and even the arrogance of the welfare state is not a criticism uniquely presented by the right wing, and passing references have been made throughout this conference to this very issue. It is true that many social agencies have their historical roots in the attempt to transform immigrant values into "native" middle-class American values. How much more freedom the New Right would leave to minority groups--however labelled--is an open question. But there should be little doubt that the liberal agenda, insofar as it exists as a unified platform, rests on a view of culture that may be enlightened or modern but that stems from deeply held values about the role of society as a whole and how the different parts of society should fit together. The liberal side has really failed to articulate--either internally or publicly--the basic values on which its platform rests, and this may be one of the reasons that the liberal platform tends to sound as if it deals with economic

issues rather than moral or "family" issues. This is a problem both of conceptualization and of public posturing.

On the other side, critics have charged that the New Right may be insensitive to procedural guarantees provided by the Constitution and that their aim is to homogenize the populace beyond any common set of values imagined by the liberal proponents of a welfare state. To be sure, hidden not far under the surface of rhetoric against state intervention, the New Right has a very impressive understanding of the way that state power and politics can be used to legislate and enforce values. It's very important here to keep clearly in mind the distinction between believing that some act is moral or immoral and legislating that only one sort of behavior will be accepted in the United States. Therefore, it seems very important not to concentrate on one or another dramatic issue in the various platforms but to really confront head on the fact that we seem to be divided over central views of society and of human values. The New Right may indeed be correct that the struggle is one over the issue of whose essential values should prevail in the tone and governance of the United States. Let me close with a quote from Jim Bakker, the television evangelist, who says:

"Christianity is a lifestyle, not a religious experience."

It behooves both sides to clarify for themselves and for the public what lifestyle they are fighting for.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION II: ON TRADITIONAL VALUES

AND THE PROS AND CONS OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCES ON CHILDREN*

CAROL JAFFE, professor at Bryn Mawr School of Social Work commented that CONNIE MARSHNER seemed to express more sympathy for working mothers than do most New Right leaders. "But how do you reconcile such a strict dichotomy between 'traditional' and 'modernist' values and this sympathy for working mothers?" Jaffe asked Marshner. "How can a mother who has to be out of the house eight or nine hours a day retain traditional values," such as the idea that a mother must nurture and be the prime caretaker of her children?

"It depends what she does when she's in the house," Marshner replied. "I mean, the form your family takes really doesn't have any relationship to the values that your family has." Marshner said she agreed with John Bowlby and Selma Fraiberg that it is "a desideratum" for the child to have a single constant loving figure--either the mother or the father--for the first three to five years. But, she said, "if you have to work, or if you're a widow or divorced or whatever, there is no evil in working, so long as the children are not suffering." However, there is a problem, Marshner said, "with women who put such a high priority on their careers that they don't care if their children suffer."

EDWARD ZIGLER said he agreed with Marshner that government officials

*[Editors' note: Parts of this discussion were lost from the tapes.]

in Washington did not take child and family issues very seriously. Noting that he was very troubled by the Reagan administration's decision not to hold a White House Conference on Children, which has been held every 10 years since 1909, Zigler asked how Marshner felt about the decision to cancel the national conference.

Marshner replied that she supported the decision to cancel the national conference and to hold state conferences instead. The problem with a national conference on child and family issues, she said, is that it "would not have been a forum in which the citizens, the parents, the families, would have discussed what was wrong." Instead, Marshner said, it would have been a forum for "professionals, academics, disgruntled human service people, and grant junkies" to voice their grievances about block grants. Citing Alan Crawford's statistics, she said that at the last White House Conference on Families "50 percent of the New York delegation were PhDs and most of them were on the federal payroll.... That's not the families of America."

WHY ARE THERE TWO CHILDREN'S LOBBIES?

Edward Zigler

There is much concern and considerable malaise today about the state of the American family. This concern appears to be an outgrowth of some striking changes in the characteristics and/or demographics of the family in America. Perhaps foremost among these changes is the rapid entrance of mothers into the paid workforce. From 1948 to 1980, the percentage of mothers working grew from 18% to 52% (and, according to our best extrapolation, this percentage will increase to 75% by the end of this decade.)

Another significant change is that 40% of all marriages in America now end in divorce. One child in six is currently being raised in a home headed by a single parent, usually a mother; and, if present trends continue, 50% of children born this year will spend some part of their childhood in a single-parent home. Pregnancy among unmarried women has more than doubled in the last 20 years: in 1960, one out of every 20 women giving birth was not married; today the figure is about one in eight. Among teenagers, there are about one million instances per year of pregnancy, with about 400,000 live births to teenage parents. Gonorrhea has tripled in the last 10 years among children less than 14 years old.

Still another disturbing fact is that 350,000 children continue to live inadequate, aimless lives in America's foster care system, a system whose bankruptcy is now well-documented. And among young people ages 15 to 20, the second most common cause of death is suicide.

The response to this disquieting state of affairs has been the emergence on the national scene of two opposing lobbies. Both lobbies assert that they are "pro-family" and wish to do nothing more than to correct or ameliorate the problems currently plaguing the American family. When nonpejorative labels are employed, one lobby, whose history can be traced back to Settlement House efforts at the turn of the century, is referred to as "liberal" or "left-wing." The second lobby which became an organized force during the 1970s, is usually referred to as "conservative" or "right-wing."

These labels currently have too little concrete meaning. Thus, rather than attempt to force the lobbies to fit these glib labels too neatly, I propose that we focus instead on the public stance each lobby adopts in regard to circumscribed issues that are currently of consequence in the child and family life field. In taking a specific issues approach, rather than an ideological one, I find myself in concurrence with Diane Ravitch, who, in response to the highly polarized White House Conference on Families, wrote in the New Republic (June 28, 1980):

> To the extent that the agenda of family policy is directed to such clear-cut but currently unfashionable issues as child welfare and maternal health, or to children's allowances and a guaranteed minimum income, then the possibility of devising a national consensus and a national policy exists. But if the agenda for formulating family policy continues to be a vehicle for the concerns of special groups, be they feminists, homosexuals, professional service providers, the new left, or the new right, then the issue will be mired in terminal political and ideological controversy.

Before comparing these two "pro-family" lobbies on specific child and family issues, I want to underscore several points. First, neither lobby is a monolithic entity. Both are characterized by factions and differences of opinion. Given the fragmented and complex nature of both lobbies, any tidy characterization of either lobby, even in the analysis

of a single issue, is fraught with the danger of oversimplification. Each lobby represents something of a Rorschach test, and the best any analyst can do is to present his or her perception of each lobby. A caveat is therefore in order: anyone's perceptions of the two lobbies must contain idiosyncratic aspects. This caveat is doubly necessary in view of the fact that, for the past 25 years, my efforts have been associated with one rather than the other of the two lobbies under analysis. (That I am something of a neutral, though, is attested to by the fact that I have worked on child and family issues with the past five administrations, both Democratic and Republican, and my only formal stint as a public servant came when I was named first Director of the Office of Child Development and Chief of the Children's Bureau by President Nixon.)

Second, in terms of mounting an effective campaign capable of influencing decisionmakers in the federal, executive, and legislative branches, one particular element of the conservative lobby, the New Right, is currently the stronger of the two lobbies. The power of the New Right lobby on child and family issues was first apparent in prompting President Nixon's harsh veto of the 1971 Child Development bill. This lobby went on to defeat the Mondale-Brademas Child and Family Services Act in 1975, and each successive attempt at comprehensive legislation designed to promote a variety of public and private responses to the child care needs of working parents. The demise of the National Coalition of Organizations for Children and Youth--a linchpin of the liberal lobby--only served to underscore the growing strength of the New Right.

However, it is easier to stop a bill than to initiate one, and traditionally the right wing has stopped bills. Thus, the fate of the

Laxalt-Hansen bill, or the Family Protection Act, which is the "child" of the New Right, will be an important test of their actual effectiveness in Congress. Despite the power of the right-wing lobby, moreover, the liberal lobby is far from impotent. This lobby has played an important role in maintaining America's Head Start program, and in keeping this program out of the new Department of Education. (While it is too soon to tell, the liberal lobby may also be more successful than many feared in protecting certain child welfare programs from inclusion in the Reagan administration's block grants.)

My third general point is that both lobbies, in viewing each other, have been content to deal in stereotypes and caricatures rather than to attempt honestly to comprehend each other's views. As a result, instead of beneficial dialogue which could deepen the understanding of both groups, each lobby has been content with little more than trading shrill invectives when dealing with its counterpart. Thus, the Conservative Digest of May/June 1980 asks the titilating question: "Should the federal government regulate relations between husband and wife and between parent and child?" The fact is that no one has advocated that the federal government assume such a role. Similarly, the Conservative Digest of April 1979, after noting the venom of many of the speakers at the National Education Association's three-day conference in February 1979, attributed to this meeting of school teachers the following views:

> Profits are evil. We need a redistribution of wealth in this country. Businessmen are against safety and a clean environment. The Soviets are no threat. Defense spending is the cause of inflation. NATO is costly and bad. In education there is practically no role for the family and rights for the parents.

Liberal groups have also been cavalier in presenting the views and concerns of single-issue groups as blanket dismissals of the conservative

lobby. Thus, Day Care and Child Development Reports of April 20, 1981 lumps the complex and variegated conservative effort under the umbrella of the "pro-family" movement:

> The "Pro-Family" movement is a coalition of groups opposing abortion, federal funding for programs that affect the family such as child care and domestic violence prevention; the Equal Rights Amendment; pornography, and homosexual rights. They are for prayer in schools, tuition tax credits and the traditional family roles of mother as homemaker and father as breadwinner.

A great step forward could be taken if we could but agree that both lobbies contain many caring and concerned citizens dedicated to improving the quality of life of American children and families. Of one thing we can be sure: both groups are made up of patriotic Americans who are employing our political processes in the best traditions of a democratic society. Neither lobby is nihilistic, and both lobbies display considerable confidence that our nation can solve the problems confronting the American family if we as a nation would but display the courage to do so. Thus, however else I may disagree with him, I find myself in complete agreement with at least one statement of Senator Paul Laxalt, one of the leaders of the New Right, who said: "I am optimistic about the fate of the American spirit and family. I have faith in the American Dream, and I intend to do everything in my limited power to make sure it continues to be an achievable goal" (Conservative Digest, May/June, 1980).

Turning to the difference in the two lobbies, I think they differ on certain underlying principles which influence the positions they take on specific issues. First, the liberal lobby's values tend to be relativistic, whereas the values of the New Right lobby tend to be absolute. Thus, Paul Weyrich, who founded the conservative political action committee, The Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, states:

What is behind the thrust against the traditional family

> values? Well, first of all, from our point of view, this is really the most significant battle of the age-old conflict between good and evil, between the forces of God and the forces against God, that we have seen in our country. We see the anti-family movement as an attempt to prevent souls from reaching eternal salvation and as such we feel not just a political commitment to change this situation, but a moral and, if you will, a religious commitment to battle these forces. (Conservative Digest, May/June 1980)

However, the liberal lobby (despite its discomfort with absolute values) displays a similar religious fervor in its belief in the ultimate perfectibility of every child and family if we but engaged in enough social engineering. The liberals' heaven on earth consists of families that never experience poverty, children that never experience disease, and a society in which domestic affairs always take precedence over foreign affairs. The liberal lobby's commitment to the secular over the religious has led it to hamstring itself in regard to utilizing the church as a natural family support system, thereby completely overlooking the strong role the church plays in many communities, especially among blacks, Chicanos, and rural whites that are frequently the "targets" of social action programs.

A second basic difference between the two lobbies is that while the left believes in social engineering, they treat the new demographics as the givens of any social action program, and then proceed to "play 'em as they lay." The extreme right, however, believes that current social trends are not inexorable; on the contrary, they insist that these trends are completely reversible. That is, the New Right lobby starts with the premise that the climbing rate of working mothers and single-parent families can be reversed, thereby removing the need for many social programs.

Yet another basic difference between the two lobbies is that the

New Right tends to prescribe and proscribe the conditions and practices of family life, while the liberal lobby is committed to the importance of families having the opportunity of making a free choice among real alternatives.

With regard to differences in values between left and right wing, Henry Fairlee summed them up with considerable cogency: "All that is represented by flag and family and God is felt to be in danger. The conservatives won on these issues because they believed something at least; the liberals lost on them because they appeared to believe little or nothing" (New Republic, January 31, 1981). Yet, while Fairlee sees a great chasm between liberal and conservative values, it should be noted that both groups attribute an unqualified primacy to the family. No committed child developmentalist could disagree with the following statement of Howard Phillips, Director of the Conservative Caucus, to the White House Conference on Families: "From the beginning of recorded history, the family has been the basic unit of civilization. It is through the family that we receive our basic training--hygiene, morality, sociability, creativity, economic, communications, preception, deportment, self-preservation, and much else, as well" (Conservative Digest, March, 1980). Both lobbies may even be said to view their task as the bringing about of those social conditions that assist families in assuming their age-old role as the primary socializers of children. Both lobbies would also agree that children should be raised by their families, and not by personnel of early childhood intervention programs, or the school, or any level of government.

If all elements in both the liberal and conservative lobbies agreed on this basic principle of the primacy of the family, why has there been

so much misunderstanding and accusation of anti-family bias on the part of each lobby toward the other? One of the major sources of misunderstanding concerns the role of the homemaker: the conservative lobby emphasizes the role of the homemaker as the primary caretaker of her children, while the liberal lobby does not. How ingrained the idea of mother as homemaker is in the more general conservative thought remains an open question. According to a Harris poll conducted for General Mills recently, a group identified as "traditionalists" joined with feminists, labor leaders, and working men and women alike in rejecting traditional assumptions regarding the responsibilities of breadwinners and the care of home and children. All groups (i.e., including the group identified as traditionalists) said they believed that: a.) rearing children should be the responsibility of both parents; b.) financial decisions should be shared by both parents; and c.) decisions about housework and family activities should be shared.

Nevertheless, some conservatives have emphasized the value of the role of the woman as homemaker, while the liberals generally have not The liberals have been much more concerned about the 52% of mothers in the work force than about those 48% of mothers who choose to do their demanding work in the home. Feminists have been particularly slow in embracing full-time homemakers as part of the women's movement. The liberal lobby is generally viewed as having disparaged the role of woman as homemaker. The subliminal message this lobby sends is that the woman who remains at home is lacking in self-actualization, is unfulfilled and perhaps lazy. While liberals have never explicitly espoused such a view, they have not been particularly forceful in championing the role of homemaker or fighting for benefits for women who choose this role.

The battle between the conservative and liberal lobbies has been costly to all women. During the past decade, American women have been caught in the middle of an ideological battleground. Many of the 50% of mothers who are working outside of the home are made to feel guilty that they may be neglecting their families, while many of the 50% of mothers who remain at home are made to feel guilty for not displaying the initiative involved in joining the formal work force. Thus, both groups seem to be fostering a feeling among women that, in regard to working or not working, you're always in a no-win situation. In view of this, it is not particularly surprising to discover that the incidence of depression is markedly higher in women than in men.

Full-time female homemakers appear to be an isolated group, possessing attitudes and opinions markedly divergent from the rest of American society. Thus, in the recent Harris poll, a 46-to-41 percent plurality of the respondents, when asked about homemaking as a full-time job, said they were convinced that it has more disadvantages than advantages compared with other jobs. However, women who are currently homemakers disagreed by a 2-to-1 margin. It seems clear that liberals will lose the support of female homemakers if they do not begin to emphasize the value and importance of homemaking and if they do not speak in behalf of this underappreciated and often ignored constituency. I for one find it easy to endorse Rae Andres' recent assertion in the New York Times that: "The social cost of today's reduced status of homemaking will be measured by the children we rear. If homemaking continues to be a low-esteem, low-security job, if it continues to be seen as a role to escape rather than to embrace, then our families and our children will suffer."

Another source of misunderstanding between the two lobbies may be

closely related to the first. While the conservative lobby tends to praise the joys of family life and emphasize what's right about it, the liberals tend to dwell on the litany of problems. In fact, liberal advocates may have committed a strategic error by constantly reciting the list of disturbing social indicators. In so doing, liberals may have inadvertently introduced a credibility gap, setting up themselves and the programs they advocate as the cause, rather than the possible solution, to the problems ailing the American family.

Finally, there is one major philosophical difference which underlies much of the communications gap between conservatives and liberals on child and family issues: while most conservatives explicitly oppose government intrusion in family affairs, liberals tend to feel that government action can be beneficial, or at least that the benefits offset the downside risks.

Now I want to turn to the two lobbies' views on specific issues. I know I am oversimplifying here, but I think the comparison still represents a fair view of where the two lobbies stand.

Issue number one is abortion: conservatives generally oppose abortion on moral grounds, while the liberals are in favor of the choice being left up to the pregnant woman. Neo-conservatives don't always oppose abortion themselves, but want to keep the federal government out of it.

Issue number two, day care: the New Right lobby conveys the message that day care should not be more available, while liberals advocate expanding access to day care with specific recommendations ranging all the way from universal free day care to the Connable bill, with its provision of tax credits for the cost of care.

Issue number three, the state versus the federal role: the conservative lobby has more confidence in the states, forgetting what liberals call the "Mississippi syndrome," where some states cannot be trusted to deliver services equitably. At the same time, the liberal lobby probably has more confidence in the federal government than it merits. For I say to you, yes, there is a Mississippi, an Alabama, an Arkansas. But that does not necessarily mean that all policy should be designed to circumvent the states.

Issue number four, attitudes toward business and the private sector: the conservative lobby is generally positive; the liberals are generally suspicious. Yet, I think that in many ways this is a non-issue. In trying to combat many of the problems facing children and families today, there must be a partnership between the public and the private sectors, and in many cases the private sector is likely to be much more influential than the federal government.

Issue number five, child abuse: the liberal lobby tends to look for government regulation to control child abuse, whereas the right tends to emphasize that there is too much reporting of abuse and government intrusion into private lives. Some liberals lean toward this view as well.

Issue number six, parent education: the left is inclined to be more enthusiastic; the right, which is worried about values inculcation, tends to be in favor if they can specify the type of education.

Issue number seven, Head Start: the liberal lobby is supportive of and positive about Head Start. The conservative lobby is against it, which is surprising, because conservatives often call for giving more control of education back to parents, and parents have more control of Head Start than any other social program.

Issue number eight, attitudes toward social service professionals: the left tolerates them; the right has little use for them. Neo-conservatives, in the person of Pat Moynihan, also oppose them.

Issue number nine, the Laxalt-Hansen bill, or the Family Protection Act: the New Right lobby is in favor of the Family Protection Act. The liberals are opposed on what are, interestingly enough, traditionally conservative grounds, namely that the bill calls for far too much government intrusion into the family and into control of the schools. In fact, this same criticism of the Family Protection Act was also recently adopted by the well-known conservative columnist, James J. Kilpatrick.

Issue number ten, social science research: the liberal lobby views social science research as a technological tool and as ideologically neutral. In so doing, the left basically accepts Donald Campbell's vision of the experimenting society. According to Campbell's vision, evaluation of social programs is crucial to hold them accountable, and the knowledge gained from social science research is considered useful to the formation of social policy.

The right, on the other hand, tends to follow the view of social science held by Representative John Ashbrook, who has stated (Conservative Digest, May/June, 1980): "Instead of opening the door for Congressionally mandated research grants, we should avoid having funds going into such areas by phasing out social science funding altogether."

Why does the conservative lobby feel such animosity toward social science research? In part, I think, it is because sometimes the research does sound frightening to the right, who fear that social scientists are really out to replace the family. And sometimes social scientists have been insensitive to such fears. I think of such efforts as the Milwaukee

and the Abecederian projects. When one reads descriptions of these projects' aims, they sometimes do sound as if the researchers were proposing to take children away from their families at a few weeks of age and put them in a center from 7:30 in the morning until 5:30 at night for about 50 weeks a year, from five weeks after birth until five years of age. If we look at it that way, it is scary. And one says, "Aha!--they are going to replace the American family. We're going to have these elitist social scientists raising children." But, of course, that is the farthest thing from Craig Ramey's mind. But it would have behooved Craig Ramey and the others responsible for that project to get a clear message to the world concerning what it is that they're trying to do. It isn't enough to say that they know what they're trying to do, if the rest of the world is getting the wrong message. So I'm saying to my colleagues in the social science field: be cautious; be careful; say what you're doing; say what your long-term goals are and where you're trying to get to in a way that most people can understand.

Now, on the social science front, I'm afraid I must assert that elements of the right-wing lobby do engage in a form of social science. But it's one that I cannot stomach. I can best describe it as pseudo-social science. It has the trappings of science; it is not true to the spirit of a true science. By "the trappings" I mean lots and lots of references. More often than not, the pseudo-social scientist begins with a foregone conclusion and the mistaken evidence in favor of it, ignoring all the evidence in opposition. It is, of course, a very short step from such an approach to the use of deception.

Let me give you some concrete examples, because I know my charges are tough. During the testimony for the 1971 Child Care bill, Senator

James L. Buckley, for whom our speaker yesterday (Alan Crawford) once worked, decided that he would get an expert to come in and tell the committee holding the hearings how bad day care was. So Dale Meers came to give this testimony, and in the process of giving that testimony, he totally confused the difference between day care and the 24-hour long-term care of children in custodial institutions. (This he did by equating one with the other and then citing studies of the shocking effects of 24-hour institutional care on children.)

I refer you, finally, to two books by an individual that I consider a "hatchet man" of the right, and that person is Raymond Moore of the Hewitt Foundation. His two books are called School Can Wait and Home Grown Kids. I've read these books carefully. They're both transparent efforts to tell mothers not to go to work, to stay home. In fact, the basic thesis of both books is that the very nature of the human brain is such that a child is not prepared for school until he reaches ten years of age, which means one parent, usually the mother, must stay home with that child until he is ten, if the child is going to develop optimally. The book has no scientific credibility with me, nor with neurophysiologists, nor with anyone who understands the first thing about the nature of the human brain. Yet, it passes itself off as science. And, of course, no scientific treatise can be written without acknowledgements. After passing over what I considered the ridiculous idea that a child can't go to school until he's ten, because that's what social science tells us, I looked over the acknowledgements in one of the books and discovered that the people acknowledged included Harold Stevenson, Jean Piaget, Jerry Brunner, Jerry Kagan, and lo and behold, Edward Zigler! I appeared on the "Today Show" with Dr. Moore, and I said to him, "This

is an idea that I would argue against vehemently. How could you possibly list me in your acknowledgements?" And his reply was, "Dr. Zigler, your work has influenced me a great deal."

So, I will conclude this section by saying I believe that there is a need for social science, and I join with both Connie Marshner and Ellen Hoffman in saying I, too, am a social activist. The only point of view that's been presented so far here that I cannot personally adopt, is the just-stand-there-and-somehow-things-will-get-better approach. I continue to feel that if you're not a part of the solution, you're a part of the problem. I'm not so much interested in what solution you come up with, as long as you're trying to solve a problem that society has.

I do not wish to identify myself as a liberal or a conservative. I consider myself a pragmatic problem solver, and I use social science to do so. I think we have many problems in society, and contrary to what I heard some others saying, I consider teenage pregnancy a problem. Which group am I talking about? I'm not talking about 19-year-old married women: I'm talking about 13- and 14-year-old girls who are having one child, often followed by a second or a third. I know what happens to those lives, and I have no hesitancy in saying I am opposed to it on psychological grounds, on grounds of what is best for the optimal development of young people and children. But how are we to discover what causes teenage pregnancy or how to prevent it without the use of social science? I'm saying that social science is a tool, and it will continue to be used as a tool if this society is serious in answering and solving the problems confronting it.

Now I conclude, and with some temerity, with a suggestion for a brief agenda for cooperation between the two lobbies. I think whatever

else happens here, getting in the same room, seeing each other--Connie Marshner has neither horns nor tail, and Ellen Hoffman seems perfectly reasonable to me--meeting each other, talking, beginning the dialogue has great value to me.

So I have studied hard, and maybe I'm being somewhat over optimistic or obtuse, but I would like to think that there is a possible agenda for cooperation between these two forces in the American scene. First of all, I join with Connie Marshner in thinking that this nation has not paid enough attention to the problems of the family, or to children, or to what has made this nation great. I do not think that the conservative lobby, as a whole, will last very long if it does not broaden its base and pull in the uncommitted. For too many years, both lobbies have been preaching to the already converted. We must now team up to try to capture the large middle group which has no allegiances. Perhaps by working together we can create a broad-based force that will finally bring families and children into the point of prominence in the national concern that they merit.

Now, as I read the demographics on the situation of women, I've come to the conclusion that, for most women, work and family are not either/or propositions. Most women would like to do both. They say so, and I'm willing to take them at their word. This means we have to find some ways, particularly by working in the private sector, by which women can pursue both roles. Why don't we then team up to see if we can produce more part-time jobs for women in this country? We can team up on issues like getting flexitime into American industry. We could greatly help women to pursue both roles simply by bringing about in this country school-age day care, for which models do exist. Both groups

could certainly espouse the value of school-age day care.

Here is a more tenative suggestion: when I think of the new social forms that I have witnessed coming into being in this country, the form that gives me, as a psychologist, the most difficulty is a phenomenon that I never thought that I would live to see in my lifetime, and that is women routinely placing three-week, five-week, and six-week old infants into group care. Now, there is a big argument among psychologists concerning whether this is damaging or not. Those who say it's not include such illustrious figures as Jerry Kagan of Harvard and Bettye M. Caldwell at Arkansas. On the other hand, we have other psychologists who warn us that this can be very dangerous. These include such luminaries as Mary Ainsworth, a student of John Bowlby; John Bowlby himself; and Selma Fraiberg. Which of the group of experts is right? I do not know. But I know one thing: if there is damage being done, we will not even know it for ten or twelve years, until longitudinal studies are mounted that will show us. We are essentially, I think, shooting dice with children and infant day care.

What then might be the solution? If the conservative lobby says they are against infant day care and would like to see mothers spend more time with their own children, especially in that very critical first few months of life, why can't they team up with liberal social scientists and say that what we need in this country is not more infant day care, that may be damaging, but six-month paid maternity leaves? What we really need is real choices for women. Now if this sounds like pie in the sky, remember that most industrialized nations already have this. We are one of the few nations that do not allow a woman who has just had a baby a period of time, paid, at home with that child, so the bond that Bowlby

talks about, that Ainsworth talks about, can develop. So I say to you, this would be one of the great social revolutions of this society, and it may well be an area where the liberals and conservatives can team up, since I think that the things we've got to say to each other are mutually supportive.

Foster care, which has come up several times, is another area. George Will, a well-known conservative, stated last Saturday night on "Agronsky and Company": "Do we really want to woo child welfare back to 1935?" He said that's not what conservatives stand for. The foster care system in this country is anathema to everything we believe in as a society. It's bad for children, it's bad for our fiscal management. I can see the liberal and conservative lobbies teaming up on foster care.

Another possible area for mutual concern and effort is accident prevention. As many of you know, I've been very concerned by one phenomenon that has gone totally unaddressed by either lobby--that is, accidents and children. We have not even transmitted to the American people the information that more children in this country die of accidents than of all childhood diseases combined. Our response to this--by government, by the private sector, by everybody--is captured by semantics: an accident is an accident is an accident. But any family that's ever gone through the death of a child in an accident can tell you that this phenomenon has no political label. It's heart-rendering. And I believe this country can mount an accident prevention program that would cut down on the number of accidents that are now a plague among our young children. I am currently working with New Right conservatives, Senator Orrin Hatch and his staff, on such a program. It is exactly the same program that I was working on with Dr. Julius Richmond, when he was the Democratic

Surgeon General in the last administration.

The point here is that there are certain issues and certain concerns that people have in this country that cut across lobbies, that cut across political labels. We must find those issues and we must work on them. I was pleased, in reading--doing my homework--for this meeting, that the conservative lobby is in favor of something that I have been in favor of for a good number of years, and that is the creation of a position in this nation of counselor to the President for the family. Family concerns, children's concerns are all over Washington. We need somebody at the level of the White House to be the focal point--somebody we can take our concerns to. Now, of course, the conservative lobby would like that person to be conservative; the liberal lobby would like that person to be a liberal. I for one will take my chances with whomever assumes that role, because in it I see a very important symbol: the problems of the family, the concerns of home and heart, are very central to the concerns of all Americans and deserve this kind of visibility. This, then, is my own personal agenda. Those of you who know me know that I will seek out my friends in the conservative lobby (and anybody else that will listen to me) and do all I can to make some of these things happen.

SHOULD THERE BE A FAMILY POLICY?

Nathan Glazer

I'm very impressed with the conference program that I received. I had intended to enlighten myself more than I have on issues of family policy by being here for the entire conference, but events have made it impossible to do so. As a result, I am afraid my talk will breathe a little bit of distance from the kinds of immediate issues that Professor Edward Zigler so well brought out.

I have a more general presentation which indicates some of the difficulties in creating what, for some years, people have talked about--a national family policy. While Professor Zigler and I have chosen different perspectives, I hope that in the discussion we can bridge some of the distance between us. But rather than doing that in my talk, I'll give the talk as I have mapped it out.

Recently I have been reading Joseph Califano's memoirs, which will appear shortly under the title Governing America. It's a fascinating book for anyone interested in the problem of family policy, and it will remind us of many things that we have forgotten as well as things we probably don't know. For example, on the first page of the book we learn that Joe Califano was contacted by President Jimmy Carter through Senator Walter Mondale after the Democratic Convention, specifically because Carter was looking for an expert on family policy. Mondale told Califano, "Jimmy wants to talk about the family at his first post-

convention appearance in Manchester, New Hampshire. He'd like your help on the speech." The next day, Carter did call Califano and said, "Too much federal policy is anti-family. I want to make it pro-family. The welfare system breaks up families, and we've got old people living in sin because they lose Social Security benefits by getting married." Then Mondale also told him, "Jimmy wants to announce in his speech that he's asking you to report on how government programs affect the family." When they met in Manchester, Carter did ask Califano to undertake a report on the family.

There is one other point in the book which introduces issues that we may have forgotten. We may think the abortion issue has reached a peak never before heralded. It has, but it certainly was no minor issue for Califano and Carter; the abortion fight is the first big chapter in Califano's book. In fact, Carter had taken a strong stand against government-funded abortion--if you remember that, I had forgotten it. Califano also had taken a strong stand against government-funded abortions. They both were very sincere about this. I will indicate in a moment how sincere they were. They had the problem of running a department which was funding abortions substantially, on Medicaid. Califano reports: "Jimmy Carter first talked to me about abortion when we lunched alone in Manchester, New Hampshire in early August, 1976. He expressed his unyielding opposition to abortion and his determination to stop government funding of abortions."

Then the problem came up that the Supreme Court did not bail them out, because it did not declare the Hyde Amendement unconstitutional. If it had, that would have meant that Carter and Califano could have said, on the one hand, "We're against abortions"--which they were--and on the

other hand, they could have said to their supporters, "We can't help it; the Supreme Court has ruled that we must continue to fund them." And so the issue was thrown into Congress, and became a very fierce issue. The federal budget was held up in 1977 for almost three months, as the issue was fought out between the House and the Senate. Eventually a form of prohibition of Medicaid funding of abortions was agreed on in the course of this fight. During the Congressional debate it came out that in 1975 there had been more abortions in the District of Columbia than births, and that the proportion of abortions that were funded by Medicaid was at least more than half. That did not help.

Eventually compromises were worked out. One of the issues that was compromised was that pregnancies resulting from incest or rape could be "voided" by "medical procedures"--the term was used for something that did not mean abortion--which could be paid for under Medicaid if the incidents were reported promptly. Well, you know what the next phase of the fight was: What is prompt? As they wrote the regulations, they battled it out with various lobbies on either side saying, "What is prompt?" And they decided prompt was 60 days. And, interestingly enough, Carter was very unhappy with that decision.

Well, why do I begin with this story, aside from the fact that I just read it and I think it's relevant? One reason I begin with it is to point out that everybody seems to want "family policy." Everybody even seems to want certain <u>specific</u> <u>things</u> about family policy. I don't literally mean everybody, but I do mean both a Democratic administration and a Republican administration. And yet, just about nothing happened in the area of family policy under the Carter administration. I wonder if anything will happen in the Reagan administration? And so I wanted to

raise the question: Why is it so hard if we are all concerned about family policy? If this was a matter of such urgency for Carter, and is a matter of such urgency for the present administration, why don't we do anything about it? It is probably a naive question, and you can all think of the answer, but nevertheless, I will pursue the question briefly.

Of course, I also want to point to the issue of whether anything <u>can</u> be done about it, or <u>should</u> be done about it. Now, let us begin with the obvious. Of course, federal policy, as well as local and state policy and judicial actions, do affect the family. If, then, there is a feeling that something is wrong with the family (and we know there is a widespread feeling about this; Dr. Zigler listed many of the concerns about the family), people will try to get government policy which affects the family changed in such a way so that those bad things will happen less. So given the question, you might ask: What does bother people about the family? In theory, we could list quite a number of things that bother people: an increasing divorce rate, an increasing rate of illegitimacy, an increasing number of female-headed families, and beyond that, the fear that these conditions are leading to children being poorly raised, which leads to psychological illness, juvenile delinquency, poor discipline in the schools, youth unemployment and many other ills.

With such an agenda of concerns, one would think it would be possible to come together on some lines of family policy that a consensus of the American people would approve. But this turns out not to be the case. It may be possible to get consensus on a general statement of family policy in a campaign. In order to achieve this, one need only refer vaguely to family problems, arousing the concern that lurks in every heart. But this won't do when we get to policy making, because the fact

is, there is no consensus in the concrete over many of the issues. I was going to say there was no consensus on any of the issues, but Dr. Zigler reminded me of many areas where I think there probably could be consensus.

But there is no consensus about many of the important things that bother us. We are deeply divided, for example, as to how we evaluate the ills that we reel off when we speak of the ills of the family. We know there's an increase in the divorce rate. Leaving aside the position of the Catholic Church, the fact is that most of us do not think that divorce is a bad thing for us individually. Clearly, the 40% of the married people who break up and divorce don't think that--they may to some extent, but they think it's better than something else. We may think, and we do think, that these figures portray something bad for the country. Divorce is resorted to by individuals when they find they prefer to live apart or with someone else. The legislation limiting divorce has become easier and easier--one recalls the time when we used to go to Mexico for divorces --and would we want it otherwise? There is a great difference between a national problem and an individual problem. Even if something national in the way of policies contributed to something individual, the line from one to the other is not clear.

To continue on divorce (which I realize is not in the center of a discussion of family policy, though it is in the center of the discussion when one talks about what's wrong with the family), I will give you an amusing interjection. A student of mine in the graduate school of education is from Taiwan and two of his five children are enrolled in a nursery school behind his house in Cambridge. He was reporting to a class on another subject entirely, but was so shaken by a discovery about the nursery school that he could not help telling us in the middle of

his report that all the children in the nursery school were from divorced families and that the head of the nursery school has written a bestseller--or so he said--a book called The Divorce Book on how to handle divorce. This was the most astonishing thing my student found out in America.

To return: to some people, divorce is a problem. And we could even think of things we could do about it. We could reduce divorce by making divorce harder through law. But hardly anyone is for doing that, as far as I know. We also know other conditions that probably increased divorce. For example, one of the things that has probably increased divorce is the reduction of the stigma over divorce. People aren't embarrassed to say they were divorced. Another thing that has probably increased divorce is the availability of welfare for mothers living alone with their children. When we look into what national policy could do about any of these things, we see the inevitability of irreducible conflicts. Would we want to increase the stigma over divorce--for example, label the "divorced" children in school? Would we want to deprive women left with young children, as a result of the father's decision or of their own, of the minimum necessary for support--would we want not to give them that minimum? I see no votes for that either.

Another argument for divorce, certainly, is the picture of the joys of irresponsible sex, which is, I'm sure, an extremely important argument for it. Novels that used to be read in secret are now presented on telvision. At one time, only some people knew what possibilities existed in life, and now everybody knows. In fact, everybody even knows about possibilities that probably don't exist in life. But would we want to censor novels, movies, and television shows about escape from the marriage state, or living outside the marriage state and accepting its discipline,

which are regularly shown and which depict such states as more pleasurable than monogamous marriage? Perhaps we have a few votes for that. But, then, we have the Supreme Court and the defendants of the First Amendment, too.

Illegitimacy is a problem, certainly illegitimacy among young teenagers. Undoubtedly, some part of its increase--I don't know if social scientists would agree--could be seen as a product of various public actions, or of social developments that might be affected by public action. Thus, we no longer treat illegitimate children differently from legitimate ones. Or, if there are any differences left, I'm sure public interest lawyers are at work hunting them out and eliminating them. I'm not against that, I'm for it. I don't think illegitimate children should be treated differently, but undoubtedly, when illegitimate children were treated differently, it served as some restraint upon having illegitimate children. I would think so. I believe that people are modestly, mildly affected by rational restraints. If we look at 19th-century novels, we see how the stigma of illegitimacy may have affected behavior. Of course, most of the novels explain how people broke through that, but they had a lot more to break through than we have today. And, presumably, when there was a lot more to break through, fewer broke through. We no longer stigmatize illegitimate children and we would not want to. Illegitimate children are entitled to the same support from AFDC as legitimate children. Would you want it otherwise?

The female-headed family is a similar case. There we see (and I now come back to my Califano/Carter story) the direct conflict between a generally asserted goal--keep the family together, try to reduce breakup, and try to reduce single female headship of families--and a policy

measure that for a long time was presented as the ideal one that would keep the family together. President Carter referred to it in that first conversation I quoted: "The welfare system breaks up families," he told Joe Califano. He was right, literally, but what he meant was that a defect in the welfare system, which we can repair, breaks up families. But about that he was wrong. We know he meant that because he, like President Nixon before him, introduced a reform to repair that defect. But it turned out it was no defect in the welfare system that broke up families. It was the welfare system--in fact, the reformed and improved one--that seemed even more effective in breaking up families than the unreformed one. Most of you know the story, since you're interested in family issues. If we provide public aid for only those families in poverty where there is no father present or where the father cannot work, why then some families will break up, either in reality--under the pressures of the opportunity presented to the mother, or because the father could only get assistance for the child by leaving--or they will break up in appearance, where the father acts as if he had abandoned the family. We thought that was the problem. And it seemed there was an easy answer: Don't restrict aid for the poor only to families headed by women, but make it available to all poor families. It seemed reasonable. As long ago as 1969 we debated welfare reform. I must say, I had already noted a problem, because we already had such a reformed and ideal arrangement in New York City, and there was clearly no moderating impact on the rate of family breakup--quite the contrary.

Nevertheless, we kept on trying, and when the same issue came up under President Carter, we did have social scientific evidence, of a sort. All evidence is flawed--that is the first thing, of course, all social

scientists know--but this was a pretty good study by the Stanford Research Institute on income maintenance in Denver and Seattle. The study showed that an unstigmatizing minimum income guarantee, regardless of family status, regulated only by need, seemed to lead to a greater increase in family breakup. We even have a theory now which explains it (which, of course, we didn't have before we started out). Income has two effects on the family as it goes up. One is an independence effect on the woman; the increase in income gives the woman independence. The other effect is that it makes life better and the couple keeps together. How these two effects work together, we don't know. I suppose if we gave couples enough money, the making-life-better effect would overcome the independence effect. But in the studies, the independence effect, the break-up effect, was greater.

At any rate, this is in fact, the issue, among others, that reduced Congressional enthusiasm for the Carter welfare reforms, as other issues had reduced enthusiasm for the Nixon reforms earlier. And for this issue, as for others, there was simply no answer. The aim of family stability (without even considering what we mean by good families and what we mean by bad families) was <u>not</u> going to be aided by a system of income maintenance that was, in effect, designed to <u>enhance</u> family instability.

This is an example of one of those dilemmas that, while rarely this neat, is frequently encountered in social policy. One can present this as a paradox: a policy intended to deal with the problem expands the problem. But, in a sense, it is not a paradox. If we give social security to the disabled, we will have more disabled--another problem Joe Califano had to deal with. If we aid the mothers of illegitimate children, we will probably have more illegitimate children. If we

eliminate, as best we can, the pains of being a single mother of a family, we will have more single mothers of families. Our aim is to deal with a difficult situation that is a problem. That is our aim in all these situations, and a proper aim, but if we make the condition less of a problem, we'll have more of the condition, now that its difficulties are mitigated or moderated. I realize this is too absolute a statement; particularly, listening to Professor Zigler, I feel this is too absolute a statement. There must be certain problems that, when you deal with them, you don't have more of them. But I think it's true of each of the problems I've talked about. If what you're trying to reduce is poverty among female-headed families, and if you aid female heads of families, you will have less poverty among female-headed families, though you will probably also have more female-headed families. So I suppose it's really that kind of package. With some things, you may be lucky and get only the good effects.

I don't know how much discussion there has been of Social Security at this conference, but of course, the aged are also a very important part of the family. I now see books coming out about the disappearance of the grandmother and the grandfather from the home and how important they were for the grandchildren. (Those are the first books; we'll have other studies, undoubtedly, that moderate that initial enthusiasm.) If that's a problem, let me point out, as I have just learned from a very interesting thesis by a graduate student at Harvard on Social Security, that it was Social Security that led to grandmothers and grandfathers leaving their children's homes. No one objects to the fact that Social Security benefits reduced poverty among the aged enormously, increased freedom among them, and changed radically their patterns of living.

Figures indicate that 30 years ago, most of the elderly lived in families where they were not the head of household. In this difficult, dependent position they served as grandmother and grandfather. Today, most of the elderly live in their own homes. The percentage living in nursing homes (while high by certain international standards and low by others) is still a mere 5% or so, double that in recent years. Social Security is our most successful social program. Yet even that had side effects which some people now deplore. There must be ways of dealing with some social problems that don't expand them, or make other problems, but examples are hard to find.

Well, having fenced myself into an impossible corner, is there any way out? Let me explain, to begin with, that I have given an analysis, not a solution. In other words, I think I've explained part of why we have more of the conditions that distress us among families. I haven't explained what we can do about it. The difference is as follows. Alexis de Tocqueville observed 150 years ago that the more generous the poor laws in any country (of course, they were generous nowhere, but still if you went to England, they were more generous then in France, and if you went to France, they were more generous than in Spain and Portugal, because there they didn't even exist), the more poor you had. And that was the first observation of this sort I'm aware of. It couldn't have been much earlier, because there was not much social policy before that, and you probably didn't have all that much then. But having explained this, he could not count on the opposite: The less assistance you gave to the poor, the less poor you would have. You have created a certain kind of dynamic situation, certain relationships, certain expectations, certain, if you will, dependencies. Having created them,

there is no cold-turkey approach to going back to a pre-existing condition. In any case, we didn't like the pre-existing condition to begin with. That's why we had all these policies, all accepted by great majorities.

It's true we can go back a little bit: If we make welfare harder, there will be somewhat fewer people on welfare. We have experience with that. If you make getting divorced, or getting support for illegitimate children, or getting support for abandoned children harder, there may be a modest decrease in the number of families breaking up and creating such categories. I'm not recommending any such policy for purposes of shoring up the family.

Even so, we may go in that direction, to some extent, for purely budgetary reasons, to restrain government expenditures. But there is a logic to the analysis that suggests some guides for policy, if the objectives I've set are truly our objectives: these conditions of the family that concern us. It is that logic that led us to steal away from welfare reform, about which we hear nothing in this administration for the first time in 10 or 12 years. We found out that it couldn't be done without getting some bad with the good.

Should all this lead us to examine any policy from the point of view of its impact on the family? Here I want to consider something which may not have been an issue at the conference, may never be an issue again: that is, the Family Impact Statement movement and the whole problem of judging governmental policies from the point of view of their impact on the family. I would hesitate to recommend any such thing. Now, I'm not sure about a White House counselor on the family, but at least I'm against the Family Impact Statement for a number of reasons. First, except in some exceptional cases, such as welfare reform, it is

hard for us, indeed impossible, to determine what the impact of any policy on the family will be. We might add, even more, that maybe the government and governmental action is not the largest component in creating the changes in the family we have seen. In fact, I think it's not.

I can think of a number of changes which have deeply affected the family in which it is hard to see how national policy could have affected them, except very distantly. Recently, for example, analyses of the family have pointed to the importance of demographic factors. Mary Jo Bane [in Here to Stay] showed that one reason more older people were living alone was that they were the survivors of the generation of the early 1900s--born between 1900 and 1910 or so--in which there were many more childless families and fewer children. So older people have fewer siblings and fewer relatives to live with. I think Social Security, as I have pointed out, is a rather more important factor, but certainly the size of generations plays a role. Now we seem to be going through a series of cycles in which small generations are succeeded by big ones, and, undoubtedly, some of our problems are coming from that. So the small families of the 1900s were succeeded by the big families of the 1920s; the 1930s, small families; and the 1950s, big families. The small families of the sixties and seventies may possibly be succeeded by another somewhat larger family generation in the 1980s and 1990s. Now, it is true that the size of the generations has been affected to some degree by national policies, such as immigration and, perhaps, economic policies, because economic policies leading to boom and bust will affect people's decisions about the size of families. But I simply don't see how immigration policy or national economic policy can be much

influenced by considerations of the size of the generations ten or twenty or thirty years in the future. I just don't think that will happen. We're going to decide on immigration policy on the basis of current factors, not on the basis of what things will look like in twenty years.

The other reason I am doubtful about the Family Impact Statement is that it simply becomes another means of combat, and a somewhat hypocritical one, in which people who oppose or favor a policy on other grounds will argue that it's bad or good for the family. We have seen a good deal of this recently. I know cases (in fact, it's already come up at this conference) in which people who have strong feelings about a particular thing say, "It's bad for the family," or "it's good for the family." For example, a guaranteed income or national health insurance (and maybe those are very good things): people argue in favor of them, as Kenneth Keniston did [in All Our Children: The American Family Under Pressure], that they are necessary for a family policy. (And, similarly, these arguments are used on the other side, too.) I think the example we have of the Environmental Impact Statement is not too encouraging. Such a statement simply becomes one more obstacle in dealing with anything, leading to more use of the courts. For example, you may be against the housing project down the street, and after you have lost your case in fourteen other forums, you say, "It's bad for the environment." Then you have another three years of legal obstruction. So, I'm not sure about the Family Impact Statement on that ground.

Finally, in terms of the large trends affecting the family, what influences me the most in thinking about a national family policy is that I think some of the major things that have affected the family really have nothing to do with government at all. That's hard to believe when

government does everything, and when we rush to it with every problem we have, assuming that if the government can solve a problem, it probably created it. And yet, as I look at those enormous trends affecting the family, I suspect the governmental impact has, in the end, been somewhat minor. For example, the great increase in the percentage of women working and mothers working, an enormous change in all industrial societies: Has government done anything to encourage that? I don't think so. To a modest extent, it has, with equal pay laws and affirmative action. But the increase in women working started before those laws, and I think government action has had a very modest impact. In fact, the increase is occurring in the countries which don't have either affirmative action or equal pay laws. Nor do I think it's anything as simple as bad times. According to that interpretation, government is making life hard for all of us by taking more of our money in taxes so that everybody has to work more. Since I don't like taxes, I'm sort of attracted to that theory, but I still don't believe that's the reason women are working.

Consider something else. Recently, since I have argued with people on affirmative action on one basis or another, I have had to think about the enormous increase of women in medical and law schools. That's obviously going to have an impact on the family. Again, I can't measure it. But these are very demanding professions, and these are the sort of professions where women expect to work terribly hard. Perhaps that may change with the entrance of so many women into these professions, but the whole tradition of it is different: you're <u>supposed</u> to work terribly hard at them, therefore, everyone thinks you can't achieve anything by <u>not</u> working hard. The young lawyer works until 10 or 11 o'clock at night, the doctor works all night on the ward. Well, it's quite something if

one-third of the members of these professions are going to be women. It's going to have an effect on the family. Possibly the children of women lawyers and doctors are the healthiest and the best, I don't know, but it's going to have an effect. Well, government had nothing to do with that. It was entirely some internal change in women's images of what they wanted to do, because I happen to know there are really just about no pressures being put on admissions offices of medical or law schools by government. The change was a kind of spontaneous one.

Another example is the change in sexual mores. I have, I must say, leaned on an article that was published in The Public Interest, by Allan C. Carlson, called "Families, Sex and the Liberal Agenda" (Winter, 1980). (And despite that provocative title, he doesn't go into anything about sex.) He says he does not think that the huge changes in sexual attitudes had much to do with government. There may be some influence in the case of pornography laws, but I suspect that's about all.

I have said three things: first, that government policy has affected the family; second, that undoing a government policy possibly won't bring things back to conditions before the policy and certainly can't be done politically (I'm not recommending it); and third, that many of the important things that affect the family are not the result of government policy. And so, what about government policy and the family? I will argue now--and this, I suppose, is where Dr. Zigler and I diverge, but I'm sure we can find many areas on which we converge--I will argue now that for the large issues (like the divorce rate, the single-family creation rate, the illegitimacy rate), for the big things, the less government does about it or tries to do about it, the better. Possibly, some of you may have seen this coming, as I indicated my caution as to whether we can really know

what the effect of a policy intended to affect the family will be (let alone policies not intended to affect the family), and as I have indicated that many things affecting the family are not government created.

But I have a better reason than any of these, now, in arguing that government should do less about the family. It is that we are so frightfully divided over key issues affecting the family. And government, when it tries to act on any of these issues, will only increase conflict on that issue. So even if government could help, I think it's probably a good time to get government out of it. This division was shown when Carter's White House Conference on Families was disrupted from the start by his appointment of a divorced woman to head it. It was demonstrated further when the questions of abortion and homosexuality ended up being main fights at the various family conferences. (Interestingly enough, by the way, having referred a few times to Califano's fascinating memoirs: he never once mentions the White House Conference on Families. He probably thinks that was too much of a disaster.) I realize we can't get government out of the family. So many things require some decision as to what <u>is</u> a family, what are the parents' rights, what are the children's rights, what are professionals' rights. While we have to deal with these issues when we give out Social Security, when we give out Medicaid or Medicare, or when we determine adoption issues, I find it hard to see how the large issues can be settled politically, those large issues I referred to at the beginning--divorce, illegitimacy, single-parent-headed families.

There is a major split in the American population over these issues. This split is best analyzed in an article in <u>The Public Interest</u> by Peter Skerry (as you see, I only read my own magazine), in which he

analyzes the division over abortion ("The Class Conflict over Abortion," Summer 1378). Abortion has become the great symbolic issue. It has become the symbol of the argument over the family. Skerry pointed out that religion was not the major dividing line over abortion; we all know that now. Catholics are only slightly more opposed to abortion than Protestants. The major division, and it was a striking one indeed, was by education. Thus, on the question, "Should abortions for the first trimester be legal?" (a question asked by public opinion pollsters in 1974 after the first Supreme Court decision), the country divided almost exactly half and half. This is interesting: a half and half division. But 70% of the college-educated said, "Yes, it should be legal," and 70% of the grade-school-educated, said, "No, it should not be legal." The division by income was not so sharp, but parallel to this division. The great division was by degree of enlightenment, if you will (or whatever enlightenment you can get in school)--a very severe division. Now, that's the sort of split you don't run into much on political issues.

To the professional classes, the highly educated--following Peter Skerry--the satisfactions of life come from career; from work directed toward some objective; to some extent from leisure, the kind of formal leisure associated with work and hobbies. You know: "work hard, play hard." To the working classes and the lower middle classes, the great satisfactions of life come from family. Even if both sides can be attracted by a slogan to save the family, as any good politician can note, it means very different things to different groups.. To the highly educated group, family policy means day care, so that some women can pursue their careers, it means, perhaps, even paying homemakers, so mothers can become professionals taking care of children and can get the

same respect other professionals get. It tends to mean recognizing the homosexual couple as a family (at least at the further edges of enlightenment). Just look at gay rights issues on the campuses--I mean, that's not the sort of thing that happens in factories, I don't think!

For the second group, family policy means respect for the organic unit of the family. This means that day care is viewed with suspicion, as giving one's children up to professionals who do not share and may be critical of the parents' values. It means respect for the traditional role of mother and homemaker, without the need to transform it into something parallel to a paid job. It means, for example, seeing homosexuality as a threat to the family. And it sees abortion, and the issues that are clustered around it--even though one resorts to it, secretly, even though it may save the family to not have another child under strain--as a threat to motherhood itself and its respected place within the family. And even if abortion isn't seen as such a threat, what is clustered around abortion is seen as a threat, such as the right of the young teenager to have an abortion without the family's consent. Now, it well may be that the working class family thinks abortion is necessary when a teenage daughter is pregnant, but few of them think it's a great idea. They are against the people who think abortion is an expression of freedom. Abortion has become the symbol of everything the less educated do not like about the more educated.

One final point: The reason abortion became a symbol is that we did make a national policy out of it. Now, the "we" in this case is not Congress, what is called the majoritarian branch of government. It is the Supreme Court that made a national case out of it. It threw out the laws of 50 states, and that made abortion a national issue. I find

it revealing, to refer to Peter Skerry's data, that support for abortion was growing steadily in this country until the Supreme Court decision. Then the size of the two sides, those for and against, froze. Until then, you could have free abortion in New York, and you could have very strict rules in Mississippi and other places. That meant hardship for some, because they would have to go to New York--New York was the great abortion mill for a while. But abortion was turned into a national issue and, thus, a symbolic issue as against, let's say, a 50-state issue. I don't think it could have attained such a position if the 50 states' laws on abortion had continued in their varied and disorderly form.

When we have conflicts over values, and abortion is such a conflict, it's hard to cut the difference, as one can in conflicts over interests, which is why I would like to keep value conflicts out of national decision-making and to keep them at the local and the state level of decisionmaking. There is always the possibility, then, of escaping the divisive national effect of a national decision.

One issue plays an enormous underground role in the family policy argument, and that is the black family. Is that a case where, as against my general position that government should stay out of it, government should get into it? I think that government should stay out of that, too. I think there <u>is</u> a real issue. I think when Moynihan wrote his report, he was addressing a real problem. But he was not addressing a problem, in my mind, that government could do much about. As a matter of fact, what he suggested doing about it was not anything directly affecting the family, but job programs, and so on, which we have in some measure attempted--probably not in the measure we should have. It was my position that if something was going to happen to change the high rate of family

breakup among poor blacks and the high rates of illegitimacy, it would have to happen the way other things in the family happen, through changes coming from people's own ideas and values, which they effect on their own. In fact, I think the unfortunate uproar over the black family report delayed that, probably for about 15 years. Because then many black leaders were forced into the position of defending the black family instead of being free to address its problems. I think by now one hears more voices in the black community saying, "How do we feel about these problems and what do we do about them?" Is there an answer? I don't have an answer. I didn't have an answer then, and I don't have an answer now.

And I don't have an answer to <u>any</u> of the great issues. I think there are answers in individual families or in individual communities. Those are the answers that come from parents telling their children to turn the television set off, and from parents regulating their children by telling them what's right and what's wrong, and from teachers doing the same. I think that what we can probably do is to permit those local clusters, those local communities, where people know what's right (or know what's right in their own mind), to do it. I suspect that would work out for the best.

THE UNBRIDGEABLE GULF IN VALUES

Sandra Scarr, Discussant

It's hard to know how to put together a discussion of the two pro-family lobbies in five minutes or less, so let me share with you some loosely connected thoughts. First of all, I'm certainly identified with the liberal lobby and Professor Zigler's goals. I think, too, it would be a lovely idea if the lobbies could work together in the interests of children and families. I'm less sanguine about getting together across what I think is a great gulf in values. And I think that the two lobbies make rather uncomfortable allies--I thought of the word "bedfellows," but I decided that the sexual connotations of that term would underscore one of the value issues about which we clearly have great difficulty.

I really want to argue with Professor Glazer's assertion that federal policies do not have much impact on families. I agree that government policy does not direct social change in families, and that the evolution of family types and forms (family constellations) and the evolution of values in the sexual area (sexual conduct and reproduction) has certainly not been guided by government policy. On the other hand, the impact of government policy is very differential depending on one's social and economic level in the population. Clearly government policies for and against families have a greater impact upon the poor than upon anyone in this room who can afford to go to Nevada or New York for an abortion. This was the state of affairs before the Supreme Court decision.

None of us would have had difficulty doing that, or going to Sweden or Puerto Rico or other places where abortions were available. However, that's not true for the people whose abortions should be supported by Medicaid. By Professor Glazer's own statistics, more women in the District of Columbia opted out of pregnancies than chose to deliver in a population of largely poor and largely black women. These are the very people against whom the current federal policy discriminates. The impact of federal policies on families is much greater for those who are on Medicaid or AFDC or Social Security than it is for any of the middle class who can largely avoid federal policy implications toward families while the poor cannot. That is, permitting those of us who can afford abortions, who can purchase day care in the private sector, and who can get divorces with private attorneys to do so is not affording equal opportunity or equal protection to those who cannot afford these "privileges."

So, I'd like to speak of a pro-family policy that I think the federal government should adopt. First, let me say what I think a family is. A family is not a nuclear family with two children and a picket fence. A family is a support system of various configurations that deals in child rearing. Well, what do we know about such support systems for child rearing? What makes them work? Well, first we know that there are important aspects of the networks and social support systems in communities that help a family do its job. A family that is connected with others in the community is a more effective family, in general. We know that the sharing of responsibilities for child rearing is a very important aspect of family life, and that one can share not only with one's relatives, but also with friends. The notion here is not genetic relatedness; the notion is the family as a social support system within

a community that provides it with more resources. Families also provide control against parental neglect and abuse. That is, the fact that more than one adult is involved in a family, most generally, means that that parent is not so overburdened and that parent is subject to social control from others. Young, isolated single parents are most likely to abuse and neglect their children--that is, those without an adequate social support system.

Now, given my definition of an adequate family, how does the present administration's policy have an impact upon families? Well, it seems to me that it guarantees that a smaller and smaller portion of our children will have the necessary family environments. We are mandating pregnancies for the young and the inept. Those who can control fertility will continue to do so, without government assistance, and, one prays, without government interference. But a large portion of the next generation will be reared without government assistance by single parents who did not want them and who are without adequate support systems called families.

It seems to me that the present administration's policy and the wishes of the administration that went before it have mixed up moral condemnation of illicit sexual activity, some of which results in pregnancies, with the legitimate needs of children to have families to rear them. It's as though rearing the children is the punishment meted out for illicit sexual activity. Although this may satisfy some sexual moralists, the effects on those children who are used as punishments for their errant parents can be nothing but immoral in my view.

A true family policy would make parenthood a responsible, rational decision to bear and rear a child. Therefore, contraception and abortion programs would be free and widely publicized. Women who chose to rear

children would do so; those who do not would not have to. So my pro-family policy would insure that families are support systems for wanted children. Then, we wouldn't have to worry so much about government interference or government assistance for families, because there would be little need for such interference or assistance. A true pro-family policy would not be concerned primarily about punishing sexuality but rather about guaranteeing the integrity of the next generation.

On both environmental and genetic grounds, one should oppose the mandatory pregnancy of those who are least able to manage their lives, least able to manage their sexuality, and least able to manage parenthood. At the same time that it proposes policies that would effectively mandate parenthood for the least able, this administration also proposes to withdraw the supports that would keep these families functioning even minimally in the service of child rearing. So there's an irony here: at the same time the government proposes to withdraw from assistance programs for families, they mandate pregnancy, delivery, and child rearing for families that are least able to do without that assistance. I don't think we can have both kinds of neglect and have a next generation of which we can be proud.

Is it true that doing nearly anything makes a problem worse? Maternal and child health programs, it seems to me, do little harm and much good. Preventing premature births, improving maternal nutrition, providing children with adequate prenatal care, hospitalization and postnatal care, seems to me does little harm and prevents a lot of long-term problems. School lunch programs prevent hunger, improve nutrition; I see little harm in school lunch programs. It seems to me that the government must act to protect children who are without adequate families. I think it is

crazy to mandate parenthood, and I think that any administration that proposes to do that is immoral.

I'm very concerned that the value issues involved are unbridgeable. At root, one major issue is: who is responsible for children? Are children at the mercy of their parents entirely (I don't mean just economically, but I mean with respect to all of their rearing and their values)? This is much of what the conservative position proposes. When and for what purposes should the state intervene to support or protect children? Professor Glazer does not want to withdraw all support from, for example, single parent families or all support from elderly people. He wants to maintain the 1981 status quo. Why? Why should he maintain the 1981 status quo? I suppose it is politically feasible, but I think I stand with Professor Zigler in saying I want to move ahead and to improve people's lives.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION III: ON THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE IN FAMILY ASSISTANCE

Federal vs. local jurisdiction

EDWARD ZIGLER was asked if there was not a basic disjuncture between his perspective and Nathan Glazer's. "You still seem [to assume] that there will be a lot of activity [on child and family issues] at the federal level," said DEBORAH ZINN, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Michigan, "whereas Dr. Glazer and other conservatives seem to be saying we should change our focus from the federal to the state and local level."

Zigler replied that "block grants are going to happen," and that "you don't need to go the Capitol" to get many programs, such as after-school care, established in a local community. On the other hand, he said, "I've been running back and forth from Washington with great regularity, and there is absolutely no sign that the town is closing down." Zigler seemed to argue that, regardless of rhetoric, the federal government will not be able to abandon entirely its role in child and family matters. It's a question of redefining, not abdicating a federal role, he said. In the first place, the "states are in an absolute panic" about how to administer block grants, he said, and the federal government is going to be forced to provide some direction, even if it amounts to no more than facilitating discussion among the states concerning which state approaches seem to work best. Second, "the whole issue of

evaluation has got to become a federal issue." To sum up, Zigler said that "while I think a lot of the real action is going to be at the state level, I think we're going to see a realignment in which the federal government assumes those kinds of powers which the federal government, and only the federal government, can assume."

NATHAN GLAZER commented that many of the programs Zigler had mentioned in his speech as being possible areas of cooperation between the right and the left on the federal level had once been, or could be, provided at the state or local level. "I remember when you could play at the schools [in New York] after school, and the federal government had nothing to do with it," he said. "Now...everyone is so used to the notion that [localities] can't afford to do anything that [the federal government] would have to pay for the basketballs...or else the kids can't play after school." Glazer acknowledged that local communities are currently in terrible financial shape, but argued that ultimately it is "nonsensical" to make these programs dependent on federal help. He said that a lot of flexitime is being employed without any government assistance, and that foster care was basically a state, not a federal, issue. While admitting that some of the items on Zigler's list were national concerns--such as the call for a presidential counselor on family issues--Glazer felt that on many other issues there is no need for any national policy at all.

How a national policy emerges

On the question of why a national policy on a controversial issue emerges, Dr. ALBERT SOLNIT, director of the Yale Child Study Center, felt that Glazer had implied that the U.S. had no policy on abortion until the Supreme Court decision in 1973. In fact, Solnit said, court decisions do not initiate national policy, but rather tend to change existing de facto

policy which has proved problematic. He argued that national policy on women's rights, far from being instigated by a court decision on affirmative action, has instead been slowly emerging at least since the time of the suffragette movement, when women won the right to vote. It may be misleading to critique existing national policy, Solnit suggested, without referring to what the government policy was before the government changed it.

Community vs. national standards

One fundamental issue that was raised in this discussion was the question of whether some policies affecting families ought to be decided by community, rather than by national standards. SANDRA SCARR raised the hypothetical case of a non-Mormon resident of Utah. Why should that person "be subject under the federal Constitution to a different set of standards than someone in New York or California?" she asked. Moreover, why should a person be subject to a moral standard set by a church to which he or she does not belong?

Glazer responded that there are already areas in which the Supreme Court has recognized the right of the community to determine its own standards, such as in pornography laws. He is not suggesting, he said, that we recognize either the community or the family as a legal entity having absolute rights, as in the extreme case of Roman law, by which the father had the right to execute his own children. In the case of abortion, he suggested that if the community standards in Utah determine that a father has a right to be informed if his daughter has obtained an abortion, then the community standard would prevail in that particular aspect of the issue.

Pregnancy and sexual activity among teenagers

When queried about statistics on the number of sexually active teenagers, Scarr reported that the approximate statistics are that 50% of 16-year-olds and 90% of 19-year-olds are sexually active. When GINA BESSEY, legislative aid to Senator Roger W. Jepsen (R) of Iowa, brought up a study showing a direct correlation between the amount of money spent on family planning services in a community and an increase in teenage pregnancies, Scarr responded that "there are many spurious correlations in this world." She cited the case of a study showing that New York schools given special funds to address reading problems had more students with reading problems than did those schools that received no special assistance. One could conclude, she said, that special reading programs produce lower reading scores, but, of course, there is no causal relationship or direct correlation between the two. The statistics stem from the fact that, naturally, the money had been given to schools where low reading scores were already a problem before the program began.

Bessey mentioned her concern that 14- and 15-year-olds are not being given sex education, but sex instruction. That is, her research indicates that some classes not only include information on reproduction and conception, but also include such information as "how to use a contraceptive to be most pleasing to one's partner." She said that there are also junior high schools where planned parenthood instructors are invited into classrooms to pass out different kinds of contraceptive devices to show 12- and 13-year-olds what they look like.

Scarr replied that as a psychologist and as the parent of teenagers and preteenagers, she thought that to ignore the fact that 50% of teenagers under 16 are sexually active is to "put our heads in the sand."

It is also unrealistic, she said, to think that these children have true access to contraceptives or that their sexual activity is a result of this access. She confessed that she herself finds the whole issue "nervewracking" and has not found an ideal solution to the problem.

When Zigler was then asked if he had a solution, he replied: "When I do, I'll mail it to both of you [Bessey and Scarr]."

SUSAN MUENCHOW, public education coordinator of the Yale Bush Center, raised the question of abortion vs. giving up babies for adoption as alternatives for teenage mothers. In The Futility of Family Policy, she said, Gilbert Steiner makes the point that there is not an increase in teenage pregnancy, but rather an increase in the number of unmarried teenagers who keep their babies. She asked, "Why has giving up babies for adoption become unpopular, and should the government actively encourage adoption as an alternative?"

To clarify the statistics on teenage mothers, Scarr stated that in an article about women and work, Lois Hoffman had written that there was an increase in teenage pregnancy. Hoffman then wrote a correction, stating that the number of live births to teenagers since the Supreme Court decision on abortion has actually declined. The actual change, according to Hoffman, is in the proportion of all live births: A larger proportion of live births belong to teenage mothers than before that decision.

Scarr also underscored that the dramatic change has been in statistics pertaining to the white population. Prior to the 1973 decision, 90% of white teenage mothers gave up their babies for adoption, and now 90% of the same group keep their babies. It would seem reasonable to assume, Scarr said, that with abortion available, a girl would not continue her

pregnancy unless she intended to keep the baby. Thus, while this change has caused a tremendous shortage of white babies for adoption, the adoption alternative is unlikely to appeal to the particular teenagers now carrying their pregnancies to term.

The term "family policy"

Zigler stated that, partly as a result of this conference, he was planning to drop the term "national family policy." "I think it's loaded. I think it gets everybody's back up"--both left and right. While the term sounds good, he said, "when you start spelling it out, you're up a creek." Similarly, he said, "the family impact business has been a charade from its inception." Although Zigler was one of the first to use the term "family impact," he said he regrets it, for his initial reservations--that there was no way to do human impact evaluations without value judgements--proved valid. He thus proposed dropping the terms "national family policy" and "family impact" and talking instead about "issues."

Zigler also agreed with Glazer on another point--the inevitable negative consequences of intervention programs. He cited a paper by sociologist Albert J. Reiss at Yale. Zigler said Reiss' thesis "was a very simple one: that there never has been an instance of government intervention that hasn't had downside consequences." But what really makes the difference between good social policy and bad social policy, he added, is "how much can you anticipate? How good is your analysis?" His concern with Glazer's position was a concern that the long view or "bigger picture" was not being considered: "We get bogged down, in these times of transition, with short views...Societies evolve, just like species do...Remember, we had slavery in this country for a long time and people sat with it." In order for a nation to develop a sense of

itself and to move forward as a nation, then some things must become national issues. Citing child labor and segregation as instances, he said that, although some problems are first identified and addressed at a local level, it takes a national effort, a national presence, to deal with them. Once dealt with, they can "lift you to a whole new plateau as a society." In order to be one society and not 50 little states, "finally we must believe in certain things, and some of those things have to do with what we are meeting about--child and family life."

In reply to another question, Glazer agreed with Zigler that "issues, concrete issues that people argue about and fight about are better than large words that they can easily misunderstand and that frighten them. So we agree on one thing: We don't want 'national family policy.'"

Speaking of "social evolution," however, he pointed to one area of social policy about which the nation has reached some consensus and done a lot about--the problem of poverty. But even while the poverty program was being put into effect, new factors intervened, such as inflation. S although we have not solved the problem--as Glazer said, "That is not to say that there are no longer any poor people, there are" --we have reached a kind of "stalemate" in the enactment of poverty programs. It is time to "go slow," he said, and to try more things at a local level.

INTRODUCTION TO A PANEL ON WORKING MOTHERS AND DAY CARE: A FOCUS ON ONE ASPECT OF FAMILY POLICY

Gary Winget, Moderator

[Ellen Hoffman, Connaught Marshner, and Edward Zigler provided a focus on one specific aspect of child and family policy when they were asked to discuss the implications of their general views to their specific views on child care policy. Gary Winget opened the panel discussion with the following remarks:]

One of the observations I wanted to make is: Why do mothers work? In talking about mothers, I am also including single-parent fathers who have young children. There are many reasons. One of the most important reasons is that mothers work out of economic necessity. We can examine this necessity by following two threads--one thread is the economic necessity a family has for a working mother, and a second thread is the economic necessity on the part of the nation for working mothers. I maintain that mothers have always worked at more than just caring for children. In the past, mothers were part of the workforce in the sense that they produced goods and services for both home and market consumption, whether by growing vegetables, by canning for the family, or by working in the field. Over time, obviously, the workplace for the production of market goods moved out of the home, and farther and farther away from the home, as did the market for goods for home consumption. So that one might argue that by the 1950s we had underemployed mothers, in the sense

that so many of their former functions had moved out of the home. Therefore, it is natural that mothers began spending part of each day away from the home and joining the office and factory workers. They did it because of economic necessity, because it has always been necessary for two adults in families to work in order for the family to support itself.

Society, too, has had need of working mothers; from time to time, mothers were needed in the workforce for national economic reasons. Obviously, World War II is an example: The country wanted mothers to come out of the home to replace the men absent from the labor force. I think we are approaching a time when the country is going to want mothers in the labor force. As we move past the turn of the 21st Century, we will have a large senior citizen population, dependent on Social Security, contrasted with a very small percentage of the population eligible to form the workforce. Society is not going to be able to support the seniors without working mothers. Mothers and fathers work, have worked, and continue to work out of economic necessity.

We know that about 25% of all working families are headed by single parents. We know that 30% of working mothers have husbands who earn less than the low income level established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even at that level--just in terms of the incomes of families--we know that economic necessity is the primary reason for women working.

The second observation is that during the 1970s we experienced a large increase in the number of preschool children who had working mothers --about a 33% increase. During the 80s, we are going to see a 70% increase in the number of children who have working mothers. Not only is the percentage of working mothers increasing, but the actual number of preschool children is increasing. We are going to see an increase in

numbers we have not experienced in the past. I think this is already creating problems and is likely to create problems that we really don't forsee--problems for children and their parents and for larger groups of society.

As we look at national child care policies, we want to look in two directions. First, how can we formulate goals and pursue policies that will minimize the need for nonparental care--that is, maximize the ability of parents to care for their own children. Fiber optics and microcomputers may bring work back to the home so that mothers and fathers can work and care for children in their own homes. Flexitime and other options would allow parents both to work and to care for their own children.

Second, you might consider the question: What do we do for parents who work but can't be at home with their children? How do we pursue policies which will promote an adequate supply of good child care at prices that parents can afford?

SUMMARY OF PANEL DISCUSSION:

ON WORKING MOTHERS AND CHILD CARE

Participants: Edward Zigler, Ellen Hoffman, Connaught Marshner

Making the child care problem more manageable

EDWARD ZIGLER remarked that the child care problem has become so large that it cannot be attacked all at once, so it has been ignored. If predictions that 75% of mothers will have entered the labor force by 1990 are correct, then the child care problem is only going to get worse. Therefore, Zigler proposed that we no longer talk about "child care systems," and instead say, "Look, we have a new phenomenon: We have more working women. These women have children. Somebody must care for the children, and I would like to see them cared for in a way that will produce productive, happy, well-adjusted future citizens." By tackling the small problems one by one, we make it possible to solve them one at a time, so we have "worked away at this gigantic monster which we have created for ourselves by our lack of anticipation and lack of good social planning."

One problem that can be addressed first is infant day care. Hopefully, he said, "in my lifetime, in the lifetime of somebody sitting in this room, we will see a six-month paid maternity leave." Both psychologically and fiscally, Zigler found that adequate maternity leave is more sensible and more feasible than expensive infant day care.

Another problem that can be considered, Zigler said, is the one already raised by Nathan Glazer: the problem of school-age day care, which, surprisingly to some, accounts for two-thirds of the day care needs in this country. Psychologists have concentrated so much on emphasizing the importance of the preschool years, Zigler said, that "somehow we have convinced the American public that at the age of five, every American child drops dead! That is not true, thank God." He agreed with Glazer that school-age day care could perhaps be dealt with at the local level. But it is also necessary, he said, to draw attention to the national scope of the problem. For that, he said, "all we need is somebody in Washington who says, 'This is my thing. This is an important problem. I'm going to pursue it.'" He sees the role of the federal government as providing models for hiring day care workers, determining cost effectiveness and defining the scope of a program. Communities would then have the information they need to design their own programs.

Finally Zigler, saying, "You can't put the cart before the horse," stated that the furthering of the Child Development Associate (CDA) training program was his first priority for a day care agenda. "We must all ask the question, who is going to take care of children while their mothers work?" he said. Stressing that child care is not something just anybody can do effectively, Zigler said the best feature of the CDA program is that it is competency-based. Those who can demonstrate the ability to care for other people's children are able to complete the program. Moreover, Zigler said that because the program stresses practical skills in child care rather than academic degrees, it is an inexpensive, cost-effective program. While applauding the virtues of the CDA program, Zigler did not think that CDA should remain under government jurisdiction.

"I think CDA is ready for its next phase," he said, suggesting that the CDA certification of child caregivers be moved into the private sector.

Protesting government cutbacks affecting child care programs

ELLEN HOFFMAN then stated that before getting "carried away" with future goals, such as six-month paid maternity leaves and expansion of the CDA program, she felt compelled to first remind the audience of the immediate crisis facing existing child care programs. "We stand to lose $200 million from Title XX, the largest single source of federal funding for child care, whether or not it is incorporated into block grants," Hoffman said. Severe cutbacks in programs for the handicapped (including preschool programs), and cutbacks in CETA (which pays for many personnel) all will affect child care programs. Budget cuts may not affect Head Start, she said, "but we are talking about killing the Appalachian Regional Child Development Program" and the Economic Development Act. which provide child care.

So the first step, Hoffman said, is to evaluate existing programs, a process in which the CDF is already engaged. The next step is to prevent the cutbacks, not only on the national level, but also on the state and local levels. She believes that the block grants "are a facade, which will result in no money being provided for these programs." She stressed the urgency of people uniting and voicing protest immediately, "because I think that if we go down without having said or done anything, and without having made these points, we will be confirming what some people are very prone to say--there is no need and no desire for child care in this country."

Questioning the need for child care

CONNAUGHT MARSHNER agreed with Zigler's ideas on developing local after-school care programs using school buildings, with "local initiative and local solutions." But "what made my antennae begin to vibrate," she said, was the question of what the federal government can do, because she thought that wasn't the right question to ask. Assuming that women who had to work were those whose children were in need of child care, Marshner asserted that women have to work because "their husbands' salaries are inadequate," and that the inadequacy of men's salaries "is the cause of the problem, of which child care is only a symptom."

To support her thesis that women only worked to supplement family income, Marshner cited a General Mills study by Louis Harris in which the question was asked: "If you didn't need the money, what would your work preference be?" She stated that only 13% of executive/management women said that they would work full time if they didn't need money. Women prefer to work part time, Marshner said, because they are "only tiding the husband's salary over until things get better with him," and that most women don't want or need a national mobilization to solve their child care problems, because they feel "it's really going to take care of itself."

One question Marshner proposed pursuing, and she called it "a hard and controversial one," was the question of whether or not we should have a differential wage scale for heads of household, so that individuals "supporting a wife and five children...[might] merit having a salary that is different from somebody who is just working for the fun of it or somebody who is just out of college and doesn't have any responsibilities."

Marshner further suggested removing restrictions on home industries for women who are able to be employed in piece-work types of industry,

such as electronics and sewing. A third suggestion was to pair up the problems of the unemployed elderly and the working mother, by having the elderly care for children.

An unidentified speaker asked Marshner what was to be done in the interim about already existing day care programs while we are working on "long-term" solutions. What is to be done for the working woman who suddenly finds that the day care program she was using has been cut and that she cannot afford private day care?

Marshner replied that her answer "may sound kind of flip, but I think the people who have the problems will figure out what to do about them." She said she found it rather presumptuous of scholars and professionals "to be sitting around at Yale saying, 'Gee, what are those poor people in Ohio going to do?'"

SUSAN MUENCHOW commented that "among the people in this room," there might be some women who are single parents, "who earn less than $10,000 a year, and who find that a quarter of their salaries go to day care if they have to buy it in the private sector. And that's only for one child--what if a woman has two?"

What ever happened to the women in the "ladies' aid society" and other private individuals and groups who used to watch children, Marshner wondered. The audience replied, "They're all working!"

PETER SKERRY[1] questioned the assessment of day care as an "urgent, pressing problem." He cited studies reported two years ago by Suzanne Woosley and others showing that there are "pockets of need," but no national need that is not being met by private arrangements. Skerry asked Zigler to refer him to more recent research showing that child care is

[1]Peter Skerry is a former research assistant at the Russell Sage Foundation, and is currently a degree candidate at the Sociology department at Harvard University.

a problem.

Zigler responded that there has long been a controversy about the extent of the need for day care. He suggested that data prepared by Gwen Morgan of Wheelock College and also by Alfred Kahn of the Columbia University School of Social Work present a different picture of the child care problem. Zigler's own analysis, he said, includes an element of experience: "It's absolutely impossible for any person to supervise more than six women in American without hearing about child care problems... It finally gets down to my opinion, based upon long experience and looking at the data."

Hoffman supported this opinion, based on her own experience traveling around the country discussing child policy issues. "Whatever issue I think I am about to talk about, we end up talking about child care...It's not a matter of class, it's not a matter of race...or vocation," she said, "it is just something that is constantly bubbling up to the surface when you're talking with people about kids and families in this country."

Skerry then cited the controversy over the need for child care on social science to interpret policy issues. When research studies show one thing and people's direct experience shows the opposite, he said, it tends to lessen one's faith in social science.

This problem is not a new one, Zigler replied, as social science is also an art. For help in reconciling the statistical data with the observable phenomenon of the need for child care, he referred to GARY WINGET.

Winget responded that in 1970 it was estimated that there were up to five million children with working mothers and one million of these were in day care. At that time, there were "a lot of naive people" saying

that these figures meant that there were four million children in need of day care. He feels that the opposite approach, however--that is, "everyone's working it out and everyone's paying for it, and there's no problem"--is equally naive. What is needed is a structure or method in national government by which people can raise the issue and examine the day care problem realistically

Quantity vs. quality

SANDRA SCARR added that the question was not so much one of quantity--i.e., how many children have no day care provision at all--but it is a question of quality. "As Mrs. Marshner suggested," Scarr said, "[most mothers] somehow make do...[But] the kinds of arrangements to which children are being subjected would not necessarily be ones that [Mrs. Marshner] or I would approve of." She cited instances of children being kept in basements without adequate food and without play facilities of any kind and added that state regulations to prevent this are frequently not enforced. Therefore, she explained, to say, "'People will make do,' isn't really an adequate response to the quality issue." Scarr added that she considered the CDA program more a response to the quality problem than to the insufficient quantity of day care.

Marshner made the point that it would be difficult to structure a day care system that would meet the varied and changing needs of children and mothers. "You're talking about kids needing grownups...about matching them with the adults who will relate to them...not about systems and structures." The key need, she felt, was for flexibility--allowing the parent to judge which adults would relate best to his or her child. "And if you overstructure something, you're going to cut that flexibility."

LEWIS Z. KOCH responded that he thought the CDA program sounded like another well-intentioned but misguided example of trying to achieve "the best of all possible worlds" for children. Koch said he felt that rather than creating another set of rules designed to provide optimum care for children, he would prefer to live with the existing tension inherent in the range of day care services, and he would only seek to protect children from the worst day care situations.

Zigler answered that while he, too, has "given up on the perfectibility of social systems," he still comes back to what he called his "own pragmatic position." The purpose of conferences like this one, he commented, is not to "polarize, fractionate, or increase tension," but to find solutions to problems. He considers the CDA program a pragmatic approach to a "real problem that, I continue to insist, exists out there."

Although Marshner agreed there must be some real need for day care if so many people are concerned about it, she is not certain that "we have defined it properly." In addition, she thinks the need has been exaggerated because "child care is part of feminist ideology, and the feminist revolution will not be complete as long as women have to take care of their own children." But she concluded that some attention was due the problem of day care on its own merit and that creative solutions could perhaps be found.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN FAMILY POLICY: BEYOND BUZZ WORDS?

Susan Muenchow

"The family will be to the decade of the 80s what Vietnam was to the 60s and environmental and consumer issues were to the 70s." Does that sound like a statement from the director of the White House Conference on Families, or maybe from the Carter-Mondale campaign? Well, the correct answer is that the statement was made by Paul Weyrich, director of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress and one of the founders of the New Right's Pro-Family Coalition.

Of course, the New Right is not the only group trying to capture public attention on family issues. The New Right was not even the first to coin the phrase "pro-family." That credit apparently goes to Jimmy Carter, who in a 1976 campaign speech, revealed that he had appointed a special adviser "as an immediate step toward developing a pro-family policy." By "pro-family policy," Carter meant such measures as securing welfare law provisions to encourage families to stay together, retaining tax exemptions for dependent children, ending tax laws that discriminate against families, supporting federally funded day care for employed mothers, and discouraging the building of freeways that displace families.

How then, has the New Right managed to capture the "pro-family" label for itself, switching the emphasis from economic assistance and social services to public enforcement of private morality and traditional

family values? There are many reasons, not least of which is the difficulty in translating any version of family policy into a national program.

But one of the major reasons is the New Right's sophisticated multimedia strategy. This includes not only TV and radio spots and newspaper ads, but also direct mail, cable television, and what might seem like very homespun techniques, such as telephone trees and distribution of leaflets to local churches. The New Right seems to understand very well one of the foremost principles of any media campaign--namely, that media influence depends not so much on reaching the largest audience as on reaching the most appropriate audience. An appreciation for the right message to the right audience is the genius behind direct mail advertising and its electronic equivalent, cable television. According to the magazine Conservative Digest, over one billion pieces of advertising mail were sent directly to voters by conservatives during the last six years. Through direct mail, the New Right has largely been able to bypass the conventional media. "You can think of direct mail as our TV, radio, daily newspaper and weekly newsmagazine," says Richard Viguerie, one of the masterminds behind direct mail advertising for the New Right.

Religious broadcasting networks have provided the New Right, and especially pro-family groups, with another tool for easy access to a sympathetic audience. The viewing audience for religious TV has doubled in the past five years. Every week approximately 20 million people listen on TV to just three conservative Christian ministers--Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and James Robison. And, in the past few years, Falwell's "Gospel Hour" and the Rev. Pat Robertson's "700 Club" have acquired an unapologetically political tone.

A third media tool used by the New Right to reach the right audience quickly and directly is the telephone tree. Telephone trees, together with direct mail, have been known to bring sacks of letters down on Congress at critical points in legislative battles. When the comprehensive child development bill seemed assured of passage in 1971, Congress was deluged with sacks of opposing mail, with most letters containing the same charges, couched even in the same phrases: that the bill would lead to the "sovietization of American youth" and a communal approach to child-rearing. According to a Conservative Digest profile of pro-family forces, the mobilization of the letter campaign can be primarily attributed to a Washington State citizen activist, June Larson, head of Citizens for Constructive Education. Mrs. Larson is said to have alerted pro-family forces promptly on the pending legislation, and thereby "orchestrated the pressure that forced President Nixon to veto then-Senator Walter Mondale's Child Development bill back in 1971."

This is not to say that the New Right's media strategy is aimed exclusively at an audience already likely to agree. The pro-family movement has also demonstrated an excellent understanding of another basic principle of media campaigns--the importance of consonance. Consonance means expressing issues in a manner harmonious with the basic values of the audience you are addressing. Direct assault on these values rarely works. As one media expert puts it, even a "flood of cigarette advertising fails to dent the resistance of a devout Mormon or Seventh Day Adventist."

How does the New Right pro-family movement apply the principle of consonance? In advice to conservatives prior to the 1978 election, media strategist Brien Benson recommended the use of words and phrases

currently popular with the media. "If you want to attack IRS intrusion into a local business," he counselled, "talk about threats to 'privacy,' not to free enterprise....If you want the school board to replace 'social adjustment' courses with reading, writing and arithmetic, release a recent study showing that our modern economy requires a new emphasis on verbal and mathematical skills. Don't say, 'we ought to return to the three R's.'" Similarly, in statements to the popular press, the New Right pro-family groups have begun to use the same psychological jargon used by supporters of many federal social programs: The ERA or federally-supported day care should be opposed, pro-family leaders say, because such measures would undermine "the maternal-child bond," or deny the child the right to reach his or her "full potential."

Meanwhile, more liberal child advocates have often shown an amazing insensitivity to the importance of consonance in media. How often child advocates make statements in the popular press calling for "early intervention." This term may be clear and acceptable to developmental psychologists, but it is likely to offend the ear of many Americans who are apt to equate "intervention" with federal interference in family life. Even if the proposed early intervention is as innocuous as a vaccination against polio, or a check-up to insure that a pre-school child sees and hears properly, the word intervention itself seems to conjure up an image of a hyperactive federal government.

In short, child advocates are sometimes their own worst enemies. Louis Margolis of the Bush Institute at North Carolina cites another example of the unfortunate terminology used by child advocates in his own state. What appeared to be a promising coalition between private pediatricians and the public sector in North Carolina, the proposed Child

Health Plan for Raising a New Generation, not only had broad-based support, but it also neither mandated any action at the local level nor required any new funds. But the plan suddenly faltered, at least in part because of the advocates' unfortunate use of the phrase "child health care home." By "child health care home," the proponents really meant nothing more revolutionary than that every child should have a regular practitioner or a regular place where he could go for checkups, innoculations, and treatment for illness. But the phrase played into the New Right's worst fears--namely, that liberals in the "helping" professions are trying to take over the family's responsibilities for child rearing. The "child health care home," according to Kotch and Johnson, was soon being billed by a conservative tabloid as a compulsory group residence and a "neo-Nazi" or "socialist" plot.

Not only have New Right pro-family groups learned to use the child advocate's jargon "buzz words" against them, but they have also learned to frame their own issues in media events. Conservative media strategist Bill Rhatican cites a prime example which he helped orchestrate in 1977. Prior to the National Organization of Women's Conference in Houston that year, Rhatician advised anti-ERA leader Phyllis Schlafly to arrive early to hold a press brunch the day before the conference opened. "As it turned out, in the press and on the networks, Phyllis fought the Bella Abzug crowd to a draw in national coverage," Rhatican observes. Had Schlafly not arrived early, Rhatican reasons, she would have enjoyed only scant media coverage.

Good timing is another secret behind the New Right's media strategy. NCPAC's successful efforts against five leading liberal senators in 1980 were based on media campaigns attacking the incumbent, campaigns launched

a year before the election. The idea was to "soften up" the incumbent in a way no challenger could. NCPAC and other New Right groups also ran campaign training schools across the country that taught media strategy.

How effective has all this media strategy been on the part of the New Right and in particular the pro-family movement? If we look at the presidential campaign, political pollsters are divided on how much credit to give the New Right for the outcome of the election. As for Senate and House races, most political professionals credit the Moral Majority and other religious New Right groups with registering enough new voters to swing several close races to Republican candidates. At the least, the New Right's media strategy seems to have succeeded in putting its issues on the voter's agenda. That is, pro-family groups may not have succeeded in telling voters what to think, but they were stunningly successful in telling them what to think about.

Beyond the question of how much New Right media strategy helped at the ballot box, there is ample evidence that this strategy has been enormously successful in mobilizing opposition to specific legislation or policy from the national to the local level. Child advocates often talk about the need for "networking." Well, the pro-family groups have a network to be envied. Networking has been crucial to the Stop-ERA movement, and to pro-family success in blocking IRS moves to refuse tax exemptions to Christian private schools. To understand how the pro-family groups use the networking concept, we can turn to an example cited by New York Times reporter Dena Kleiman. In an article printed just last Sunday [17 May 1981], she refers to the experiences of Joy Cook, president of a Blunt, South Dakota parents' group which was attempting to purge "secular humanism" from the schools. Mrs. Cook explains how she first got involved in the effort. She was working to oppose the proposed Equal

Rights Amendment in her state. She was advised to call a lobbyist in North Dakota, who in turn said she would put her in touch with someone who could tell her more about secular humanism. Fifteen minutes later, Mrs. Cook said, she received a phone call from Mel Gabler of Texas. Working out of his home in Longview, Texas with his wife Norma, Gabler operates the largest "textbook clearinghouse" in the country, advising parents' groups on the moral acceptability of textbooks. In short, the pro-family network extends from the national to the local level, with many of its key leaders not even based in Washington. While one can draw many conclusions from the pro-family group's success in building a network, I think one lesson is that their leaders are not too self-important to take the time to develop local leadership.

Despite the great success of New Right and pro-family media strategy, the question remains whether these groups will be able to sustain their gains. Because the more visible the New Right pro-family movement becomes and the more mass media attention it attracts, the less likely some of its media techniques are to be effective. As Richard Viguerie says himself, direct mail "is the advertising medium of the underdog. It allows organizations or causes not part of the mainstream or not popular to get funding. Direct mail is the advertising medium of the nonestablishment candidate." Whether the same media strategies which helped to gain power will work to sustain power remains to be seen.

Are these New Right pro-family practices unethical? Here I think one has to be careful in one's judgments. In part, the pro-family groups have simply mastered a game that every advocacy organization plays. That game is called "News Subsidy." It would be hard to overestimate the role of news subsidizers in determining the media's agenda. Nearly 60%

of the stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post come from such routine channels as press releases. And these routine channels are, in turn, heavily subsidized by news sources who want to influence public policy. The Child Welfare League does it. The Children's Defense Fund does it. Planned Parenthood does it. Parents Anonymous does it. The Bush Center does it. We may not like the media's heavy dependence on subsidized news, but we can hardly single out the New Right as the only culprit.

Nor is the New Right's use of single issue groups to defeat politicians necessarily unethical. Paul Brown, executive director of the Right to Life Political Action Committee, points out that the Vietnam War was also a single issue. It was used not only to defeat Lyndon Johnson, but to help elect Dick Clark. Taxation without representation was a single issue back in 1776.

I'm not even sure that I agree with the networks' recent denunciation of groups like the National Federation for Decency and the Coalition for Better Television who are trying to boycott sponsors of TV shows to which they object. While I do not think a minority should be able to dictate what people outside their group watch on television, it seems to me that the networks' charge of censorship against these groups is a little misplaced. Surely the most effective television censor is the ratings system itself, which serves to ban programs which do not attract a mass audience and to narrow the TV fare to such programs as "Three's Company" and "Too Close for Comfort." As long as commercial TV seems to exist primarily to serve sponsors, it does not seem unethical for any group to try to influence sponsors in the only way they understand--refusing to buy their products.

What unfair tactics are the New Right and some pro-family groups guilty of? No more, or less, than being masters of propaganda. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, an organization that operated as a service to U.S. citizens just prior to World War II, sums up the techniques of propaganda. Among them are the glittering generality, or the association of an idea with a virtue word; the testimonial from some respected person that a given idea, program, or product is good; card-stacking, or the arranging of facts or falsehoods in order to present the best (or worst) possible case for an idea; and the bandwagon theme, also known as "everybody is doing it."

Here the pro-family movement is masterful. Glittering generalities and virtue words abound--from the Moral Majority, to the Christian Bill of Rights, to "morality" report cards and so-called "Christian" vote ratings, to the very name "Pro-Family Coalition." Glittering generalities and name-calling are also used to link opponents of New Right pro-family positions with evil: Senators who vote to keep abortion legal are termed members of the "deadly dozen" targeted for defeat in 1982; participants in the International Year of the Child are called advocates of "Kiddie Lib." And one pamphlet even asks, "Is humanism molesting your child?" Sometimes pro-family groups simply choose to ignore the facts: Ever since 1971, literature opposing child development legislation has charged that the proposed bills would result in mandatory day care for all pre-school children, despite the fact that each of the bills has clearly stated that its aim was only to increase access to day care on a purely voluntary basis. Ignoring the facts may not constitute a Big Lie, but it has certainly been an effective small lie.

Of course, the New Right has no monopoly on propaganda. Groups

trying to counter pro-family forces sometimes resort to propaganda, too. In the film, "Right-Wing Machine," which many of you saw last night, the AFL-CIO resorts to glittering generalities and name-calling--"Godfather Richard Viguerie." Sometimes the film gets so carried away that it mixes metaphors: The New Right is called a "Right-Wing Web" but then is said to "multiply like rattlesnakes." The American Civil Liberties Union has been running national ads headlined, "If the Moral Majority has its way, you'd better start praying." Not only does the ad--placed in the New York Times and other large circulation dailies--run the risk of poking fun at prayer and thereby offending religious people not otherwise sympathetic to the Moral Majority, but it also lumps all New Right groups and "new evangelicals" under the banner of Moral Majority, something even the Moral Majority itself isn't arrogant enough to do. [Ira Glasser, executive director of the ACLU, responds that the advertisement was really attacking the Moral Majority movement, not the single organization. Glasser also points out the difficulties of constructing an advertising campaign on any public issue: "The point that I really wanted to make is that these groups are not conservative, but anti-Bill of Rights: but 'anti-Bill of Rights' doesn't make a very good headline."]

What can be done to cut through the propaganda, so that policies are debated on their merits, rather than reduced to a war of misleading "buzz" words? I don't think the answer is to escalate the propaganda. But advocates--no matter what their cause--can improve their own sense of media strategy. Before constructing a media campaign, advocates should first determine the nature of the audience they are trying to reach, and take care to use phrases not likely to offend that audience. Why advocate "child care homes" if you are really only trying to ensure that children

receive regular pediatric care? Why call for "a cadre of child care providers" (a phrase which might have the right ring in Castro's Cuba) if what you are really advocating is the development of a child care profession?

Advocates can also construct media campaigns to counter what they view as bad propaganda. But this should not be done with a heavy-handed approach. One good example is the work of syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman, who says what the nation most needs now is an upsurge in the number of "extremist moderates." Goodman questions the claims to moral absolutism of some New Right groups without indulging in the same tactics she tries to oppose.

Finally, advocates can attempt to press for the application of the "fairness doctrine" to religious broadcasting. The Communications Act of 1934 requires broadcasters to serve the public interest by covering public issues in a balanced way. This doctrine may have to be modified in order to apply to cable TV and religious broadcasting. I don't mean that the FCC should require a Baptist-owned station to give equal time to Catholics and Jews. But religious stations should be required to air dissenting views when they address explicitly political issues.

Ultimately, however, the best hope for transcending propaganda does not lie in media campaigns of any kind. For the line between legitimate media campaigns and propaganda is always thin, and mass media campaigns are as apt to serve the Devil as the Lord. The best hope lies in the highest standards of journalists themselves, whose job is to hold policy--and politicians--accountable. Thus, one of the most important tasks of the media during the Reagan administration may be to keep track of whether the cutbacks in the social programs achieve the administration's

expressed aim, namely reduction in tax dollars. For example, will reductions in maternal and child health programs save the taxpayers' money, or will they lead to increased birth defects and tax expenditures for special education and institutionalized care? Will cutbacks in welfare aid save tax dollars, or will they eventually lead to the disintegration of vulnerable families, thereby increasing public expenditures for foster care? Similarly, are requirements for parental consent for contraceptives likely to reduce teenage sexual activity, or to increase the number of teenage pregnancies? By holding public policy accountable, journalists can help the public to debate policies on their merits, not their labels.

FAMILY POLICY: A SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

Robert Moroney

Over the past few days we have heard a number of rich and thoughtful presentations from people who have either identified themselves or have been identified by others as representing the positions of the "New Right," the "neo-conservatives" and the "liberals." Susan Muenchow, in her opening charge to the participants, asked that we systematically explore those areas where we might achieve consensus, and that we also identify areas where agreement is likely to be impossible.

In this presentation I have not attempted to provide a session-by-session or point-by-point summary. Given the richness of the presentations and discussions, this would have been an impossible task. Rather, I have identified a number of themes that cut across the individual presentations and will discuss these themes with reference to the positions of the presenters. Finally, I have taken the liberty of including my own opinions on these issues, opinions that have evolved from my policy research in the United Kingdom and the United States.

It is clear to me that there are areas of agreement as well as of disagreement. Many of the presenters have raised the same concerns from different ideological positions and this has resulted in different prescriptions. Many, however, share a common framework for analyzing problems facing families. And, finally, many agree on certain solutions to one problem.

As the conference evolved, we found that each of us was unwittingly caught in two traps. The first I will refer to as a belief in a dichotomous world, a world of either/or, we/they. Because three positions had been identified, each of us was labeled a neo-conservative, a liberal, or a proponent of the more conservative position of the New Right. The trap was that such a labeling tends to produce an adversarial or conflict situation. "If you are not in my camp, you must disagree with my position." Such a characterization, however, is not a reflection of social reality, just as the labels "democratic" or "republican," "liberal" or "conservative" are not meaningful terms. This is the second trap. If I can label someone, I believe that I fully understand that person's position on every policy issue.

And yet, over the years, I have found myself labeled a liberal on some issues and a conservative on others. Or, to put it another way, I have found that I have been a proponent of a policy that has been labeled either a conservative or a liberal position.

In 1976, for example, a policy study I had carried out in the United Kingdom was published [The Family and the State: Considerations for Social Policy (London: Longman's, 1976)]. The study was sponsored by the Joseph Rountree Memorial Trust and the Department of Health and Social Services. These two organizations were concerned with the claim that families today were less willing and less capable than families in the past of providing care for their severely dependent members, e.g., the frail elderly and severely handicapped children, and were transferring this responsibility in greater numbers to the State. If this were occurring, they believed that the possible long- and short-range consequences of such transfers needed to be examined, especially in light

of the fact that many felt such transfers were caused by an expanding welfare state.

As the analysis evolved, it became clear that there was little hard evidence either that health and welfare services were being misused or that they were undermining family responsibility. In practice, those who were benefiting from the services were mainly those dependent persons who had no family or had none within reach. Families who decided to provide care for handicapped children and elderly parents experienced considerable hardship and stress; few, if any, supportive services were available. I concluded that when families cared for dependent members at home, society in general and the State in particular benefited (at least in terms of keeping expenditures down), but that these families themselves were being penalized. My recommendations included a list of services that would help support such families, and a plea that the State balance its current emphasis on substitute care with one of shared responsibility for care of dependent persons.

A year later I received an invitation from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to discuss my work. In our discussions, however, I found that they had interpreted my analysis as a call for reducing government involvement in the care of dependent persons. If government withdrew, as OMB read my analysis, families would assume more responsibility and expenditures would be reduced! This, of course, was not my position, but I had been identified as a conservative. In sum, I believe that the labeling process we tend to use is dysfunctional, in that we assume we understand another's position rather than entering into meaningful dialogue.

Most of the presenters dealt with the current status of American

families. Some emphasized the "deteriorating" family and others emphasized the family's strength. We end up with a continuum on which the Pollyannas and the Cassandras are the end points. It is important for us to keep in mind, however, that each position has emerged from a review of the same data base. Each person brings to the data a set of values that shapes a perspective, which in turn influences his or her interpretation of the data. Examples that come to mind are statistics on divorce, working mothers, and related child care concerns. One who believes that the family is weakened cites the fact that one in two marriages will end in divorce, a breakup rate that is significantly higher than those of previous periods. Another person analyzes the same data and concludes that divorce is a solution to a problem. According to the latter interpretation, in previous decades, when divorce was unacceptable culturally, legally, and religiously, spouses stayed together only because they had to and, in so doing, often were unable to provide a healthy environment for their children. Similarly, the increase in the percentage of mothers who are entering the labor force when they have children under six years of age can be interpreted as either a plus or a minus for the family. One group interprets this data as a turning away from traditional child rearing functions which will harm the child; others view this trend as both an emancipation of women and as a financial necessity. How one evaluates the trend toward mothers' entry into the labor force may in turn influence whether one sees day care as harmful or beneficial to the child. The research on day care is equivocal, primarily supporting the conclusion that--it depends. Day care can be harmful if the mother wants to stay home but has to work. On the other hand, the child may also be harmed if the mother wants to enter the labor force but cannot. In all instances,

however, we should recognize that data is only pieces of information--indicators--and can be interpreted differently depending on our value orientation.

While emphasizing that one's values inevitably influence one's interpretation of data, I nevertheless must take clear-cut exception to one of Lewis Koch's points. He argued that those who are writing in the area of family policy from a "liberal perspective" tend to be "prophets of doom." This is a totally erroneous statement. If one examines the work of Mary Jo Bane, Carol Stack, Bob Moroney, Alvin Schorr, Kenneth Keniston, Nicholas Hobbs, and Edward Zigler, to name just a few, one has to conclude that families, while under stress, are resilient. Moreover, each of these analysts has made suggestions to support families. We should recognize that we can identify "prophets of doom" and Pollyannas on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Social reality is, in all likelihood, to be found at neither extreme. Most of us can agree that families today are experiencing considerable stress, even if we disagree on the cause of that stress. Most of us would also agree that families tend to be highly adaptive--more adaptive, in fact, than other social institutions--when faced with rapid social change.

Edward Zigler commented earlier that we need to find a common ground, a viable middle road, in our search for an agenda for policies affecting families. To do this, I believe, requires that we move beyond rhetoric, labels, and disagreements. But before turning to those common concerns and themes that might help us shape such an agenda, I first want to address two critiques of the whole concept of "family policy" which have arisen during this conference. The first criticism concerned our tendency to look to Europe for solutions, policies, and overall direction. If by

this criticism we mean that one should not expect to transfer the European experience to the United States, I agree: European experience is suitable to their social structure and to their political economy. However, we can learn from some of the more general strategies Europeans have developed. Most of these countries do not have a "family policy" as such; instead, they have attempted to identify and to analyze how existing social policies affect families and then to formulate new policies to support families. Moreover, most of these countries have focused their analysis around some limited key issues.

European analysts began with the belief that the world of work and the world of family cannot be separated. Each is dependent on the other, each affects the other. This has always been a reality, even when most families relied on a single wage earner. Now that the two-worker family is a feature of modern society, it is even more pressing that this inter-dependency be recognized. The Europeans recognize this phenomenon and are exploring ways to minimize the resulting stress on families. Most European countries also recognize that the raising of children is a societal responsibility rather than solely a family responsibility. For example, one-third of American families are raising 83 percent of all children under 18 years of age. The costs associated with child rearing are, for the most part, borne by these families alone. The question before us is whether these costs (financial, social, and emotional) should be shared by all families, whether they have children or not. According to the dominant view in this country, individuals who decide not to or cannot have children have no responsibility to those families who do bear children. We occasionally hear this argument even in discussions concerning responsibility for financing public education. The Europeans, on the

other hand, tend to follow a human investment framework or resources for the future rationale, whereby children are viewed as the next generation of adults. In this country we are faced with the problem of fewer and fewer adults supporting more and more retirees through our Social Security system and other programs financed through general revenues. If we act on the premise that we who do not have children have little responsibility for those with children, we might find ourselves in the near future being told by these children (who will be in the labor force) that they have no responsibility for us. European policies assume that everyone has to be concerned with the growth and development of children--it is in the public interest that responsibility be shared.

The second criticism of family policy voiced here was that such an endeavor was a "sterile activity" (Koch) in that it did not produce solutions. Moreover, Connie Marshner suggested that "even the notion of family policy is outrageous," in that it is "presumptuous and dangerous." Koch expanded his criticism to argue that the major beneficiaries of the family policy movement were the analysts--the "entrepreneurs of family policy"--a point made by Gil Steiner in his latest work [The Futility of Family Policy, 1981]. The notion of entrepreneurs of family policy needs clarification. If this means that once a demand for a service arose, providers entered the marketplace to meet the demand, then I find the phrasing acceptable. However, if the term is used in a pejorative sense--that those individuals produced nothing of value to families and policy development--I must take exception. The criticism is too far reaching. Moreover, I would suggest that a net cast over these entrepreneurs would, indeed, have to be large. It would include the obvious "liberals," e.g., Zigler, Hobbs, Keniston, Moroney, the four Bush Institutes, and the

less obvious conservatives, e.g., Koch and Steiner, who have become quite visible through their writings on families, and Marshner, who was one of the architects of the Family Protection Act.

Entrepreneur or not, liberal, conservative or New Right, I believe we do agree on some aspects of family policy. A comprehensive family policy is a foolhardy, dangerous, and impossible goal. It would not result in a meaningful product, in that we have such a diversity of families in this country. There is no one dominant family type. There are isolated nuclear families. There are extended families and there are modified extended families. There are families in which both spouses work or in which only the husband works and the wife stays home to care for the children; there are single parent families in which the parent works and others in which he or she stays home; there are families without children. None of these types, however, should be viewed as the dominant or "ideal" family type. No one type is superior to another or should be favored over another, and yet to develop a "family policy" could result in a rigid codification that would implicitly define certain families as normal and others as deviant. I feel that most of us at this meeting would find this unacceptable. With the exception of France, European countries have not attempted to develop a comprehensive family policy.

There might be value, however, in evaluating the impact of policies on family life. Many of the presenters discussed the "Family Impact Seminar" and concluded that this effort has not produced what it set out to do. In part, this might be explained in terms of its initial reliance on the Environmental Impact Statement required by the Environmental Protection Agency. Our experience with this earlier effort demonstrated that whereas economic benefits and costs can be derived, social benefits and

costs have eluded our methodological capability. And yet, analysis of the impact of policies on family life is primarily concerned with social benefits and costs. Still, a number of analysts have argued and demonstrated the value of examining the impact of discrete policies on specific types or classes of families. As more work is carried out, we recognize that a policy might "benefit" one type of family and penalize another. While this approach is much less ambitious than earlier efforts at comprehensive policy analysis, it has value in identifying specific courses of action.

An early example of this approach is the research carried out by Willmott and Young in Bethnal Green, an inner London borough. Immediately following World War II, the British government developed a new mini-town on the outskirts of London to house families who had been bombed out. The planners targeted Bethnal Green, where a significant number of houses had been leveled and the remaining houses were sub-standard. Priority was given to families with young children, and the program was quite successful in improving the physical environment of those who were relocated. Later, we found that these policies unintentionally had negative effects on local neighborhoods, to the point of destroying informal support networks and of weakening the existing extended family, resulting in a higher incidence of social problems and impaired social functioning. Services previously offered by families were later provided by social agencies.

A more recent example was a change in the Supplementary Security Income program. In order to prevent or delay institutionalization, the SSI program in 1976 paid higher benefits to those recipients who were unable to live independently, but were capable of functioning in a

domiciliary care facility. These facilities included foster care homes, family-type settings for fewer than five persons, and even larger group settings. As stated, "the major purpose of foster care is to enable handicapped and elderly persons to live within a family setting."

Payments to these persons averaged $232.00 per month compared to the average SSI payment of $157.70 per month. This policy makes a great deal of sense, building on the principles of normalization and least restrictive envirnoment. Alternatives to nursing home care are encouraged, potentially cutting back on expenditures. However, "the Federal payment will be reduced by one-third if an individual is living in another person's household and receiving support and maintenance from that person." On the one hand, the policy pays more money to stimulate the development of surrogate families, on the assumption that families provide better environments than institutions. On the other hand, the policy reduces the benefit if the recipient is living with, and being cared for by, a relative. Natural families are penalized, while others are paid to function as families.

A final example is the Carter administration's proposed welfare reform plan. Early drafts stated that in some programs the unit of eligibility for services and income grants would shift from the "family" to the "household." If this program had been implemented, many adult children caring for their aged parents (2.5 million elderly, mainly women over 75 years of age and impaired) would be responsible for paying for their medical care, since the household income would make the elderly parents ineligible for Medicaid. The result--an increase in nursing home placements, since the State would then pay for the care.

Issues such as these do lend themselves to policy analysis.

The remainder of this presentation discusses a number of themes that have emerged through the conference.

Theme I: General Paradigms

Paradigms are useful for heuristic purposes, in that policy can be used to organize major positions on key policy issues. Both Rieder and Zigler addressed this in their presentations. In that we are attempting to identify areas of disagreement and agreement, I suggest that we are faced with two ideological paradigms. The first, I call the "old" paradigm. The old paradigm emerged during the 1930s and held center stage for some forty years. Briefly stated, it encompasses four principles:

1. We believed that a succession of group-identified needs warranted public action. This is a variation of the public interest argument and would include programs ranging from public education to social insurance to national health insurance.

2. We believed that family life is enhanced by relief from onerous caregiving tasks. Examples of these policies would include homemaker/home care services for the frail elderly and respite care for parents with mentally retarded children.

3. We believed that large-scale organizations are efficient and responsive in meeting human needs. Aspects of this principle include notions of economy of scale and management.

4. We believed that professional skill is central to service delivery. Examples of these policies are regulations dealing with staffing requirements in day care, nursing home care, and child welfare.

Under the "new" paradigm (emerging in the 1970s):

1. We believe that government efforts to improve the quality of life of individuals and families are undesirable and not benign. This

is a variation of the idea that governmental intervention invariably weakens families by creating dependency.

2. Families should not be relieved of traditional caring tasks as they have under the old paradigm. This is another variation of the dependency notion. Intervention becomes interference and is interpreted by families as a lack of trust in their caregiving capability.

3. Decisionmaking and organizational response should be decentralized --Milton Friedman's argument. This principle assumes that the further away decisionmaking is from those in need, the less sensitive and responsive is the effort.

4. Professionals are suspect in terms of what they can actually do. This is the position of Christopher Lasch and Jacques Donzelot, who argue that professionals are self-serving and invariably dependency creating.

Under the old paridgm, we believed in family integrity and that families recognized their natural obligation to care for one another. We also believed, however, that families were weakened or under stress due to modernization or industrialization. We recognized that shifts in the economy created risks and consequences that negatively affected the quality of family life, and we moved to reduce these risks by creating a floor or safety net.

Under the new paradigm, we believe that too much has been done, that families are spoiled, and that they need to reassume more of the traditional caregiving tasks--even if they do not want to. This position is best exemplified by Sir Keith Joseph's statement (a leading conservative theorist in the United Kingdom) that "when you take responsibilities away from people, you make them irresponsible."

We can reduce this paradigmatic disagreement to one fundamental

question. Under what conditions and for what purposes should government intervene in family life? Conditions is concerned with the issue of when and purposes with ends. Under the old paradigm, government assumes a proactive stance, i.e., to minimize risk and to enhance social functioning. Policies tend to be universal in coverage. Under the new paradigm (actually this paradigm has its roots in poor law ideology and utilitarianism), government assumes a reactive stance, i.e., it only intervenes when there is clearly identified pathology.

We also find disagreements when we look at government intervention. Under the old paradigm, we believed that government is empowered to provide direct services or benefits. However, in a number of instances, we believed that such provision should be the responsibility of the federal government in that state or local government provisions would vary and people might be penalized if they lived in less progressive states. This was the argument for a national social insurance program and the transferring of some public assistance programs (e.g., AB, OAA, APTD-now SSI) to the federal government. Under the new paradigm, we argue that if government is to be directly involved in families, it should be through state and local governments and not through the federal government.

Furthermore, we find some disagreement concerning the appropriate role of the private sector. Under the old paradigm, we believed that the market was not capable of responding to many social needs, that it was imperfect. Given this, government replaced the private market. Under the new paradigm, we believe that the private market is preferable and that when intervention is necessary it should be undertaken by private organizations, including industry, volunteer agencies and, lastly, private not-for-profit agencies. This appears to be the position of the

current administration, with its call for a new voluntarism and a greater role of the private sector. Interestingly enough, this was the position of the Hoover administration in the early days of the Depression. At that time, President Hoover justified the channeling of federal monies to numerous banks but decided that it was unconstitutional to give funds to states, local governments, or individuals, citing Pierce's veto of an act to provide funds to establish mental hospitals. Hoover called on the voluntary sector, especially the United Way, to meet the social needs of people. After a good deal of hard work, the project failed. Channeling money into the private sector did not result in getting these needs met. Of course, Mr. Hoover lost the next election, and President Roosevelt redefined what was "constitutionally appropriate."

Another problem with assuming that the market should meet social needs is that many people, particularly social scientists, assume that "the market" refers to a for-profit system. Many of us look at profit making in this area as somehow immoral. In addition, the market has not demonstrated responsiveness to human needs. One of my concerns is the provision of respite care to families caring for sick or handicapped children. What I found all around the country were middle-class parents who were able to afford respite care, but could not buy respite care, because no one would provide it. The supply and demand theory does not seem always to apply to human service needs, and I think we have to question whether or not the free market can be counted on to respond to the demand.

Each of the presenters touched on these issues. Marshner distrusts the public sector and lacks confidence in its capability to respond. She finds a strong federal involvement distasteful and argues that if there

is to be any public involvement it should be by the states. Therefore, she supports the movement to block grants.

Ellen Hoffman raised the notion of national goals, and Zigler pointed out that there have been disparities among the states in providing human services. Both Hoffman and Zigler argue the need for accountability--whatever the system--but especially as we move to block grants and private sector provisions.

Marshner and Glazer reject the notion of accountability, in that government's historical response has led to a plethora of stifling regulations.

For one group, government involvement has to be reduced to allow for creativity. For the other, such a movement could weaken our national effort to target specific population groups.

Theme II: Labels

Throughout this conference, people and positions have been labeled. These labels have included liberal, progressive, conservative, New Right, left and Moral Majority. I would suggest (as I did earlier) that these labels are not useful and are not defined in the same way by each of us.

As a point of departure, I would like to present what I consider to be a more useful classification system. The British system has had three major parties--each with a clearly different ideological base. The first is the Liberal position, with a strong rooting in laissez-faire economics. This position assumes that nothing is inherently wrong with the free enterprise capitalistic system and that government intervention is dysfunctional in that it always results in a weakening of individual freedom. The classic Liberal argues, further, that when individuals and families have problems they are caused by some inherent pathology or

deficiency. If we were to intervene, it would only make them weaker and create more problems. Social Darwinism is, perhaps, the best explanation of this position. If we refrain from intervention, some people will work out their problems and participate effectively in the economy; those who do not will eventually vanish!

The second position--the Conservative party--recognized the need to humanize the economic system, to develop a buffer by providing corrective measures when families and individuals were no longer productive. However, these attempts to balance individual and collective welfare were grounded in long-standing poor law tradition and 19th-century utilitarianism. People were divided into two groups, those people who needed assistance to survive and the majority of people, who did not. Finally, it was believed that the cause of their problems was either a moral flaw in their characters or some other deficit. Intervention was argued on two grounds--social control by the prevention of civil unrest and the establishment of humane society. Conservatives accept the notion that the State should provide for the basic needs of people when they cannot do so on their own--a minimum standard of living.

The third position--the Labor party--believes that the cause of problems is not to be found in the individual but in the political, social, and economic order. Problems are structural, and government has the responsibility to monitor these systems constantly and to adjust them when required. Unlike the first approach, which argues little or no government intervention, and the second approach, which argues a reactive minimalist government intervention, this approach requires a much more proactive government and moves beyond providing basic needs to maximizing the quality of life for all.

Each of these positions begins with a definition of the causes of problems and leads to different strategies for problem solution. The current approach in the United States is to stimulate the economy by reducing social welfare expenditures. The New Right recognizes that this will cause hardship for some people, but believes that to provide services or benefits to them will only retard economic growth. They have great faith in the "trickling-down theory,"--that all people will eventually be better off, first the rich, and, lastly, the poor. I find it fascinating that the position Connie Marshner presented yesterday--looking at the problems of families in structural terms--is basically that of the radical left in the United Kingdom. Yet, while she accepts a structural definition, she defends the administration's economic laissez-faire solution, a classic Liberal party stance.

The rest of us at this conference, neo-conservatives and liberals (i.e., New Deal, Great Society liberals), probably fall into the British Conservative camp. The programs we have discussed, such as income maintenance, child care, parent education, housing, and employment, are concerned with meeting the basic needs of people. While we may have broadened the definition of basic need, we must recognize that programs are just that and are not efforts at changing the social and economic order. Social policies since the 1930s continue to emphasize a social minimum and are guided by economic concepts, with human services functioning as a "safety net." There is a lovely saying that arose in the United Kingdom when they were trying, after World War II, to develop the new welfare state in England: "Shall we have an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff, or shall we have a fence around the top of the cliff?" The safety net that we have now in this country is really the

ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. What we tend to disagree on is what services and benefits belong in the ambulance.

Theme III: Values

Zigler suggests that we might be able to divide the "right" from the "left" in terms of whether we believe in absolute or relative values. Marshner stated that the New Right is concerned with the just and humane society that is possible only when we return to traditional values. The question we need to address then is: What are these traditional values, and when did society hold them? The assumption is that at one time families were strong because of their values. In my own analysis, I have examined government and other official documents as far back as 1602 and found statements in which each successive generation was crying, in effect, "Woe! woe! woe! the family is deteriorating!" Of course, the perceived cause of the deterioration changed over time. It is likely that every generation, when confronted with some crisis, invariably looked at the family as it then existed, disliked what it saw, and suggested that the deterioration could be reversed if families became more like those of the "past." If we could go back to the Garden of Eden, we would perhaps see the first time that people longed for "the good old days."

Another problem is that each generation might have held up too high an ideal and seen the failure of that ideal as rooted in a different cause. In 1832, the cause of the failure of society and of the family was seen as sun spots. If only we could get rid of sun spots, we could save the family. In 1906, they talked about it in terms of genes. If only we could improve the genetic factors, we could save the family. In our time, we have seen the cause of social problems as the growing welfare state, religion (its presence or absence), and the political economy

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(capitalism or socialism). So we may ask again, what past are we returning to, and which traditional values are we returning to?

The second part of this theme of values concerns the whole question of community norms. Even if this society achieves some consensus on traditional values without finding them in some previous time, will these values be treated as absolute--will it result in a very authoritarian sense of community, requiring adherence by all? Historians have identified periods when communities have proposed particular value sets and patterns of acceptable behavior and established elaborate social control mechanisms to deter "deviant behavior." Do we want to move towards an acceptance of absolute values? Can we really discard notions of pluralism? The notion of community, which I find very appealing, is historically very disturbing. If you haven't read Edward Shorter's The Making of the Modern Family, I think you should, because he shows very graphically what community norms meant in many countries. The price may be more than we are willing to pay.

Our own recent history is replete with examples of our attempts to establish community norms and to deny the existence of pluralism. For example, we question, through our social welfare system, the child rearing patterns of American Indians. What we've done, very effectively, is to tell them they are wrong, they are deviant, and that they must conform to our notions of what child rearing is. If they don't, we remove their children from the reservations and put them in foster care homes or institutions.

Glazer, in his review of demographic shifts, concluded that even if government wanted to do something, it is powerless to do so. I infer from this that he accepts the value of pluralism and that he believes

government should not attempt to shape behavior. Government should, for example, neither encourage nor discourage women from entering the labor force. Government should neither reward nor penalize certain families through the tax system. Government policy should recognize different forms of child rearing and family types and should not attempt to shape all families into one mold. Absolute values would, I believe, move toward conformity.

Theme IV: Professionalism

Koch has suggested that professionals tend to infantalize adults by creating dependency. This position is held by Lasch and Donzelot. Their argument is telling. Donzelot writes of the "colonization" of the family by helping professions when the patriarchal family broke up through modernization. He writes of their "full penetration" of the family, of the "ceaseless technocratic interventionism," of the "continuous surveillance they exercise over domestic life." None of us can ignore this argument, whatever our ideology. Most of our programs do create dependency. Most professionals require dependency (in Parson's concept) to achieve some successful outcome. Some of the participants argue that this is always the case, that it is the nature of professionalization. In my own work, I recently reviewed 1200 articles in terms of how professionals viewed family members when there was a handicapped person in the household [Families, Social Service and Social Policy: The Issue of Shared Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980). These articles covered the fields of medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and social work. The dominant theme was that family members are either the cause of the problem or barriers to successful treatment. A few professionals accepted the family members as part of the helping team, but

only as extenders of the professionals. Fewer still (usually those dealing with mentally retarded children) accepted family members as primary caregivers with professionals supportive to them.

Because of the way human services have been organized and funded in the past, professionals have tended to define problems in terms of the services we have, and they have had to fit people into those services instead of being allowed to step back and be flexible. Those participants here who believe that we can intervene in a supportive fashion, that we can help families develop their own capacities and strategies, need to develop new strategies of their own.

The question of common ground

Based on the discussion over the past few days, it seems that those from the New Right have little in common with those who are labeled "neo-conservative" or "liberal." Their position is clear and, in a somewhat simplistic fashion, can be characterized as follows:

- Traditional values are the only acceptable values.
- Absolute values are preferable over relative values.
- Some family types are to be preferred over other family types.
- The role of the government is to support traditional values.
- The government should not be involved in family life, especially in the provision of benefits and services.

On the other hand, I do find considerable agreement (and some disagreement, of course) between the neo-conservatives and the liberals. Neo-conservative theorists such as Glazer, Kristol, Moynihan, and Bell are concerned with our history of creating dependency. They argue that the human services we have developed and the attitudes of the professionals who deliver these services have resulted in this dependency and continue

to foster it; and they further argue that to continue in our present course helps neither the recipients of the services nor the economic system. I believe that many of us would agree with this diagnosis and would agree also with the neo-conservatives that the more indirect the services and benefits, the more beneficial they are. By indirect services I mean income maintenance, family or children's allowances--any provision that permits the recipient to enter the market to purchase services. Theoretically, this can allow families to develop their own capabilities, because it allows for choice. Many liberals would agree, as long as these "markets" are responsive and do not arbitrarily exclude some people. Some neo-conservative theorists also support the notion of national health insurance. Again, this allows for consumer choice and judgment, and liberals would support such an effort. Other indirect measures mentioned over the past few days included parenthood insurance (Denmark has such a program), maternity leave benefits (France has such a program), constant attendance allowances to families with severely disabled members (the United Kingdom has such a program), tax credits for child care, etc. Basically, the neo-conservatives are saying that there are ways we can intervene without interfering, ways we can create a supportive framework rather than taking over the duties or role of the family.

The disagreement we do find is in the area of direct services. Those of us who believe that services do not have to result in greater dependency must take the responsibility for demonstrating this. I would suggest that a beginning point would be to separate "hard" services from "soft" services. In lumping them together, we are placing ourselves in a difficult position. Under "hard" services I would include day care, respite care, education, and employment. These we can demonstrate are

supportive to families and do not create dependency. Under "soft" services I would include counseling and therapy. I am not arguing that these services always produce dependency, but historically the evidence shows that dependency often results. We need to demonstrate new forms of intervention that enhance growth, that allow for development.

Perhaps we don't know how to solve all the problems of the American family. Let's be a little more humble than we have been in the past. In searching for common ground, I am making a personal plea to liberals and conservatives for the notion of the "gray areas." I think it is in terms of those gray areas that we have some chance of building a consensus. Any stance that denies the existence of gray areas is one which will block the formation of a common agenda for helping families.

APPENDIX I

CONCEPT SUMMARY OF THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981 (S. 1378; H.R. 3955), AS INTRODUCED BY SEN. ROGER JEPSEN, AND A COMPARISON OF THE ACT WITH THE EARLIER VERSION (S. 1808), AS INTRODUCED BY SEN. PAUL LAXALT IN THE 96TH CONGRESS

The following is a concept summary of the current (1981) Family Protection Act and a point-by-point comparison of it with the old Laxalt bill. The material was provided by the office of Sen. Roger W. Jepsen, one of the sponsors of the Family Protection Act of 1981. In a few instances, new or conflicting information was obtained from other sources, and we have indicated this in the form of bracketed notes.

S.M. and M.L.M.

THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT -- 97th Congress

Jepsen-Smith (S.1378; H.R. 3955)

Concept Summary

TITLE I -- Family Preservation

1. Rights of Parents -- Reinforces the responsibility and legal rights of parents to direct the religious and moral upbringing of their children. (Section 101)
2. Parental Notification -- Provides that parents be notified when an unmarried minor receives contraceptive devices or abortion-related services from a federally-funded organization. (Section 102)

[Note: Exceptions and further restrictions are noted in the

adolescent family life program (enacted as section 955 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L. 97-35, and incorporated as Title XX of the Public Health Service Act. For details, see Congressional Research Service Report No. 81-234A, 9 October 1981.]

3. Juvenile Delinquency -- Prohibits the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statutes pertaining to juvenile delinquency. Interstate compacts will be maintained. (Section 103)
4. Child Abuse -- Restricts the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statutes pertaining to child abuse. Revises the definition of child abuse to exclude corporal punishment (spanking) "applied by a parent or individual explicitly authorized by a parent to perform such function." Federal funds for operating a child abuse program are subject to specific authorization from state legislatures. (Section 104)

[Note: Although Jepsen's analysis indicates that his intent is only to sanction spanking, corporal punishment is not defined as "spanking" in Section 104(c), nor is it defined in any way. According to the Congressional Research Service, existing law in virtually every state permits parents and their representatives to administer "discipline reasonable under the circumstances," a privilege which is not denied by the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. Section 104(c) of the FPA thus could be interpreted as sanctioning corporal punishment which is <u>not</u> reasonable under the circumstances, i.e., more severe forms of physical punishment. Although such a change would not affect the enforcement of existing

state or local laws, "unreasonable as well as reasonable corporal punishment would be removed from the purview of programs funded under the (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment) Act." The editors feel that this section would remove a significant extra protection for abused children without adding anything to already existing protections of parental authority.]

5. Spouse Abuse -- Restricts the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statutes pertaining to spouse abuse. (Section 105)
6. Legal Services: Abortion -- Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation seeking to compel abortions, assistance, or compliance with abortion, or funding for abortion. (Section 106)
7. Legal Services: Divorce -- Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation involving divorce. (Section 106)
8. Legal Services: Homosexual rights -- Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation involving homosexual rights. (Section 106)
9. Spouse Allowance -- Reinstates Department of Defense provision that service personnel living separately from their families automatically send home the predetermined "dependent's allowance" for family support. (Section 107)
10. Homosexual Organizations -- Denies federal funds to any organization which uses the funds for the express purpose of advocating homosexuality as a lifestyle. (Section 108)

TITLE II -- Taxation

11. Education Savings Account -- Establishes a savings plan whereby relatives may deposit up to $2,500 tax exempt, per year, to save for a child's education. (Section 201)

12. Tax-exempt Schools -- Schools operated by parents are granted tax exemption if they fulfill certain requirements, and are granted accreditation for all purposes of federal education law. (Section 202)

13. Multi-generational household -- Allows a tax credit of $250 or a tax exemption of $1,000 for each household which includes a dependent person age 65 or older. This provision allows either the tax credit or the tax exemption--not both. (Section 203)

14. Parental Care Trust -- Establishes a trust account procedure similar to the Individual Retirement Account, under which taxpayers can save $1,500 a year for the support of an aged parent or a handicapped relative. (Section 204)

15. Retirement Savings Account for Spouses -- Contributions by an employed person to a savings account for a non-salaried spouse are tax-deductible up to $1,500 a year. (Section 205)

16. Day Care -- A corporation may deduct from taxes its contributions to a joint employee-employer day care facility. (Section 206)

17. Exemptions for Childbirth or Adoption -- Married Couples filing jointly are granted an additional $1,000 tax exemption for the year in which a child is either born or adopted. The exemption increases to $3,000 if the child is born handicapped or if the adopted child is handicapped, over the age of 6, or biracial. Additionally, this provision allows the individual to deduct the amount of adoption expenses paid during the taxable year. (Section 207)

TITLE III -- Education

18. Religion Courses -- Provides a cause of action for parents if an educational institution receiving federal funds prohibits them from participating in decisions regarding their child's enrollment in religion courses. (Section 301)

19. Visitation of Classrooms -- Provides a cause of action for parents if an educational institution receiving federal funds prohibits them from visiting their child's classroom. (Section 301)

20. Teacher Unionization -- Provides a cause of action for individuals if an educational institution receiving federal funds requires forced payment of dues as a condition for the employment of teachers. (Section 301)

21. Reviewing Textbooks -- Provides a cause of action for parents if an educational institution receiving federal funds prohibits parents from reviewing textbooks prior to their use in public schools. (Section 301)

22. Sexism in Textbooks -- Prevents federal funds from being used to promote educational material that denigrates the role of women as it has been historically understood. (Section 301)

23. Teacher Qualifications -- States are ensured the right to determine teacher qualifications unhampered by federal regulations. (Section 302)

24. Attendance Requirements -- States are ensured the right and authority to regulate attendance requirements at public schools without interference from the federal government. (Section 302)

25. Sex-intermingling -- Local schools are given back the authority over sex-intermingling in sports and other school activities. (Section 302)

26. National Labor Relations Board Jurisdiction -- Private schools are

exempted from National Labor Relations Board Jurisdiction. (Section 302)

27. Block Grants -- Most titles of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act are repealed and replaced with block grants of money to states as they deem necessary. (Section 303)

[Note: Many of the titles of ESEA have already been repealed and replaced, effective 1 October 1981, under section 587 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L. 97-35. See also Congressional Research Report No. 81-234A, 9 October 1981.]

28. Release Time for Parenthood Education -- If schools require a course on parenting, parents may arrange for their children to be taught the course by a church or by the parents on a release time basis. (Section 304)

29. Legal Services: Busing -- Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation involving busing solely for the achievement of racial quotas or for desegregation purposes. (Section 305)

TITLE IV -- Voluntary Prayer

30. Guarantees the individual's right to the free exercise of religion, whether in public or in private. Section 401)

[Note: The actual title is more specific; the right which it is designed to secure is the right to participate in group prayers or religious meditation in buildings supported in whole or in part by federal funds, e.g., public schools.]

TITLE V -- Rights of Religious Institutions and Educational Affiliates

31. Federal agencies may not regulate religious activities such as church schools, religious activities, religious youth homes, and ministries of religious institutions. The provision in no way interferes with provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (with respect to race, creed, color, or national origin) or with the authority of local governments to require reasonable fire, health, and safety standards. Exempts religious organizations from regulations of affirmative action, quotas, guidelines, or actions designed to overcome racial imbalance. (Section 501)

TITLE VI -- Jurisdiction

This section outlines the various courts of jurisdiction to which an action under the Act may be brought by an aggrieved party. (Section 601)

COMPARISON OF

THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981

AND

S. 1808 (96th Congress)

The Family Protection Act of 1979 (S.1808) was originally introduced in the United States Senate on September 24, 1979, by Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev).

The Family Protection Act of 1981 was formally introduced in the United States Senate on June 17, 1981, by Senator Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa), and on behalf of Sen. Laxalt, and by Rep. Albert Lee Smith.

The Family Protection Act of 1981 is the product of two years of discussion and recommendations to S.1808. It reflects, in a large degree, a difference in statutory construction and Congressional approach to the concepts presented in S.1808.

Following is a comparison between the Family Protection Act of 1981 and S.1808:

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S.1808 (96th Congress)
1) Rights of Parents--Reinforces the responsibility and legal rights of parents to direct the religious and moral upbringing of their children.	--Declares a legal presumption in favor of an expansive interpretation of parental supervision of religious and moral formation of offspring.
2) Provides that parents be notified when an unmarried minor receives contraceptive devices or abortion-related services from a federally-funded organization.	--Requires that parents be informed when an unmarried minor receives contraceptive appliances, or abortion-related services from a federally-financed clinic. Parents must be informed of venereal disease treatment provided.
3) Prohibits the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statutes pertaining to juvenile delinquency. (Interstate compacts will be maintained)	--Protects the rights of states to enact their own statutes on juvenile delinquency, without pressure from the federal government; and grants automatic tax-exempt status to private associations wishing to provide treatment for juvenile runaways, providing no federal funds are received.

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S.1808 (96th Congress)
4)Restricts the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statutes pertaining to child abuse. Revises the definition of child abuse to exclude corporal punishment (spanking) "applied by a parent or individual specifically authorized by a parent...to perform such function." Federal funds for operating a child abuse program are subject to specific authorization from state legislatures.	--Forbids federal influence from attempting to change any state statute on child abuse; defines child abuse so that spankings are not considered abuse; prohibits the use of federal funds for operation of a child abuse program without specific authorization from the state legislature.
5)Restricts the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statutes pertaining to spouse abuse.	--States that family relationships are beyond the scope of federal influence; protects state statutes on the subject from federal influence; facilitates the establishment of private community associations to provide care and treatment to domestic violence victims.
6)Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation seeking to compel abortions, assistance, or compliance with abortion, or funding for abortion.	--Prohibits funds of the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation seeking to compel abortions, compel assistance or compliance with abortion, or compel funding for abortions.
7)Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation involving divorce.	--Prohibits Legal Services funds for divorce litigation.
8)Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation involving homosexual rights.	--Prohibits Legal Services funds for homosexual rights litigation.
9)Reinstates Department of Defense provision that service personnel living separately from their families automatically send home a predetermined "dependent's allowance" for family support.	--No comparable provision.

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S. 1808 (96th Congress)
10) Denies federal funds to any organization which uses the funds for the express purpose of advocating homosexuality as a lifestyle.	--Forbids allocation of federal funds under any authority from being awarded to any organization, group, or other entity which advocates homosexuality, or presents homosexuality as an acceptable alternative lifestyle.
11) Establishes a savings plan whereby relatives may deposit up to $2500 tax-exempt, per year, to save for a child's education.	--Establishes the Family Savings for Education Plan--a special account which parents could deposit up to $2500, tax-exempt, per year, to save for their children's education.
12) Qualified schools are given tax-exempt status if they fulfill certain requirements, and are granted accreditation for all purposes of federal education law.	--Establishes a separate tax category for parent-run schools, granting them automatic tax-exemption if they fulfill certain requirements, and grants them automatic accreditation for all purposes of federal education law.
13) Allows a tax credit of $250 or a tax exemption of $1,000 for each household which includes a dependent person age 65 or older.	--Allows a tax credit of $250 or a tax exemption of $1,000 for each household which includes a dependent person age 65 or more.
14) Establishes a trust account procedure similar to the Individual Retirement Account under which taxpayers can save $1,500 a year for the support of an aged parent or handicapped relative.	--Establishes a trust account procedure, similar to an Individual Retirement Account, under which taxpayers could save money for their parents' old age support. The maximum deduction from income allowed would be $1,500 per year, per parental support account.
15) Contributions by an employed person to a savings account for the non-salaried spouse are tax-deductible up to $1,500 a year.	--Creates within the Internal Revenue Code a new provision, creating a tax-exempt savings account, a Retirement Savings Plan for spouses. This would allow an employed taxpayer to set aside up to $1,500 a year of non-taxed savings for his non-working spouse.

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S. 1808 (96th Congress)
16)A corporation may deduct from taxes its contributions to a joint employee-employer day care facility.	--Allows a corporation which contributes funds to a cooperative, employee-employer day care facility, to deduct its costs from taxes.
17)Married couples filing jointly are granted an additional $1,000 tax exemption for the year in which the child is either born or adopted. The exemption increases to $3,000 if the child is born handicapped or if the adopted child is handicapped, over the age of 6, or biracial. Additionally, this provision allows the individual to deduct the amount of adoption expenses paid during the taxable year.	--Grants an additional $1,000 tax exemption for married couples filing jointly during the year in which a child is either born or adopted. The exemption increases to $3,000 if the adopted child is handicapped, over the age of 3, or biracial. The exemption may be carried over to subsequent years if it exceeds the tax liability of the couple during year of the birth or adoption.
18)Provides a cause for action for parents if an educational institution receiving federal funds prohibits them from participating in decisions relating to their child's enrollment in religion courses.	--Witholds federal education funds from states which do not have procedures for guaranteeing parental consent as necessary for student enrollment in courses about religion in the public schools.
19)Provides a cause for action for parents if an educational institution receiving federal funds prohibits them from visiting their child's classroom.	--Provides that federal education funds will be witheld if schools attempt to exclude parents from visiting public school classrooms or school functions.
20)Provides a cause for action for individuals if an educational institution receiving federal funds requires forced payment of dues as a condition for the employment of teachers.	--This is a teacher right-to-work provision; it would deny any federal funds to school districts which require public school teachers to belong to a union.
21)Provides a cause for action for parents if an educational institution receiving federal funds prohibits parents from reviewing textbooks prior to their use in public schools.	--Denies federal funds to states which failed to establish a procedure whereby parents and community may review textbooks prior to their use in public schools.

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S.1808 (96th Congress)
22)Prevents federal funds from being used to promote educational material that denigrates the role of women as it has been historically understood.	--Denies federal funds for the purchase of textbooks or other educational materials which belittle traditional women's roles in society.
23)States are ensured the right to determine teacher qualifications, unhampered by federal regulations.	--Ensures the rights of states to determine teacher qualifications, free from influence of federal law or regulation, or blackmail of federal funds.
24)States are ensured the right and authority to regulate attendance requirements at public schools without interference from the federal government.	--Reserves to states the authority to regulate attendance at public schools--and ensures that federal regulation or other coercion shall never occur.
25)Local schools are given back the authority over sex-intermingling in sports and other school activities.	--Would return to local authorities decisions regarding intermingling in sports or other school activities, removing the matter from federal jurisdiction.
26)Private schools are exempted from National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction.	--Exempts private schools from National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction.
27)Titles I, II, III, IV, VII, and IX of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act are repealed and replaced with block grants to states to implement at their discretion.	--Repeals most titles of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and replaces it with block grants of money to states to use for education as they deem necessary.
28)If schools require a course on parenting, parents may arrange for their children to be taught the course by a church or by the parents on a release time basis.	--Ensures that, if schools require a parenthood course, parents may arrange for their children to be taught the course by a minister or church on a release-time basis.
29)Prohibits any funds under the Legal Services Corporation from being used in litigation	--Prohibits Legal Services money for school desegregation litigation.

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S. 1808 (96th Congress)
involving busing soley for the achievement of racial quotas or for desegregation purposes.	
30) Guarantees the individual's right to the free exercise of religion, whether in public or in private. Any individual aggrieved by violation of this title may bring a civil action in the appropriate federal or state court.	--All federal funding under education authority shall be witheld unless state laws are enacted allowing voluntary prayer in public buildings.
31) Federal agencies may not regulate religious activities such as church schools, religious youth homes, and ministries of religious institutions. The provision in no way interferes with provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (with respect to race, creed, color or national origin) or with the authority of local governments to require reasonable fire, health and safety standards. Exempts religious organizations from regulations of affirmative action, quotas, guidelines, or actions designed to overcome racial imbalance.	--Prohibits agencies of the federal government from adopting and enforcing rules which violate the constitutional rights of religious institutions. Bans the imposition of federal regulations affecting religious activities such as church schools, religious homes and other ministries.
32) No comparable provision.	--Removes the jurisdiction of the federal courts from the entire matter of voluntary prayer in public buildings, and from the entire matter of qualifications imposed by states on teacher selection and promotion.
33) No comparable provision.	--Makes it clear that college students may not receive food stamps.
34) No comparable provision.	--Eliminates the current "marriage tax", by eliminating the tax schedule "married filing separately," which currently penalizes married couples with two incomes.

FAMILY PROTECTION ACT OF 1981	S. 1808 (96th Congress)
35)No comparable provision.	--Allows the child care credit for expenses incurred in connection with charitable, civil, political, or religious volunteer work.
36)No comparable provision.	--Writes into law a statement that discrimination against declared homosexuals would never be considered an "unlawful employment practice."

APPENDIX II

POSTSCRIPT ON THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT

During the symposium on "What is Pro-Family Policy?", the proposed Family Protection Act was a frequent subject of debate. What, then, has become of this centerpiece of the New Right pro-family movement's legislative agenda?

On June 17, 1981 a revised version (S. 1378) of the Laxalt version of the Family Protection Act (S. 1808) was introduced by Sen. Roger Jepsen (R) of Iowa and Rep. Albert Lee Smith (R) of Alabama. In response to criticism that parts of the original bill were unconstitutional (see Catherine Ross's presentation), some provisions of the bill were altered or eliminated. For example, the Jepsen-Smith bill eliminates a provision that would have barred homosexuals from protection from discrimination in employment practices. The new version has also softened some legal remedies. While the Laxalt bill would have withheld all of a state's federal funds for education unless state laws were enacted allowing voluntary prayer in public buildings, the new version simply guarantees the individual's right to bring civil action if the schools violate his right to the free exercise of religion.

Nevertheless, as the section-by-section comparison provided by Sen. Jepsen's office makes clear (See Appendix, p. 195), much of the original bill remains intact. The Jepsen-Smith version still contains provisions, for example, which would revise the definition of child abuse to exclude corporal punishment, and would prevent federal funds

from being used for textbooks that denigrate "the role of women as it has been historically understood." The revised bill also contains a provision which would bar Legal Services Corporation funds from being used to assist clients on issues related to divorce, including child support and child custody.

As of this writing (March, 1982), it seems unlikely that Congressional hearings will ever be held on the Family Protection Act as a whole. Yet, as a platform of the New Right, the bill may have been more successful than its legislative tract record would first suggest. Although the Family Protection Act continues to have a low profile in Congress and in the White House, some of its goals have been accomplished through less visible means. Whether as a result of lobbying by the pro-family movement or not, some of the concepts of the Family Protection Act have been enacted as riders to budgetary measures or promulgated as new federal agency regulations:

.Parental notification -- The section of the Family Protection Act which would require that parents be informed when an unmarried minor receives contraceptives or abortion-related services has not passed. But portions of the "Teenage Chastity bill" (referred to in Alan Crawford's presentation), which was renamed the Adolescent Family Life bill (S. 1090) passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35). The new teenage pregnancy prevention programs funded under this legislation (the Adolescent Family Life program) would be required to notify and to obtain the permission of parents before providing services to teenagers, with some important exceptions -- e.g., unless the minor requests treatment for venereal disease, or was a victim of incest, or has an adult relative willing to certify

that the minor would be physically abused if her parents were notified. In addition, grantees under this new legislation are neither allowed to perform abortions nor to make referrals for abortion counseling, unless both the minor and her parent request such a referral.

Through the regulatory process, the Reagan administration has also proposed tightening the requirements for Title X-funded family planning services. When these services were refunded in fall 1981, Congress merely called on family planning projects "to the extent possible...(to) encourage family participation." But new regulations proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services (see Federal Register, February 22, 1982) would mandate parental involvement, forcing a clinic to notify both parents of any minor seeking a prescription for birth control, and to verify that notification had been made. The regulation will go into effect by the end of April 1982, unless opposing public comments are strong enough to reverse the rule.

.Juvenile Delinquency -- We know of no Congressional action on the section of the Family Protection Act which would prohibit the federal government from preempting or interfering with state statues pertaining to juvenile delinquency. Although federal funds for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act have been cut from $100 to $70 million, the preservation of the federal program seems to represent at least a temporary victory for those who favor a federal role in regulating juvenile delinquency. However, the Reagan administration has proposed zero funding for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act for FY 1983.

.Legal Services -- Although we know of no direct action on the portion of the Family Protection Act which would bar Legal Services Corporation funds from being used in litigation involving divorce, abortion, or

homosexual rights, both current and pending legislation already contains some restrictions on litigations related to abortion and homosexuality. For example, the existing Legal Services Corporation Act prohibits litigation which seeks to compel an abortion "contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such individual or institution." In addition, the appropriations bill passed by the House would allow the Legal Services Corporation to provide legal advice related to abortion, but not to get involved in litigation for non-therapeutic abortions. The FY 1982 continuing resolution prohibits the provision of legal assistance "for any litigation which seeks to adjudicate the legalization of homosexuality." Finally, the authorizing legislation pending in the House for the Legal Services Corporation contains a restriction on the use of funds "to promote, defend or protect homosexuality." However, the Family Protection Act is unique in placing restrictions on divorce litigations.

.Adoption -- Portions of the section of the Family Protection Act granting a tax exemption in the year in which a child is born or adopted passed as a part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The new tax provision allows a $1500 execption for the adoption of certain children with special needs. Unlike the Family Protection Act, the law specifically allows single-parent adoption.

.Elementary and Secondary Education Act -- Although the section of the Family Protection Act dealing with repeal of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) has not passed in total, many of the titles of the ESEA have been repealed and replaced by a block grant under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. Although Title I was not included in the educational block grant, it was super-

ceded by a piece of legislation entitled "Chapter I," which among other things eliminates requirements for Parent Advisory Councils and other provisions designed to make Title I accountable to parents. In addition, the Reagan administration has granted $1 billion less for Title I than the $3.48 billion authorized under the Reconciliation Act, and further cuts are proposed for FY 1983.

In short, even if the remaining portions of the Family Protection Act are never acted upon, the combination of block grants, funding reductions, budget riders, and revised federal regulations may accomplish some of the bill's goals. In fact, many of the bill's provisions may have a better chance of being enacted if they are not directly debated. Thus, while the Family Protection Act, like the bulk of the New Right's "social issues," has taken second place to economic measures in the first year of the Reagan administration, many of these budgetary polices, implicitly if not explicitly, amount to a social policy. What we have seen is not a moratorium on the New Right pro-family movement's legislative agenda, but rather a moratorium on a full public debate of that agenda.

S.M. and M.L.M.